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Abstract 
In this thesis, I investigate the function of Original Sin in W. H. Auden‘s political philosophy 
during and after the Second World War. The analysis is twofold, with a theoretical bridge. In 
the first chapter I consider the role of Original Sin in Auden‘s understanding of fascism, 
liberalism and democracy during the early 1940s, based on a reading of selected prose (1939-
48) as well as two long poems Auden wrote in the early 40s: ―New Year Letter‖ (1940) and 
―For the Time Being‖ (1941-42).  Drawing on a theoretical framework developed by Roger 
Griffin in his study of modernism and fascism, I show how Auden‘s religiously grounded 
political philosophy in general, and his notion of the time being in particular, underpins his 
rejection of totalitarian apocalypticism. In the second chapter I bring in the theoretical 
perspective of political philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose concept of action sheds light on 
the time being as well as providing a useful conceptual framework for my analysis in the third 
chapter. In chapter 3 I investigate Auden‘s poem sequence Horae Canonicae (1949-54) in 
light of the findings from the previous chapters, with focus on its central theme of the act or 
crime and its portrayal of beginnings and ends. I demonstrate how a reading of the poems in 
light of 1) Auden‘s political philosophy from the 1940s onwards and 2) Arendt‘s theory of 
action reveals new insights into Auden‘s understanding of Redemption or the Last Judgment.   
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Preface and acknowledgments 
I first fell for Auden in a library in Connecticut. It happened during the Fall semester of 2010, 
on the near-deserted third floor of the University of Connecticut library, Storrs Campus. I, like 
many in my generation, had first come to know of Auden through the movie Four Weddings 
and a Funeral (1994), where the character Matthew (John Hannah) gives a beautiful and 
understated reading of the poem ―Stop All the Clocks.‖ The next encounter had been just as 
much of a coincidence, when one of Oslo‘s cheap chain bookstores inexplicitly happened to 
have one volume of Another Time (1940) on sale for 30 NOK. It was lucky that Another Time 
should have been the first collection of Auden‘s poetry that I read; unlike the Collected Poems 
it includes two of Auden‘s most famous, but later to-be-discarded poems; ―Spain, 1937‖ and 
―September 1st, 1939.‖ These two rhetorically powerful poems contributed to a firm first 
impression of Auden as someone who – also – had something to say about politics: ―Find 
what occurred at Linz / What huge imago made / A psychopathic God‖ along with lines like 
―None can live for long / In an euphoric dream; / Out of the mirror they stare, / Imperialism‘s 
face / And the international wrong.‖ The same collection – a jackpot, really – also contains 
Auden‘s elegy to W. B. Yeats, in which he not only writes that ―poetry makes nothing 
happen,‖ but that the role of poetry is, ―In the prison of his days / Teach the free man how to 
praise.‖   
But back to the library in Connecticut: on that near-deserted third floor I found, among 
other works, a first edition of The Shield of Achilles (1955). I opened it on a random page and 
read the curious, casual poem ―Vespers.‖ Casual, that is, until its very last lines, where the 
speaker states that ―…without a cement of blood (it must be human, it must be innocent) no 
secular wall will safely stand.‖ I didn‘t understand what it meant. This, I believe, was the true 
beginning of my fascination with Auden‘s poetry – a mystery. I found nothing in the poem to 
explain why a civilization – even ―our dear old bag of a democracy,‖ as Auden writes, adding 
insult to injury – by necessity should have to be founded on innocent blood, nor why anyone 
would end a poem on a statement like that, and then seem to move on as if nothing had 
happened. The quest for an answer led me to the sequence Horae Canonicae, which again led 
me to discover and then try to figure out Auden‘s Christianity, which eventually led me to the 
topic of this thesis, broadly described: Original Sin in Auden‘s political philosophy. Needless 
to say, it has been a process in several stages, during which I have had a lot of help from a lot 
of people. 
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Introduction 
―Democracy is hard,‖ writes the poet W. H. Auden in a book review in October 1939.  ―I do 
not think that democracy can be sustained or defended unless one believes that pride, lying, 
and violence are mortal sins, and that their commission entails one‘s damnation.‖2 Eight 
months later, in an address to college students, he states that while it is ―tempting in this 
terrible crisis, which may quite conceivably end in temporary disaster, to believe that it is due 
to the sudden appearance of some unusually wicked men. This is too simple. Man is lazy, 
impatient, and wicked at all times.‖3 These statements demonstrate quite explicitly what 
Auden believed at this point, namely that democracy did not work unless people were 
convinced of the reality and seriousness of sin, at all times. Coming from an author who had, 
during the 1930s, become famous for his anti-fascist political commitment as much as for his 
poetic virtuosity, statements like these were bound to raise some eyebrows. 
This is a thesis about ideas as much as it is about poetry. More specifically, it is a 
thesis investigating the ideas of a poet, in poetry and prose, during a time of political crisis. 
W. H. Auden was a poet for whom ideas meant a great deal, including in his writing. Randall 
Jarrell noted that ―Ideas, theories, dialectic are material for him as they have been material for 
few other poets; he uses abstractions, sets of ideas, astonishingly naturally and well…in his 
poetry.‖4 According to Edward Mendelson, Auden used his poetry ―to comprehend the world 
he shared with his audience.‖5 The world that Auden shared with his audience, however, has 
changed. As one critic notes, religion, for instance, ―no longer occupies the same securely 
central place in contemporary discourse. Many of those who in earlier generations would have 
felt some obligation to attend to such matter no longer feel it.‖6 
As religious belief becomes not only impossible but inconceivable for many people 
who would form Auden‘s natural contemporary constituency of readers, it would be a 
serious loss if it also became impossible to grasp how much his religious thought is 
bound up with his…poetic language. [Auden‘s] ideas about poetry and about religion 
are never very far from each other.
7
   
In this thesis, I read Auden‘s poetry and prose with the aim to ―comprehend the world he 
shared with his audience,‖ and to comprehend Auden‘s own idiosyncratic world-view.  
                                                 
2
 W. H. Auden, ―Democracy is Hard,‖ Collected Prose Volume II (1939-38), ed. Edward Mendelson (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.), 28. Hereafter Prose II.  
3
 Auden, ―Romantic or Free?‖ Prose II, 68. My emphasis.  
4
 Randall Jarrell, Randall Jarrell on W. H. Auden, ed. Stephen Burt with Hannah Brooks-Motl (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), 70. 
5
 Edward Mendelson, Early Auden (New York: The Viking Press, 1981), xiv. 
6
 Sean O‘Brien, ―Auden in Prose,‖ in W. H. Auden in Context, ed. Tony Sharpe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 335. 
7
 O‘Brien, ―Auden in Prose,‖ 335-336. 
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Original Sin 
Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made. – Immanuel Kant 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I delve into what Auden ―saw in‖ Original Sin, its ―content‖ 
and relevance for his politics, in copious detail. I refer to this chapter for a more 
comprehensive investigation into its meaning and use in Auden‘s writing. Nevertheless, a 
short presentation of what Auden understood by Original Sin, and how he connected it to 
politics in the first place, is in order. References to sin, sinfulness, the Fall and Original Sin 
appear frequently in Auden‘s prose and poetry throughout the forties, but nowhere does he 
provide one unequivocal definition. In his unpublished manuscript of prose ―pensées,‖ The 
Prolific and the Devourer, he writes that sin is ―consciously to act contrary to self-
interest….the only generalization we can make with certainty is the universality of guilt.‖8 
This view is echoed in a couplet from New Year Letter: ―To sin is to act consciously / Against 
what seems necessity.‖9 The Fall of Man, he continues in the pensées, ―does not mean that 
there was once a time when he did no evil, only that there was once a time when he did not 
sin… [The Fall] is repeated in the life history of each individual, so that we have a double 
memory of Eden, one from personal experience and one social-historical.‖10 In his poetry, 
some of the clearest expressions of his view of the human condition appear in poems written 
during the early years of the Second World War: 
 
 …lest we should see where we are, 
 Lost in a haunted wood, 
 Children afraid of the night, 
 Who have never been happy or good. (―September 1st, 1939.‖)  
 
 Alone, alone, about a dreadful wood 
 Of conscious evil runs a lost mankind. (For the Time Being. 1941-42)  
 
These quotes give an idea of Auden‘s understanding of sin. Sin, simply put, expresses itself in 
―conscious evil,‖ it is ―universal‖ and ―repeats itself in the life of each individual.‖ In fact, 
one of the most concise descriptions of what Auden meant by original sin is found in another 
stanza from ―September 1st, 1939‖:  
 
 The error bred in the bone 
                                                 
8
 Auden, Prose II, 427. 
9
 W. H. Auden, New Year Letter (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), Ll. 608-9. Hereafter NYL.All quotes from 
New Year Letter are from this source, unless otherwise stated.  
10
 Auden, Prose II, 427. 
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 Of each woman and each man 
 Craves what it cannot have, 
 Not universal love 
 But to be loved alone. 
 
In a 1941 review of a work by the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, whose influence on Auden 
will be discussed further in chapter 1, he writes that the ―most brilliant passages‖ in Niebuhr‘s 
book are those that deal with the nature of sin and stating, at the same time, that ―No Christian 
doctrine is more unwelcome to the modern liberal than that of Original Sin.‖11 Sin is also 
sometimes referred to in terms of rebellion, as when Auden writes, in an essay about detective 
stories, that ―every murderer is the rebel who claims the right to be omnipotent. His pathos is 
his refusal to suffer.‖12 In the same essay Auden muses that the typical reader of detective 
stories is, ―like myself, a person who suffers from a sense of sin.‖13 
One reason why Auden never concisely (or un-contradictorily) defines Original Sin 
was, perhaps, because he could assume, at the time of writing, that his audience was likely to 
be sufficiently familiar with the idea. In case this should no longer be so, I will in the 
following give a summary presentation of the term. 
Alan Jacobs writes that Original Sin must not be confused with the ―fatal choice‖ or 
flaw familiar from ancient Greek tragedies; a ―choice that sets in motion vast irresistible 
forces of retribution.‖14 In Reinhold Niebuhr‘s words, Original Sin was not an inherited 
corruption, but should rather be understood as an ―inevitable fact of human existence, the 
inevitability of which is given by the nature of man‘s spirituality.‖15 The Christian 
understanding of sin, Niebuhr significantly emphasizes, involves the conviction that evil is 
―inextricably bound up with good‖ and that the ―possibilities of evil grow with the 
possibilities of good.‖16  
  The most well-known passages on Original Sin in the Bible come from Paul‘s letter to 
the Romans. Sin ―dwells in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good 
thing….‖17 Among other things Paul complains, in a line of thought picked up and 
paraphrased by Auden, about the paradox that ―knowing the good‖ does not mean either 
willing or doing it. ―For the good which I desire, I don‘t do; but the evil which I don‘t desire, 
                                                 
11
 Auden, Prose II, 134. 
12
 Auden, Prose II, 265. 
13
 Auden, Prose II, 269. 
14
 Alan Jacobs, Original Sin (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), xi. 
15
 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper & Brother Publishers, 1935), 90. 
16
 Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 97. 
17
 Rom 7:17, 7:18   
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that I practice…while I desire to do good, evil is present.‖18 All of creation, in Paul‘s writing, 
is fallen, awaiting redemption through Christ. ―As through one trespass, all men were 
condemned; even so through one act of righteousness, all men were justified to life.‖19 
The first thinker to develop the doctrine of Original Sin into a cohesive body of 
teachings, and a significant influence on Auden, was the church father Augustine of Hippo, 
famous for his Confessions, in which he recounts his youthful sins. Augustine was especially 
concerned with the ―forking and branching of his will,‖ and his fundamental judgment about 
himself is that he is ―internally divided, driven here and there by multiple pressures and 
desires.‖20 In Augustine‘s teaching Adam and Eve, having been created with free will, ―chose 
to disrupt the perfectly good order established by God,‖ and as a result of the Fall, ―all human 
beings are heirs to the effects of Adam‘s original sin, and are vessels of pride, avarice, greed 
and self-interest.‖21  
Jacobs points out that the ―deeper malady‖ of human life, according to Augustine, was 
that of cupiditas, or ―the orientation of the human will toward its own gratification‖ as 
opposed to caritas, ―divine love, which Augustine defined as ‗the movement of the soul 
toward God.‘‖22 Augustine believed in predestination: ―For reasons known only to God, He 
has predestined some fixed number of men for salvation…while most He has predestined for 
damnation as a just consequence of the Fall.‖23 Auden often quotes Augustine, and was 
especially interested in his reflections on the acte gratuit, which Auden describes as ―neither 
reasonable nor physically pleasant, but a pure assertion of absolute self autonomy.‖24 The 
desire to commit such acts reveals, for Auden, something essential about human nature, 
namely the desire for complete autonomy, which for him is the same impulse that drove Eve 
and Adam to eat from the Tree of Knowledge.  Auden‘s favorite among Augustine‘s 
confessions was the latter‘s ironic insight into the true character of his repentence; Auden 
paraphrased this saying in a poem as ―I am sorry I‘m not sorry… / Make me chaste, Lord, but 
not yet.‖   
 
 
                                                 
18
 Rom 7:19, 7:21 
19
 Rom 5:18. 
20
 Jacobs, Original Sin, 27. 
21
 J. Mark Mattox, ―Augustine‘s Political and Social Philosophy,‖ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ISSN 2162-0002, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aug-poso/ (Accessed 11.10.2013) 
22
 Jacobs, Original Sin, 26. 
23
 Mattox, ―Augustine‘s Political and Social Philosophy.‖ (Accessed 11.10.2013) 
24
 Auden, Prose II, 229. 
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Materials: Prose 
Auden‘s prose texts constitute an important body of source material for this thesis. I have 
mainly relied on the Collected Prose Volume II (1939-48) and Collected Prose Volume III 
(1949-55), referred to as Prose II and Prose III throughout the text. It has been necessary to 
make a careful selection. As Sean O‘Brien puts it, Auden wrote and ―immense quantity‖ of 
prose, spanning four large volumes.
25
 One reviewer claims that Auden ―must have been 
writing even while taking a shower.‖26 The texts vary from essays, book reviews, essay 
collections, lecture transcripts and one critical monograph titled The Enchafèd Flood.  Auden 
tended to use occasional essays (as he did with occasional poems) as an excuse to write at 
length about whichever topic occupied him most at the time. Complex metaphysical 
arguments could turn up thinly disguised as book reviews. An exasperated Randall Jarrell 
wrote that ―…purple patches, heartfelt confessions, and memorable feats of dialectical 
ingenuity reach their highest concentration in reviews of minor theologians.‖27 This is at the 
same time what makes Auden‘s prose such a rich source of insight. The primary essays 
discussed in this thesis are listed below. They have been selected according to their relevance 
for the main topics of the thesis; they deal with theology in general and (original) sin in 
particular; comment on fascism, totalitarianism, Hitler and the war; discuss the nature of evil 
and the nature of ―man,‖ or the nature of love and Agape. For the analysis in the third chapter 
I have focused on essays containing discussions of (natural and historical) time, forgiveness, 
the Redemption, the community and the city. When referring to essays published in the 
magazine Encounter, I have used the magazine‘s archives, which are conveniently accessible 
online. These have also been reprinted in Prose IV. The decision to use the online archive was 
pragmatically motivated: the print-outs were lighter to carry. I have assumed they might also 
be easier to access for any interested readers. When referring to the essay collection The 
Dyer’s Hand and the commonplace book A Secondary World, I have used the original 
volumes, for the same reason.  
 
Important essays are listed on the next page. 
 
                                                 
25
 O‘Brien, ―Auden in Prose,‖ 329. 
26
 Jeffrey Hart, ‖How good was Auden?‖ The New Criterion Vol. 15 (1997), 59. Available online: 
https://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/howgoodwasauden-hart-3394   
27
 Jarrell, in Randall Jarrell on W. H. Auden, 89. 
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From Collected Prose II 
 ―A Great Democrat‖ (March 1939) 
 ―Effective Democracy‖ (May 1939) 
 ―The Prolific and the Devourer‖ (Summer 1939) 
―Christian on the Left‖ (September 1939) 
―Democracy is hard‖ (October 1939) 
 ―Jacob and the Angel‖ (December 1939) 
―Against Romanticism‖ (February 1940) 
―Romantic or Free?‖ (August 1940) 
―Mimesis and Allegory‖ (1940) 
―Criticism in a Mass Society‖ (1941) 
―Tract for the Times‖ (January 1941) 
―A Note on Order‖ (February 1941) 
―James Joyce and Richard Wagner‖ (March 1941) 
―Yale Daily News Banquet Address‖ (March 1941) 
―The Means of Grace‖ (June 1941) 
 ―Eros and Agape‖ (June 1941) 
―Ambiguous Answers‖ (June 1941) 
―La Trahison d‘un Clerc‖ (January 1942) 
―Lecture Notes I-V‖ (November 1942) 
 ―Vocation and Society‖ (Early 1943)  
―Purely Subjective‖ (Summer 1943) 
―A Preface to Kierkegaard‖ (May 1944) 
―Augustus to Augustine‖ (September 1944) 
 
 From Collected Prose III 
―Nature, History and Poetry [A]‖ (19xx) 
―Nature, History and Poetry [B]‖ (19xx) 
―Nature, History and Poetry [C]‖ (19xx) 
―The Things Which Are Caesar‘s‖ (19xx) 
―Introduction to The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard‖ (19xx) 
―Balaam and the Ass‖ (19xx) 
 
From Encounter 
 
―Hic Et Ille‖ (1956) 
―The Fallen City‖ (1959)  
―Thinking What We Are Doing‖ (1959) 
 
Note: When citing important essays, I will provide the titles in footnotes. Otherwise, I will 
simply refer to the collected prose volumes.  
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Materials: Poems 
New Year Letter 
The poem ―New Year Letter‖ was written during the early months of 1940 and first published 
in the U.S., in the collection The Double Man (March 1941). In May the same volume was 
published in England with the title New Year Letter.
28
 Both volumes consisted of a 
―Prologue‖; the 1707-line poem ―New Year Letter‖; 82 pages of commentary, short poems 
and quotations called ―Notes to Letter‖; the sonnet sequence ―The Quest‖; and an ―Epilogue.‖  
The ―Prologue‖, ―The Quest‖ and the ―Epilogue‖ were all reprinted as independent poems in 
later collections.
29
 ―The Quest‖ has been left out of consideration in this thesis, as has the 
―Prologue‖ and ―Epilogue.‖ The focus here is on ―New Year Letter‖ and the ―Notes.‖ All 
references in this thesis are from the 1941 British version, New Year Letter, for two important 
reasons: This publication, unlike the Collected Poems (1994), provides line numbers, and the 
―Notes‖ to the letter are left out of Collected Poems entirely. For the sake of simplicity and 
readability I have used the italicized form New Year Letter or the abbreviation NYL in my 
references. I use line numbers when referring to ―New Year Letter‖ and page numbers when 
referring to the ―Notes.‖  
  New Year Letter was dedicated to one of Auden‘s close friends in New York, the 
fifty-six-year-old Elizabeth Mayer, wife of an expatriate Jewish psychiatrist. Mayer was a sort 
of mother-figure to Auden, as well as a ―real exile‖ and a patron of the arts, who opened her 
home to artists such as Auden and Benjamin Britten to live and work there, to the annoyance 
of her own children.
30
 Auden addresses Mayer directly several times in the poem, calling her 
a ―dear friend‖ who: 
 
…on the lives about you throw 
A calm solificatio. 
A warmth throughout the universe… 
[…] We fall down in the dance, we make 
The old ridiculous mistake 
But always there are such as you 
Forgiving, helping what we do.
31
 
 
                                                 
28
 John Fuller, W. H. Auden: A Commentary (London: Faber and Faber, 2007), 319. 
29
 The titles of the three in the 1945 Collected Poems were, respectively, ―Spring 1940,‖ ―The Quest‖ and ―The 
Dark Years.‖  
30
 Fuller, A Commentary, 320; Mendelson, Later Auden 101. 
31
 NYL, ll. 1694-96; 1699-1703.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ―solificatio‖ means a ―radiating 
warmth as from sunshine.‖ Their only example quotation is from ―New Year Letter.‖  
(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/184269?redirectedFrom=solificatio#eid) 
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―New Year Letter‖ consists of three parts of varying lengths. It is written in octosyllabic 
couplets, and falls most easily into the category ―discursive verse.‖ The 1700+ lines allow 
Auden to ―range eclectically through distant epochs and conflicting ideas,‖32 building a work 
which is part lighthearted metaphysical treatise, part ―nutshell political theory‖ with the 
―pragmatic philosophical discoveries of a great talker thrown in for good measure.‖33 Michael 
Murphy has written thoughtfully about the neoclassicism of the poem, and its debt to the 
Augustan verse epistle.
34
 He draws attention to how the flexibility of verse letter conversions 
allows Auden to engage with issues as wide-ranging as the experience of exile, Marxist and 
Freudian theory and the language of quantum physics.  
 The opening lines of ―New Year Letter‖ set the tone of Auden‘s verse discursion: 
―Under the familiar weight / Of winter, conscience, and the State…‖35 The ―Letter‖ to 
Elizabeth Mayer takes the form of a digressive meditation on the ―situation of our time,‖36 
from one exile to another. It draws on Auden‘s wide knowledge of history, art and 
philosophy, and includes a range of quotes in German, French, Italian, Latin and Greek – all 
falling ―neatly into metrical step at Auden‘s command,‖37 more or less correctly spelled. In 
the first and shortest part, Auden presents a ―tribunal‖ of literary ―Great masters‖ by whom he 
imagines himself to be assessed, the three most important of which are Dante, Blake and 
Rimbaud. The historical situation ―surrounds us like a baffling crime,‖ and he enlists the help 
of his literary influences in order to not only understand the ―grand apocalyptic dream,‖ but to 
avoid the ―temptation to surrender‖ to it.38 In the second part, he delves into the metaphysical 
and moral puzzles facing him and everyone else now that the ―scrambling decade‖ of the 30s 
is over: ―[O]ur lives have been co-eval / With a political upheaval,‖ he reminds the reader, 
with reference to the Russian Revolution, and goes on to remind us of his own former 
political sympathies as well: ―Some dreamed, like students always can, / It realized the 
potential Man. […] We hoped, we waited for the day / The state would wither clean away, / 
Expecting the Millenium / That theory promised us would come; / It didn‘t.‖39 The central 
question for the former revolutionary enthusiast is how to face his disappointment, admit his 
mistakes and find a new framework for his (political) philosophy without seeking ―atonement 
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in reaction.‖40 Part II largely takes the form of an imagined philosophical argument with the 
Devil, portrayed as trying to tempt the speaker into overly dualistic reactions to the 
disappointments and failures of his former political life. This gives an indication of another 
topic of central importance in ―New Year Letter,‖ namely Auden‘s newly adopted 
Christianity. Murphy points out that the poem, while dialectic and discursive in tone, moves 
in the direction ―not of rational argument but…the uncertainties and doubts of faith.‖41 
Mendelson calls ―New Year Letter‖ Auden‘s Faust, with Mephistopheles (the Devil is also 
referred to by Auden by that name) as the continual threat and tempter and the only ―solution‖ 
an ―eternal process,‖ a state where one must ―daily regain [one‘s] life and freedom.‖42 The 
third and longest part of ―New Year Letter‖ spans out into lengthy reflections on time, Hell, 
Purgatory, industrialism, mass-production, the ―Economic Man,‖ Auden‘s childhood in 
England (―what I did when I was young‖), the Ego and the Unconscious, modernity, war and, 
well, etcetera
43
.   
In my discussion of the poem for this thesis, I am especially interested in what Auden 
has to say about ―conscience‖ and the ―State‖ (Or: his conviction of Original Sin and its 
relation to his understanding of totalitarianism and liberal democracy) during the winter of 
1939-40, in the shadow of the Second World War.  The passages selected for discussion are 
therefore the ones addressing the ―situation of our time,‖44 and the ones most relevant to the 
argument under construction concerning the relationship between religion and politics in 
Auden‘s thought during the historical ―crisis‖ of the Second World War.   
 
For the Time Being 
Auden composed his Christmas Oratorio For the Time Being in the winter 1941-42, and 
originally intended for it to be set to music. He and Benjamin Britten even began to discuss 
the oratorio as a musical collaboration, but the completed text – about fifteen hundred lines – 
turned out far too long to be sung. Eventually, the text of the Oratorio was published in the 
1944 collection For the Time Being. The text referred to in this thesis is that in Collected 
Poems (1994). The Oratorio consists of nine parts, which correspond to the traditional 
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ninefold gospel account of the Nativity celebrated in church festivals and medieval drama.
45
 It 
opens with a chorus describing a society in the grip of winter and war: ―Darkness and snow 
descends‖ and ―The evil and armed draw near.‖46 The apathy and apprehension captured in 
the opening lines are interrupted by a Narrator, who appears throughout the poem in several 
guises, at times sounding like the head of a government PR team, at other times more 
hesitantly and doubtfully as an anonymous ―average man.‖  The historical situation of the 
Oratorio is unclear. The ―Temptation of St. Joseph‖ takes place in a well-lit bar, the 
Shepherds are, as Auden explained in a letter to his father, a kind of ―city-proletariat,‖47 and 
Herod self-identifies as a ―liberal.‖ In addition to the characters mentioned so far, the poem 
gives ―speaking parts‖ to the Wise Men, Mary, Gabriel, Simeon, the Soldiers (who are sent to 
massacre the first-borns), a variety of choruses and, as a matter of fact, to what C. G. Jung had 
called the ―four faculties‖: Intuition, Thinking, Feeling and Sensation.  All the characters 
speak in different verse and prose forms. In my own analysis, I focus on the prose 
monologues of Herod and Simeon, the first of which effectively parodies what Auden saw as 
―secular, humanist liberalism,‖ and the second of which have been called a ―condensed and 
exhaustive statement of Auden‘s religious position at the time.‖48 I also refer to parts by the 
Chorus and the Narrator, often expressing existential and historical anxiety, and emphasize a 
crucial aspect of the ―Temptation of St. Joseph.‖  
 
Horae Canonicae  
The poem sequence Horae Canonicae, which I turn to in the third chapter, consists of seven 
poems Auden wrote between the years of 1949 and 1954. They were published as a whole in 
the collection The Shield of Achilles (1955), but some of them had previously been published 
individually. The poems are based on the Divine Office, also known as the Liturgy of the 
Hours or canonical hours, and refer to a series of prayers recited at fixed hours throughout the 
day. The seven poems in Auden‘s sequence borrowed their titles from seven of these prayers: 
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Prime, Terce, Sext, Nones, Vespers, Compline and Lauds. The prayers traditionally 
correspond to the events of Good Friday, and their main purpose is to induce reflection upon 
the Crucifixion. As Fuller notes, Auden drafted ―many tables of septenary categories‖ during 
the period of these poems‘ composition.49 Some of these are reproduced in Later Auden, and 
the way in which the prayers are tied to corresponding historical, social and physiological 
categories can be quite complex. Ultimately, however, in the published version of Horae 
Canonicae, ―only a fraction of this program remained.‖50 I have therefore chosen to disregard 
these charts in order not to force my interpretations into an unnecessarily narrow framework. 
In the overview below, I have listed the hours to which each of the poems correspond, their 
years of composition and their publication history. The poems are listed in the order in which 
they appear in Horae Canonicae. 
Title  Hour  Time of Composition  First Published 
Prime  (6 a.m.) August 1949   Nones (1952) 
Terce  (9 a.m) October 1953   The Shield of Achilles (1955) 
Sext  (Noon) Spring 1954   The Shield of Achilles (1955) 
Nones  (3 p.m.) July 1950   Nones (1952) 
Vespers (6 p.m.) June 1954   In Encounter Magazine (Feb 1955) 
Compline (9 p.m.) Spring 1954   The Shield of Achilles (1955)  
Lauds  (3 a.m.) 1952*    The Shield of Achilles (1955)  
  
The texts referred to in this thesis are the ones printed in Collected Poems (1994). For the 
sake of readability, and to distinguish the sequence as a whole from the individual poems, I 
consistently italicize the sequence title, Horae Canonicae.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
My thesis project originates in a paper presented at the conference Modernism, Christianity 
and Apocalypse during the summer of 2012. The premise of the conference was that the 
modernist imperative ―Make it new!‖ posits a break with not only traditional artistic forms, 
but also with the entire mould of a civilization felt to be in a state of terminal decay (‗an old 
bitch, gone in the teeth‘, in the words of Ezra Pound). Modernism was ―steeped in the 
language of apocalyptic crisis, generating multiple (and contradictory) millennial visions of 
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artistic, cultural, religious and political transformation.‖51 At the same time, what has been 
described as the ―political religions‖ of the twentieth century (Stalinism, Fascism, Nazism) 
―promulgated their own revolutionary visions of Apocalypse and a secular Kingdom. […] 
These alternative salvation histories…were undeniably linked to their paradigm in the 
Christian tradition.‖52  
Accordingly, my project has been informed by two overarching theoretical 
frameworks, which have lent direction to my thesis. One concerns the role of Christianity 
within modernism, while the other explores the link between modernism and fascism. These 
theoretical perspectives have shaped my choice of topic and interpretative strategies; 
introduced me to relevant research and methodological practices; and directed my attention to 
basic questions concerning period definitions (―isms‖) and ―canonized‖ critical perspectives. 
The following introduction to and outline of these frameworks should be considered as a 
theoretical and methodological backdrop to my own investigation, placing it within a wider 
critical landscape concerning modernism, Christianity and fascism.  
Modernism and Christianity 
Auden is among the ―modernist converts‖ to Christianity. His Christian framework of ideas, 
and his interpretation of the Christian concept of Original Sin was, as I will argue, adopted 
(and adapted) as a conscious response to fascism. Auden‘s appropriation of the concept of 
Original Sin, in particular, forms the basis of much of his political philosophy from 1940 and 
onwards. In the recently published work Modernism and Christianity (2014), Erik Tonning 
defends the view that ―Christianity is intrinsic to any coherent account of Modernism,‖ and 
that ―any theoretical, historical or critical discussion of Modernism that neglects of minimizes 
[the impact of Christianity] is inevitably flawed.‖53 Tonning claims, further, that a 
fundamental task for ―Modernism and Christianity‖ as a field of study is to chart and 
document how the ―active, unavoidable, formative tension between modernism and 
Christianity manifests itself from case to case,‖ and calls for ―dense, historical context, 
archival research and biographical and textual details.‖54 My investigation of Auden, which 
begins with an analysis of the function of Original Sin related to what Auden himself 
                                                 
51
 Quoted from the description/program poster of the conference, available here: 
http://modernismchristianity.org/events/18-20-july-2012-modernism-christianity-and-apocalypse/ (Hereafter: 
MCA conference poster.) The term ―political religion‖ has been used, among others, by Emilio Gentile. See 
―Fascism as Political Religion,‖ Journal of Contemporary History 25: 2/3 (1990), 229-251.  
52
 MCA conference poster. 
53
 Erik Tonning. Modernism and Christianity (London: Palgrave, 2014), 1. 
54
 Tonning, Modernism and Christianity, 5.  
13 
 
understood as the distinctly modern phenomena of fascism and totalitarianism, contributes 
one such case study of how Christianity manifested itself and impacted on a modernist 
author‘s central concerns and poetic practice. I argue that my thesis manages to reconstruct 
the kind of ―dense, historical context‖ that Tonning calls for, effectively charting and 
thoroughly documenting one modernist‘s appropriation of Christian concepts and ideas as 
well as assessing the function of those concepts and ideas within his political philosophy.  
Modernism and Fascism 
One aspect that becomes important in my research into Auden‘s metaphysical political 
philosophy is his perception(s) of time. Auden‘s adoption of the doctrine of Original Sin leads 
him towards an understanding of Redemption or the Last Judgment which, I will argue, is 
linked to a rejection of what one can call totalitarian apocalyptic utopianism. In this argument 
I draw on the theoretical perspectives of certain scholars working within a field that can be 
referred to, for the purposes of this thesis, as ―Modernism and Fascism.‖ These scholars have 
a common interest in the parallels between modernism in the arts and the ―political 
modernism‖ of the fascist movements in the first half of the 20th century.55 In the following I 
will present some aspects of their theories which have proven particularly relevant for my 
thesis. 
One of the earliest proponents of the idea that parallels between artistic and ―political‖ 
modernism were to be found, was the literary critic and English Professor Frank Kermode, 
who in a series of lectures published as The Sense of an Ending (1967) explored the links 
between ―apocalyptic fictions‖ in the arts and ―apocalyptic utopianism‖ in revolutionary 
political movements. Kermode argues that several major modernists, including Yeats and 
Eliot, were aesthetically and philosophically invested in apocalyptic visions: That the sense of 
living in the ―end of an era,‖ with contemporary society diagnosed in terms of decadence and 
disintegration, permeates modernist works. The sense of an ending, Kermode writes, is ―as 
endemic to what we call modernism as apocalyptic utopianism is to political revolution.‖56 
Kermode is interested in how the aesthetic paradigm of apocalypse functioned in modernist 
art, and how that paradigm had parallels in the political sphere. In other words, he establishes 
an analogy rather than any direct relation between the aesthetic and the political sphere. He 
makes sure to distinguish, therefore, between poetic fictions and politicized myths; 
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nevertheless, he asserts that modernist radicalism involves ―the creation of fictions which may 
be dangerous in the dispositions they breed towards the world.‖57  
 Another major contribution to the field is Roger Griffin‘s Modernism and Fascism: 
The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (2007).
 58
 Griffin, whose field of 
expertise is the history of fascism and its ideological dynamics, takes Kermode‘s essay as his 
starting point to build a wide-ranging, synoptic study of modernism and fascism. Griffin, like 
Kermode, identifies a sense of ―permanent transition and crisis‖ as pervading literary and 
cultural modernism, and is interested in its ―correlatives‖ in the political realm. Griffin‘s 
theory rests on the assumption that the sense of an ending described by Kermode was 
accompanied by an equally strong, and related, sense of a beginning; of regeneration and 
rebirth. The term apocalyptic can be said to describe, after all, ―a sense [of] imminence about 
[a] great upheaval‖ to come; the apocalypse is ―the scenario whereby we now go from this 
evil and corrupt world to the redeemed one.‖59 In Griffin‘s framework, it is the image of the 
―redeemed world,‖ what he calls a ―temporalized utopia…created within historical time,‖ 
which constitutes the ―core myth‖ of fascist movements.60 The term he coins to describe this 
myth, as an ideal type, is palingenesis: The myth of social, national or collective rebirth or 
regeneration.
61
 
Griffin understands modernity as a ―secularizing and disorienting force‖; one 
identified with a ―qualitative change in the experience of time‖; and one increasingly 
perceived, from the mid-nineteenth-century and forwards, through the trope of ―decadence‖ 
rather than that of ―progress.‖62 To classify or describe the change in ―experience of time‖ he 
draws on a typology first presented by Kermode, where the latter distinguished between 
chronos (―ordinary clock-time‖), kairos (a point of time ―filled with significance, charged 
with meaning derived from its relationship to the end‖) and aevum (a time ―neither temporal 
nor eternal…in which things can be perpetual‖).63 Griffin prefers a simpler distinction 
between Cronus (the ―monstrous incarnation of human time‖) and aevum (―transcendental 
time‖, including moments of kairos). Modernity entailed, according to Griffin, a wide-spread 
experience of time as cronic; dreary, monstrous and devoid of significance. Correspondingly, 
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he sees modernist movements as (often) motivated by the ambition to re-instate or recreate the 
experience of sacred, significant, transcendental time: The ―quest for temporal 
transcendence.‖64 
Similar to Kermode‘s distinction between poetic fictions and politicized myth , Griffin 
distinguishes between epiphanic and programmatic modernism. Whereas the former sought, 
often in strictly aesthetic terms, to cultivate ―special moments‖ of transcendence of a ―purely 
inner, spiritual kind,‖ programmatic modernism expressed itself as a ―mission to change 
society, to inaugurate a new epoch, to start time anew.‖65 It is in the latter sense that Griffin 
describes political movements such as National Socialism as examples of ―political 
modernism.‖ For programmatic and epiphanic modernists alike, however, modernity had 
begun to be identified, above all, in terms of decadence. Whereas the Enlightenment 
promoted a belief in human progress, by the mid-nineteenth century ―the practical effects on 
European society‖ of the French and industrial revolutions had ―undermined the myth of 
progress to a point where for many among its cultural elites modernity lost its utopian 
connotations and began to be constructed as a period of decline, decay, and loss.‖66 Epiphanic 
modernists tried to achieve the momentary suspension of Cronus by passing through ―the still 
point of a turning world,‖ while Programmatic modernists generally aimed at a revitalization 
or cleansing of those modern, decadent societies. In either case, in Griffin‘s words, 
modernism can ultimately be summed up as ―the revolt against decadence,‖ one ―intensely 
politicized form‖ of which emerged in fascism.67 He therefore arrives at a ―shorthand‖ 
definition of fascism as 
[A] revolutionary species of political modernism originating in the early twentieth 
century whose mission is to combat the allegedly degenerative forces of contemporary 
history (decadence) by bringing about an alternative modernity and temporality (a 
‗new order‘ and a ‗new era‘) based on the rebirth, or palingenesis, of the nation.68 
Kermode emphasized the myth of transition in the apocalyptic, or eschatological, 
imagination; the sense of living in an end-time, soon to be succeeded by a new age, which 
turns into a sense of perpetual transition, perpetual crisis. In response to this crisis, according 
to Griffin, fascism would ―literally make history. Its belief that a doomed form of modernity 
was ending was dialectically related to a heightened sense of a new beginning.‖69  
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The art critic Mark Antliff has cast the fascist approach to time even more specifically 
in terms of opposition/resistance to capitalist modes of time; the ―pervasive rationalization of 
time under capitalism and the subsequent breakdown of older cultural patterns as the capitalist 
system of time became universalized.‖70  In response to the capitalist ―disenchantment‖ of 
time, fascism sought to ―infuse time with qualitative value.‖71 This factor becomes especially 
important when we consider the revolutionary character of fascist movements. Antliff quotes 
Griffin‘s claim that a revolution is ―a moment when a mythically charged ‗now‘ creates a 
qualitative change in the continuum of history, which is to be distinguished from 
undifferentiated ‗clock time.‘‖72 The mythically charged ‗now‘ would be described by 
Kermode and Griffin as, respectively, ―kairotic‖ and ―aeval.‖ In revolt against modernity‘s 
―perpetual crisis,‖ and in commitment to a utopian goal, fascist movements became dependent  
on a ―perpetual revolution‖ in order to preserve/achieve a permanent sense of transcendent 
time, the ―mythically charged ‗now‘.‖   
These perspectives on modernism and fascism investigate the parallels between artistic 
modernism and fascist movements, and identity a common ground in the 1) perception of time 
under modernity as cronic, ordinary and un-transcendental, and the resulting quest for 
―temporal transcendence,‖ 2) the revolt against the perceived ―decadence‖ of contemporary 
society, and 3) the shared belief that ―temporal transcendence‖ could indeed be achieved by 
humans within historical time, whether by ―epiphanic‖ or ―programmatic‖ means. Fascism is 
distinguished by its revolutionary character, its mission to bring about a ―new epoch‖ in 
historical time based on national rebirth, and its commitment to violent destruction of those 
―enemies‖ onto whom modern decadence had been projected. 
I draw on these theoretical perspectives in my investigation of Auden‘s religiously 
informed rejection of totalitarian and fascist politics. As I will argue, Auden‘s adoption of 
Christian beliefs involves a shifting of the eschatological horizon into the beyond, to be 
realized only with the coming of a redeemer. I then use these perspectives as a backdrop to an 
exploration of Auden‘s concept of the time being, the conditions of the Now and human 
action. I will show that Auden‘s time being is fundamentally incompatible with any 
perceptions of time that allows for the conception that history can be ―made‖ or that Paradise, 
the Millennium, The Thousand Year Reich, Parousia – whichever expression is used – can be 
made a reality within the frames of secular, historical time.   
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Auden and Hannah Arendt 
In chapter 2 of my thesis, which constitutes what I have called a ―theoretical bridge‖ between 
my two main analytical chapters, I introduce the political philosopher Hannah Arendt‘s theory 
of action. This constitutes, of course, a theoretical perspective in its own right, and one that 
will be applied in my analysis in chapter 3. The affinities between Auden and Arendt have 
started to receive attention only in recent years, and two contributions should be mentioned. 
Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb has written a monograph titled Regions of Sorrow: Anxiety and 
Messianism in Hannah Arendt and W. H. Auden (2003), in which she presents a thorough 
analysis of Arendt‘s and Auden‘s responses to the ―historical disasters‖ of the twentieth 
century.
73
 Secondly, a conference was arranged in April 2012 with the aim of investigating 
the links between Auden‘s poem ―The Age of Anxiety‖ and Arendt‘s body of writing: Poetics 
of Anxiety and Security: the problem of speech and action in our time. Homi Bhabha on 
Auden and Arendt.
 74
 Gottlieb restricts her analysis of Auden to his The Age of Anxiety (1949) 
and the poem ―Canzone‖ (1942). She points out that an ―explicit discussion of Auden‘s 
complicated commitment to Christianity‖ is absent from her study.75 She suggests, too, that 
For the Time Being would be the place to start for such a discussion. My own exploration of 
Arendt‘s theory, therefore, carried out in the interest of shedding light on the ―time being‖ as 
portrayed in For the Time Being, can be read as a first attempt to make up for this absence.   
On Methods 
The contemporary critic has two primary tasks. Firstly he must show the individual that 
though he is unique he has also much in common with all other individuals, that each life is, 
to use a chemical metaphor, an isomorph of a general human life and then must teach him 
how to see the relevance to his own experience of works of art which deal with experiences 
apparently strange to him… 
 And secondly the critic must attempt to spread a knowledge of past cultures so that his 
audience may be as aware of them as the artist himself, not only simply in order to appreciate 
the latter, but because the situation of all individuals, artists and audience alike, in an open 
society is such that the only check on authoritarian control by the few, whether in matters of 
esthetic taste or political choice, is the knowledge of the many.
76
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Some of Auden‘s ideas did, at the outset, appear a bit strange. What does Original Sin have to 
do with democracy? It was clear that, in order to understand the connections between 
philosophy, politics and religion in Auden‘s intellectual framework, not to mention the way 
these links appear in and influence his poetry, I would have to reconstruct the historical and 
intellectual context in which Auden‘s ideas took shape. I have read Auden‘s prose texts in 
order to reconstruct the arguments, dilemmas and convictions which, at any given time, 
informed his poetry. Approaching the poems with the intent of identifying and making sense 
out of potential political views, I have found these prose texts extremely helpful: often, Auden 
will transport an argument developed in an essay, practically intact, to a poetic passage he is 
working on at the same time – or vice versa; an idea first played around with in the poetry will 
find polemical or didactic shape in a review. In order to carry out this part of the analysis, I 
have also relied on a range of previous criticism concerning Auden in general and Auden‘s 
religious and political ideas in particular.  
The label that lies closest to my methodological practice as outlined so far is arguably 
that of New Historicism. In a recent publication within the Modernism-Fascism field, 
Matthew Feldman refers to the ―new historicist‖ turn within modernist studies as 
characterized by an insistence upon, above all, ―theorizing from a position of empirical 
accuracy.‖77 This approach also places heavy stress, as he explains, upon ―authorial presence 
and historical contextualization.‖78 My argument is underpinned by thorough readings of 
Auden‘s prose, as solidly documented throughout the thesis.  These readings are 
supplemented by references to historical figures and works by which Auden was 
demonstrably influenced, notably The Nature and Destiny of Man by the contemporary 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. As such I have striven to achieve a measure of empirical 
accuracy, as well as emphasizing authorial presence and historical contextualization. Feldman 
further explains how he uses a methodological approach first formulated by the historian of 
fascism, George Mosse, simply described as the attempt to ―see how people then understand 
the world [sic]‖ in a process of ―methodological empathy.‖79 I could say the same of my 
investigation into Auden‘s belief; I try to understand them on Auden‘s own premises. While 
Auden‘s turn to Christianity and its connection to fascism is generally well documented, I 
could borrow Feldman‘s expression, I am ―coloring in‖ Auden‘s interpretation of Christian 
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doctrines such as Original Sin and the Last Judgment, and their exact role in his rejection of 
totalitarian politics.  
To my knowledge, Erik Tonning the only one who has applied an interpretative 
approach to a close reading of Auden‘s prose and poetry.. Whereas Tonning‘s analysis of 
Auden enters into a comparison with T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, which furthermore makes up 
one part of a larger (and highly innovative) study of modernism and Christianity, my analysis 
is solely focused on Auden, allowing me to delve into Auden‘s intricate systems of ideas in 
further depth. It has, moreover, allowed me allowed me to extend the scope of my analysis to 
one of Auden‘s central sequences written after the Second World War, Horae Canonicae 
(written 1947-1955). As a sequence that involves a meditation upon the Crucifixion, Horae 
Canonicae forms a natural counterpoint to Auden‘s Christmas Oratorio, For the Time Being, 
which is discussed in the first chapter.  
In chapter 2, I bring in the theoretical perspective of political philosopher Hannah 
Arendt, known for her pioneering analysis of totalitarianism. Arendt‘s theory of human action 
from her major work The Human Condition bridges the analysis of Auden‘s writing during 
the early forties (chapter 1) and the interpretation of Horae Canonicae in chapter 3. In the 
discussion of Arendt‘s theory and its relevance for Auden in chapter 2, my approach varies 
slightly from the two other chapters. Rather than accounting for direct influence between 
these two thinkers (although we know that they became mutual influences on one another), I 
will construct something more like an intellectual parallel; using a distinction borrowed from 
Richard Shorten, I am interested in affinities rather than influence.
80
 As a theoretical bridge, 
the chapter relies on the understanding of Auden‘s framework of ideas as developed in 
chapter 1, and prepares for the analysis of Horae Canonicae in chapter 3. More abstract than 
the two others in tone, it reveals its full relevance once Arendt‘s concept of action is 
employed in my interpretation of Horae Canonicae. As I will show, Arendt‘s theory brings 
out crucial nuances of Auden‘s Christian eschatological vision, which becomes especially 
important when the implications of that vision are contrasted with the eschatological hopes 
embedded in totalitarian ideologies.  
Finally, my interpretative approach could be described, with a term first developed by 
the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, as ―thick description‖: the essential task, in his words, is 
―not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick description possible, not to generalize 
across cases but to generalize within them.‖81 In other words, I make no claims as to the 
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representativeness of Auden as a literary modernist invested in Christianity, nor do I carry out 
comparisons between Auden and other modernist writers. What I have attempted to do is to 
present Auden as a case of a literary modernist consciously adopting Christian dogma to 
formulate an anti-totalitarian political vision.  
Auden noted his own ―reproach‖ to the use of unique historical events and persons in 
universalizing generalizations in one of his ―Shorts,‖ originally appearing in the notes to NYL:  
 
'Hard cases make bad law,' as the politician learns to his cost: 
Yet just is the artist's reproach; 'Who generalizes is lost.'
82
 
 
I make no claims to ―make law.‖ Rather, I hope to supply a ―thick‖ individual case in all its 
richness. As such, I hope my case study of Auden, a ―hard case‖ perhaps, but an immensely 
rewarding object of study nevertheless, may contribute to the field of Auden studies as well as 
to the wider fields of Modernism and Christianity and Modernism and Fascism. 
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1 Apocalypse Deferred: Original Sin in W. H. Auden’s 
Anti-Totalitarian Vision  
Auden‘s ―studiedly casual‖ use of the phrase ―original sin‖ in a 1939 review ―marked 
a watershed in his prose.‖83 It also came to form the crux of his political ideas. In this chapter 
I will investigate the function of Original Sin in Auden‘s analysis of liberalism and fascism 
during the early 1940s, and the role it played in his vision of what it would ultimately take to 
resist totalitarianism. As Auden saw it, the failure of liberalism to prevent the rise of Hitler 
was due, in the last instance, to its fundamentally misconceived idea of human nature as 
inherently virtuous. Fascism, in his view, embodied a disillusioned reaction to the underlying 
premises of liberalism, but also against the experience of modern temporality. Drawing on 
Roger Griffin‘s theory of the palingenetic nature of fascism, I will present Auden‘s alternative 
vision of society as an elaborately constructed response to, and rejection of, the time-defying 
and apocalyptic tendencies he saw as inherent in totalitarianism. The chapter draws on 
Auden‘s prose writing from the 1940s, as well as excerpts from the long poems New Year 
Letter (1941) and For the Time Being (1944). Justin Replogle has argued that ―all of Auden‘s 
major forties works are variations on the view of human existence introduced in New Year 
Letter.‖84 For the Time Being has been described as ―the fullest and most balanced expression 
of Auden‘s religious attitudes‖ with earlier religious ideas and images placed in ―an ordered 
whole.‖85 In these works Auden draws up, against the apocalyptic backdrop of an escalating 
world war, the poetic framework of his religious convictions.  
1.1 The outlaw and the liberals 
In a 1941 review titled ―Where Are We Now?‖ W. H. Auden wrote: ―The rise of Hitler, the 
outlaw, to power is a phenomenon that can never be sufficiently studied.‖86 In Auden‘s 
writing, Hitler had become a central figure, not just as a threat to liberal civilization, but as a 
troubling symptom of a modern, misdirected system of metaphysics unwilling to come to 
terms with the source of human evil. The logic exhibited by Hitler‘s ideological stances, and 
the reception of Hitler as a sort of secular Saviour and prophet to the German nation both 
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seemed representative of an underlying set of attitudes that, in Auden‘s view, could be traced 
back to Romanticism.
87
 Romantic idealism had provoked a disillusioned pessimistic reaction, 
out of which emerged the ―political romanticism‖ he saw as characteristic of National 
Socialism. This merits some explanation. 
Romanticism derived its power, according to Auden, from its ―double faith, first in the 
possibility of realizing Unity and Equality on earth, and secondly in the intrinsic goodness of 
the physical world.‖88 This idealism had, in the field of politics, ―stimulated demagogy and 
the woolliest kinds of humanitarianism from which the reaction into the worship of brutality 
and bureaucracy is now only too obvious.‖89 Elsewhere, he is even more direct: ―Like 
Rousseau, liberal capitalism began in the belief that all individuals are equally free to will, 
and just as Rousseau died a Catholic, so the masses, disillusioned, are beginning to welcome 
the barrack life of Fascism, which at least offers security and certainty.‖90  
One thing ―liberal capitalism‖ and fascism had in common, to Auden‘s mind, was the 
abandonment of a notion of the unconditional: ―[the view] that there is nothing which is 
unconditionally required, nothing for which one is in some sense or another eternally damned 
for doing or not doing.‖91 Liberalism, with its Enlightenment heritage of commitment to the 
faculty of Reason, invested itself in the human capacity to arrive at truth by their own efforts. 
It had successfully wielded the weapons of ―skeptical rationalism, pragmatism [and] 
naturalism‖92 against the ―old orders‖ of tyranny and ignorance. However, a challenge arose 
once the Enlightenment‘s ―own‖ intellectual and scientific disciplines started bringing the 
objectivity of reason itself into question (as in the theories of Freud and Bergson), or 
challenged the values of humanism (accused by Marx of concealing class interests, and 
further called into question by Nietzsche). Unless the existence of unconditional truths and 
values are assumed, Auden writes, all truths must be viewed as relative. In that case, 
liberalism has few ideological defences against alternative political systems that claim a better 
ability to provide material security, or against the outlaw who claims that ―social stability can 
only be secured by coercion.‖93 Confronted with a movement that explicitly denied freedom 
and equality for all, how could liberalism defend the superiority of ideals that could neither be 
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proven to be absolute, nor provide the results they promised? The historical importance of 
Hitler, Auden concludes, is to have ―pushed liberalism to its logical conclusion.‖94  
Among the misconceptions that liberalism in Auden‘s view had inherited from 
Romanticism, the most important was the notion of human innate goodness, i.e. that ―man‘s 
essential nature is uncorrupted.‖95 The danger in this optimistic conception of human nature 
derived, among other things, from its denial or misinterpretation of ―opposing evidence.‖ This 
in turn prepared the ground for a pessimistic counter-reaction which under the conditions of 
modernity could have catastrophic results. Under liberal capitalism, which in Auden‘s view 
had produced ―the most impersonal, the most mechanical and the most unequal civilisation 
the world has ever seen,‖96 any claim that the ―good life‖ was equally available to all was 
patently absurd. While technological progress had created an economy of abundance that in 
theory made an ―open society‖ possible, different social classes moved towards this open 
stage at different speeds.
97
 This inequality would, as Auden saw it, reproduce the dangerous 
dualism of optimism and pessimism described above. The ―Ins,‖ or the ―proper and 
conventional / Of whom this world approves,‖ (CP: 367) would tend to identify the ideals of 
Freedom, Truth and Justice with the current state of affairs. The ―Outs,‖ perceiving this 
―ideological pretention,‖ would on the other hand be disposed towards denying or rejecting 
such ideals altogether,
98
 as when the token poor shepherds in For the Time Being sing: 
―feeling the great boots of the rich on our faces / We live in the hope of one day changing 
places.‖ (CP: 384)  
The distinction between the ideal types of the ―open‖ (modern) and ―closed‖ 
(traditional)
99
 societies is important in Auden‘s analysis of contemporary disillusionment with 
liberal optimism. Whereas the individual‘s role in the static, traditional society had been a 
function of the external environment, the modern individual had to seek and recognize her 
own peculiar vocation, a predicament Auden refers to as ―subjective requiredness.‖ As a 
consequence, the ―external causal necessity of matter [had been transformed] into the internal 
logical necessity of moral decision.‖100 In New Year Letter, Auden writes that:  
[T]he machine has cried aloud 
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And publicized among the crowd 
The secret that was always true 
But known only to the few, 
Compelling all to the admission 
Aloneness is man‘s real condition.101  
 
Open, differentiated, modern societies had, as Auden saw it, revealed to an unprecedentedly 
broad range of people a certain arbitrariness of traditional ways of life, and of traditional 
beliefs and values. Many of yesterday‘s cognitive footholds had been eroded by the ―skeptical 
rationalism…and naturalism‖ referred to above. In New Year Letter Auden refers to Darwin, 
for instance, as one of those ―who brought an epoch to a close… brought / Man‘s pride to heel 
at last and showed / His kinship with the worm and toad / And order as one consequence / Of 
the unfettered play of chance,‖102 thereby exposing ―Man‖ to a new sense of the chaos and 
contingency of existence. Marshall Berman later described this experience of contingency and 
indeterminacy as ―the sense of being caught in a vortex where all facts and values are whirled, 
exploded, decomposed, recombined; a basic uncertainty about what is basic, what is valuable, 
even what is real.‖ 103 Modern society had, in a sense, democratized existential anxiety.  
 Once an awareness of Auden‘s ―subjective requiredness‖ had been achieved, there 
could be no turning back.  The individual was now aware that ―his position in life is no longer 
a real necessity; he could be different if he chose.‖104 Any attempt to abolish such choice and 
recreate the conditions of ―objective requiredness,‖ Auden concluded, would have to come 
about through artificial stimulation orchestrated by the state, as when ―a Pseudo-Nature of 
imaginary objective dangers, Jews, plutocrats, communists, foreigners, [is] consciously 
manufactured by the State which in the end, of course must provide real ones, the Police and 
finally War.‖105  
In Auden‘s analysis, the experience of modern vertigo and isolation had combined 
with the disillusionment with liberal politics and humanist ideals to create a twin impetus—
widely shared among the modern masses—to get rid of the democracies of the 1920s and 30s. 
In the ―political relationship of the impassioned leader and the impassioned masses‖ that had 
clearly contributed to the appeal of National Socialism, Auden saw a return ―to a collective 
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and political myth of Eros,‖106 an attempt to escape or drown the insecurities of modern life 
through totalitarian politics: Since modern man and woman ―cannot lose the sense that they 
are individuals[,] they can only try to drown that sense by merging themselves into an 
abstraction, the crowd.‖107 In this context, Hitler‘s appeal was practically messianic. 
Auden saw in Fascism a ―Socialism that has lost its faith in the future.‖108 Modern 
historians, on the other hand, have come to emphasize precisely the futural orientation of 
fascism; its revitalizing, palingenetic dimension. One such perspective has been offered by the 
historian of fascism Roger Griffin. Griffin was the first to formulate a theory of fascism that 
emphasized what he refers to as its ―core myth‖ of palingenesis. Palingenesis, derived from 
palin (again, anew) and genesis (creation, birth), refers to ―the sense of a new start or of a 
regeneration after a phase of crisis or decline which can be associated just as much with 
mystical (for example the Second Coming) as secular realities (for example the New 
Germany).‖109 As I will argue, the theory of the futural or millennial quality of fascism may in 
fact shed light on Auden‘s analysis, not least on the alternative vision of society he eventually 
developed. According to Griffin, Hitler can be understood as a kind of modern propheta, a 
term originally used to describe 15th century radical, charismatic figures on the fringes of 
crisis-ridden societies, who together with their followers were intent on turning instances of 
particular upheaval ―into the apocalyptic battle, the final purification of the world.‖ 110 
Nazism, defined by Anthony Stevens as a ―new religion born out of social disintegration and 
the compensatory emergence of a charismatic leader,‖ presented itself as a radical break with 
the past, embodying a ―revolutionary vision of history‘s total regeneration.‖ 111 Griffin finds 
considerable evidence for the significance of the regenerative and revitalizing aspects of 
National Socialism in his work.
112
 The unique blend of ideas represented by the German Nazi 
Party (NSDAP) was, he argues, ―harnessed to the vision of a national palingenesis within a 
new order… [and] led by a man onto whom [sic] widespread popular longings for redemption 
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and a new sacred canopy [replacing the pre-modern Christian horizon] could be projected, 
Adolf Hitler…‖113  
[National Socialism] functions as a vehicle for secular transcendence, for the re-
embedding of society, for national regeneration, and for... cultural and ethnic 
cleansing… It was the projection onto Hitler of this temporalized utopia of a purified 
society created within historical time that lay at the heart of the Hitler cult, and 
allowed him to embody the propheta leading his new community through its collective 
rite of passage into the new world beyond decadence and decay.
114
  
As an antidote to modern despair and decadence, that is, Hitler promoted cleansing and 
national rebirth. This rebirth was to be achieved through an acceleration of social crisis into a 
cathartic ―holy war‖ bringing the advent of the ―new [order] of peace, harmony and 
justice.‖115 In the Notes to New Year Letter, Auden calls Fascism‘s slogan ―Now or Never. In 
demanding a dictator it is really demanding the advent of the Good Life on earth through a 
supernatural miracle.‖116 The ―projection of a temporalized utopia‖ on to the figure of Hitler 
could be seen as an attempt to evoke or activate such a ―supernatural miracle.‖  
One way to understand National Socialism, then, is as a revolutionary movement 
aiming to bring about the total regeneration of society by provoking a secular apocalypse. To 
elucidate this project Griffin, drawing on the work of Frank Kermode, employs the notion of 
Cronus—―monstrous human time‖—and the contrasting belief in Aevum—sacred, 
transcendental time.
117
 The fascist project of bringing about a secular Utopia through holy 
war, according to this view,  can be seen as rooted in a fundamental human drive to ―escape‖ 
secular (mortal, ―monstrous‖) time, not unlike Auden‘s theory of despairing moderns trying to 
―lose themselves‖ in fascism.118 Griffin‘s interpretation of the millenarian promise of National 
Socialism in terms of human vs. sacred time—its ―time-defying‖ dynamic or its will to 
―embody a new transcendent temporality‖119— may serve to clarify and illuminate Auden‘s 
alternative vision for society. To Auden, in the forties, humans were fundamentally unable to 
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achieve such transcendence by their own efforts; transcendence lay beyond the realm of 
human affairs and could as such only be approached in terms of faith, bestowed by divine 
Grace.  This view, as we shall see, was rooted in the conception of the inherently sinful nature 
of human beings.  
 
1.2 Self-love and Sin  
―The power by which, without blinding himself to his anxiety, [man] is nevertheless still able 
to choose, is religious faith.‖120 
Auden‘s writing in the early 40s is informed by the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. As 
Auden explained in a 1944 review, Kierkegaard approached the study of human nature and 
existence from the individual‘s immediate experience as a subject, and as such, the ―basic 
human problem is man‘s anxiety in time.‖ A human being is defined as ―a being who 
becomes[;] a conscious being who at every moment must choose of his own free will out of 
an infinite number of possibilities which he foresees.‖121 Having an existential stake in the 
outcome of one‘s actions, however, can make the self-aware individual‘s existence an agony 
of choices—comparable to that threatening experience of time that Griffin labels Cronus. 
―Infinite‖ choice entails an infinite possibility of failure: in a finite existence, the 
incongruence between the irrevocability of action, the uncertainty of an action‘s outcome, and 
the ever-present availability of alternative choices manifests itself in anxiety for the reflective 
individual.  
The onrush of modernity had exacerbated this ―cronic‖ condition of anxiety. In the 
work of the contemporary theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, however, Auden found an 
interpretation of human nature that moved beyond its agonizing paradoxes. To Niebuhr, 
anxiety is an inevitable side-effect of ―the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is 
involved,‖122 but from his point of view the real issue is not anxiety, but the sinfulness of 
human attempts to escape it. The problem of anxiety is thereby subordinated to the problem of 
sin.
123
 Niebuhr sees human evil as a consequence of man‘s refusal ―to acknowledge his 
dependence, to accept his finiteness and to admit his insecurity, an unwillingness which 
involves him in the vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity from which he seeks to 
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escape.‖124 The human ability to transcend one‘s situation and regard it from a distance, while 
allowing him to envision other and more virtuous ways of life, also tempts man to 
megalomania and persuades him ―to regard himself as the god around and about whom the 
universe centres.‖125 In practice, Niebuhr concludes, humans ―always mix the finite with the 
eternal and claim for themselves, their nation, their culture, or their class the center of 
existence. This is the root of all imperialism in man.‖ 126 Crucially, this means that human evil 
is inextricably intertwined with the capacity for good. ―The Christian view of evil is so 
serious… because it places evil at the very centre of the human personality: In the will.‖127  
In Auden‘s Christmas Oratorio, For the Time Being, humans‘ misuse of their will and 
their freedom is explicitly stated as the cause of the Fall of Adam and Eve. Describing the Fall 
during the Annunciation to Mary, the angel Gabriel delivers the following lines: ―Eve, in love 
with her own will, / Denied the will of Love and fell… Adam, being free to choose, / chose to 
imagine he was free / To choose his own necessity.‖ (CP: 359-60) The play on the words 
―will,‖ ―love,‖ ―choose,‖ and ―free‖ here amounts to a Niebuhrian argument about mistaking 
the finite for the eternal and claiming one‘s right to literal self-determination. The law of 
human nature, Niebuhr states, is ―love.‖ When man tries to make himself the centre and 
source of life, this law is violated. ―His sin is the wrong use of his freedom and its consequent 
destruction.‖128 Spiritual imperialism and escapism are, in other words, considered the two 
vectors of human sinfulness in Niebuhr‘s schema. Elsewhere he uses the expressions pride 
and sensuality: ―Man falls into pride, when he seeks to raise his contingent existence to 
unconditioned significance; he falls into sensuality, when he seeks to escape from his 
unlimited possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of self-determination, 
by immersing himself into a ―mutable good,‖ by losing himself in some natural vitality.‖ 129 
In New Year Letter, Auden portrays the modern, anxious subject as oscillating 
between these two varieties of sinfulness. The first is embodied in the Ego, who ―looks upon 
her liberty / Not as a gift from life with which / To serve enlighten and enrich,‖ but rather ―as 
the right to lead alone / An attic-life all on her own, / Unhindered, unrebuked, unwatched, / 
Self-known, self-praising, self-attached.‖130 Upon discovering the indeterminacy of this 
position—the infinity of choices and the impossibility of ascertaining the right ones, and 
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whether it all means anything—the Ego plunges into an abyss of despair. Trying to destroy 
the self-consciousness that has brought on its miserable vertigo, the individual seeks escape in 
a suicidal nihilism, worshipping ―the Not, the Never and the Night‖ and ―The formless Mass 
without a Me.‖131 Denying any possibility of a meaningful life in Time, the autonomy-seeking 
Ego falls back on its own bare power to end itself: the individual tries to be the hero whose 
―intellectual life [is] fulfilled / In knowing that his doom is willed.‖132 Willing one‘s doom 
becomes the final attempt at self-determination.  
These modes of flight from Cronus could, in ―modern times,‖ only be combined ―in a 
collective form, in warfare, where every individual is at one and the same time the 
masochistic murderee and the sadistic murderer, or in the political relationship of the 
impassioned leader and the impassioned masses.‖133 The extraordinary temptation and danger 
of twentieth-century totalitarianism lay, according to Auden, in its ability to offer both 
spiritual ―triumph‖ and escapism. The first mechanism was demonstrated by the group-based 
superiority constructed by totalitarian ideology. The spectacle of escape, on the other hand, 
consisted of ―an ecstatic and morbid abdication of the free-willing and individual before the 
collective and the daemonic. ―We have become obscene night worshippers who, having 
discovered that we cannot live exactly as we will, deny the possibility of willing anything and 
are content masochistically to be lived.‖134 Auden‘s linking of the dynamics of escape from 
sin to twentieth-century totalitarianism is entirely in tune with Niebuhr‘s description of 
modern fascist nations as having achieved ―a daemonic form of national self-assertion.‖135 
Collective egotism, in Niebuhr‘s phrasing, offered the individual ―an opportunity to lose 
himself in a larger whole; but it also offers him possibilities of self-aggrandizement beside 
which mere individual pretensions are implausible and incredible.‖136 By contrast, the power 
of the Christian interpretation of existence, in order to withstand totalitarian ideologies, would 
need to be anchored in its acknowledgment of original sin.
137
 Both Auden and Niebuhr saw 
the Christian faith as unique in allowing humans to acknowledge both the paradox of their 
transcendence-desiring finitude, and the real ―bias towards evil‖ with which that condition is 
intertwined. Furthermore, it offered human beings the possibility of dealing with rather than 
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try to escape their condition, through the ability to repent and the related possibility of divine 
redemption.  
The odd moment when a glimpse of Paradise—the potential for harmony and Agape—
reveals itself, catching us off guard with an ―accidental happiness,‖ plays an important role in 
New Year Letter. Auden recalls one such moment of private ―vision‖ taking place in a 
―wedding feast‖ hosted by the Letter‘s recipient, Elizabeth Mayer: ―Warm in your house, 
Elizabeth, / A week ago at the same hour / I felt the unexpected power / That drove our 
ragged egos in / From the dead-ends of greed and sin.‖138 Critic Lucy McDiarmid has called 
weddings the ―paradigmatic ritual[s]‖ in Auden‘s poetry, rituals that symbolize the potential 
for the ―[reconciliation of] a divided, unhappy community.‖139 The kind of private communal 
activities described by Auden in New Year Letter form a counter-plot
140
 to the agonized 
frenzy brought on by solipsistic megalomania: In this scene, McDiarmid writes, ―the 
centripetal power of love…[counteracts] the centrifugal selfish forces.‖141 Without these 
instances of private happiness, Auden wrote in The Prolific and the Devourer, we could not 
have faith.
142
 They remind us that we can, at least, serve other ends than the ―ornate / 
Grandezza of the Sovereign State,‖ by learning to love ―the polis of our friends.‖143 
As Edward Mendelson has shown, Auden‘s pre-existing interest in the subject of the 
Absolute, once he immersed himself into the writing of Kierkegaard and modern theologians 
such as Niebuhr, lead him towards a distinctly existentialist Christianity. Measured against an 
absolute value or unconditional standard, no subjective life could be adequate, or even claim 
full access to that value. Thus, as Mendelson writes, ―the existential drama of absolute choices 
occurred in a human world with no comfort and no guidance, in a universe that accepted 
neither compromise nor half measures.‖144 The bleakness of this scenario might seem 
purgatorial, and in New Year Letter time – ―the life in which we live / At least three quarters 
of our time‖ – is indeed described as the ―purgatorial hill we climb.‖145 Any skyline we attain, 
Auden writes, ―Reveals a higher ridge again.‖146 However, as is suggested a few lines further 
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down, this vertiginous montaineering seems to be ―the only game / At which we show a 
natural skill.‖147 Our task, then, is to ―Ascend the penitential way / That forces our wills to be 
free,‖ even while aware that ―every step we make / Will certainly be a mistake.‖148 Penitence 
is one way of responding to one‘s self-aware existence in the ‗monstrous‘. Now that 
acknowledges an Absolute horizon while accepting that it is beyond human reach. ―In Time 
we sin,‖ Auden says, ―But Time is sin and can forgive.‖149  
 
1.3  Equally evil: Equality of wretchedness 
―While the Nazi success in Germany undermined Auden’s faith in the self-evident values of 
liberal humanism, the existentialism of Kierkegaard… helped shape the concept of Agape into 
a political credo.‖150 
In New Year Letter, modest visions of interpersonal community building form an important 
contrast to the hellish struggle to escape, rather than bear, our existential burdens. Such 
private consolations would become the blueprint for Auden‘s formulations of a ―counter-
vision‖ to totalitarianism on the social and political scale; a democracy grounded in a 
common recognition of our ―equality in wretchedness‖ and the necessity of Agape. For 
Auden, the ―pact of totalitarianism‖ represented a ―manifest contract of souls in reflective 
self-love.‖151 In New Year Letter, Hitler emerges, startlingly, as an inverted theologian: 
We face our self-created choice 
As out of Europe comes a Voice 
A theologian who denies 
What more than twenty centuries 
Of Europe have assumed to be 
The basis of civility, 
Our evil Daimon to express 
In all its ugly nakedness 
What none before dared say aloud, 
The metaphysics of the Crowd. 
152
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The ―evil Daimon‖ answered the moan of apathy and despair emanating from a ―corrupt 
Christendom,‖ whose members Auden drily imagined as saying to themselves: ―Faith is too 
difficult; nothing is despair, we must have no God but Caesar.‖153  
In Auden‘s wartime Christmas oratorio, Caesar‘s Empire is portrayed as a decaying 
liberal state that has lost faith in itself. Caesar is praised for having conquered the Seven 
Kingdoms of rational virtue—metaphysics, science, mathematics, economics, technology, 
medicine and psychology.
154
 As the Chorus puts it: ―Great is Caesar: God must be with Him.‖ 
(CP: 371) The Narrator excitedly explains that this is ―History… in the making… / The 
longest aqueduct in the world is already / Under construction; the Committees on Fen-
Drainage / And Soil-Conservation will issue very shortly / Their Joint Report… and the recent 
restrictions / Upon aliens and free-thinking Jews are beginning / To have a salutary effect 
upon public morale.‖ (CP: 373) But despite the efforts of the public relations team, no one is 
entirely convinced – ―at least not all of the time.‖ In fact, the atmosphere haunting the 
Imperial Capital seems to be one of apathy and alienation. The opening chorus is permeated 
by forebodings of evil; anxiety is rising to the surface from under the layers of reassurance 
and propaganda, and the citizens of the would-be Liberal State
155
 find themselves ill-prepared 
for the advent of a seemingly ominous moment in time: ―Darkness and snow descend. / The 
clock on the mantelpiece / Has nothing to recommend, / … / The eyes huddle like cattle, 
doubt / Seeps into the pores… / The prophet‘s lantern is out / And gone the boundary stone… 
// [As] The evil and armed draw near.‖ (CP: 350) Some subconscious Horror is scratching at 
the door, and the Narrator tries to find a plausible cause for ―why we despair,‖ citing a sense 
of unreality and the sudden discovery that the ―person we know all about / Still bearing our 
name and loving himself as before‖ has become a fiction, whilst ―our true existence / Is 
decided by no one and has no importance to love.‖ (CP: 352) ―This,‖ the Narrator concludes, 
―is the wrath of God.‖  
The Narrator seems to echo Niebuhr when he admits that ―We know very well we are 
not unlucky but evil.‖ (CP: 374) The influence of Niebuhr‘s argument becomes even clearer 
in the following couple of lines, which state: ―that the dream of a Perfect State or No State at 
all, / To which we fly for refuge, is a part of our punishment.‖ (CP: 374) Here, then, is an 
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explicit acknowledgment of that underlying sense of sin that Auden saw as a crucial part of 
the explanation for the modern appeal of totalitarian movements. Man is ―tempted by guilt 
into a despair which tells him that his isolation and abandonment is irrevocable,‖ and tries to 
flee from that despair into the open arms of the totalitarian family. In a review of Niebuhr‘s 
Christianity and Power Politics, Auden had written: ―man cannot live without a sense of the 
Unconditional: if he does not consciously walk in fear of the Lord, then his unconscious sees 
to it that he has something else, airplanes or secret police, to walk in fear of.‖156 
The failure of liberalism to offer a desirable alternative to totalitarian movements lay 
for Auden, as critic Bruce Cicero explains, in its refusal ―to acknowledge the impossibility of 
successful social democracy without an unequivocal belief in man‘s bias towards evil.‖157 In 
the 1941 essay ―Criticism in a Mass Society,‖ Auden makes explicit his belief that one‘s 
attitude towards the concept of Original Sin is decisive for one‘s political choices. Either, he 
says, you presuppose that ―Man is a fallen creature with a natural bias to do evil,‖ or you 
presuppose that ―Men are good by nature and made bad by society.‖158 Fascist ideology, he 
asserts, is based on the combination of a lack of faith in absolute values and a hierarchical 
system of human value. Assuming that absolute values do not exist, and that some 
individuals, nations or races are better and more deserving than others, the elite must ―coerce 
the masses into accepting as absolute what in fact are myths‖ in order to achieve social and 
cultural unity; the system of government must be authoritarian and ―the people must be 
protected from the consequences of their own mistakes by those who cannot err.‖159 The 
presupposition for social democracy, on the other hand, is that absolute values do exist, 
though our knowledge of them is always imperfect: ―Men are equal not in their capacities and 
virtues but in their natural bias towards evil. No individual or class, therefore, however 
superior in intellect or character to the rest, can claim an absolute right to impose its view of 
the good upon them.‖160 Thus, democracy itself begins, in Auden‘s framework, with an act of 
faith, namely that absolute values exist even though we must never claim to fully know or 
possess them.  
The sense of totalitarianism substituting a lost faith in an unconditional Divine applies 
not only to its institutions of oppression (the secret police as a substitute for Divine Law), but 
extends, in Auden‘s view, to the very core of the totalitarian project. Let us recall his 
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description of Fascism in the Note to New Year Letter: ―[Its] slogan is Now or Never. In 
demanding a dictator it is really demanding the advent of the Good Life on earth through a 
supernatural miracle.‖161 In Roger Griffin‘s definition, National Socialism represented a 
longing for ―secular transcendence,‖ a ―temporalized utopia of purified society created within 
historical time,‖ to be achieved through what could be thought of as a secular apocalypse. 
Auden, seeing in this apocalyptic logic the lie of individual sublimation to a mythical 
collective, sought to elaborate a metaphysical alternative capable of providing a sense of 
meaningful co-existence within secular time. In the following sections of this chapter, I will 
show how that alternative built on Auden‘s definition of the good community, and offer an 
interpretation of how his ―communal counter-vision‖ relates to his idea of the time being. 
1.4 Communal counter-vision 
So far I have showed how Auden, during the early 40s, built up an elaborate framework of 
ideas from which he analysed the dynamics of liberalism and fascism. The cornerstone in this 
framework was the concept of Original Sin, allowing for a defence of democracy based on an 
―equality of wretchedness‖ and an imperative to have faith in absolute values of which we 
lack full knowledge. The emphasis has been on his critique of what he thought humans could 
not achieve, namely a ―temporalized utopia of purified society created within historical time.‖ 
What kind of a society could be created? ―If it were easy to be good / And cheap, and plain as 
evil how, / We all would be its members now,‖ he states in New Year Letter.162 Yet he did, of 
course, have some notions of the good. In the same poem Auden describes the kind of private 
experiences of community and happiness without which he considered it impossible to have 
any faith: ―O but it happens every day / To someone… Out of his organised distress / An 
accidental happiness‖ catches man off his guard, surprising him ―Out of his life in time.‖163 
To understand how personal ―visions‖ such as these informed Auden‘s visions of society on a 
larger scale, we must turn to his definitions of, and distinctions between, societies, 
communities and crowds. Auden, notorious for his love of categories and classifications, 
returned to this particular taxonomy in a number of essays throughout the forties and fifties: 
A crowd is a collection of people whose sole common bond is that they are together. 
[…] A society is an association of individuals for some functional purpose. Here I can 
think of something inorganic like a molecule of water, or of something organic like a 
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string quartet. The point about a society is that the part is subordinate to the whole. 
[…] A community is an association of human beings who are united by a tie of a 
common love.
 164
  
(From ―The Prolific and the Devourer,‖ Auden‘s unpublished 
book of pensées written during the summer of 1939) 
A public is a disintegrated community. A community is a society of rational beings 
united by a common tie in virtue of the things that they all love; a public is a crowd of 
lost beings united only negatively in virtue of the things that they severally [sic] fear, 
among which one of the greatest is the fear of being responsible as a rational being for 
one‘s individual self-development.165  
   (In a review of Louise Bogan from 1942) 
The same distinction played an important role in his major published analysis of Romanticism 
from 1949, The Enchafèd Flood, to which we shall return in chapter 3: 
In a society, where the structure and relation of its members to each other is 
determined by the function for which the society exists and not by their personal 
choice, the whole is more real than the sum of its parts. In a community, on the other 
hand, which is determined by the subjective verbs Love or Believe, I always precedes 
We. In a closed traditional community this fact is hidden, because the I is only 
potential. The believer by tradition is unconscious of any alternative to his belief…and 
therefore cannot doubt. The further civilization moves towards the open 
condition…the sharper becomes the alternative: either personal choice and through the 
sum of such choices an actual community or the annihilation of personality and the 
dissolution of community into crowds.
166
 
 
A community, that is, is an association of rational human beings ―united by a tie of a common 
love.‖ On a personal level this could be a love for any number of things, be it literature, music 
or football. On a larger societal scale, a principle of love uniting heterogeneous segments of a 
population would have to be impersonal and universal. This is how Auden came to shape the 
Christian concept of Agape, referring to the reciprocal love between God and humanity which 
extends to the ―love of one‘s neighbor,‖ into a ―political credo.‖  Agape is in his view 
ultimately the ―absolute value‖ in which humans must place their faith, although no one can 
ever claim to fully know or possess its meaning. In accordance with this interpretation, Auden 
writes, in 1944, that ―there is no perfect form of society; the best form can only be the form 
through which at any given historical moment or in any given geographical location, love for 
one‘s neighbor can express itself the most freely.‖167 That ―love‖ was a serious component in 
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Auden‘s political analysis, indeed that he considered it the central component, is emphasized 
by the following from New Year Letter. Note that the passage demonstrates how the idea of 
Original Sin underpins and anchors the imperatives expressed; that ―we need to‖ and ―can‖ 
love ―each‖ and ―all.‖ 
 [T]rue democracy begins 
 With free confessions of our sins. 
 In this alone are all the same, 
 All are so weak that none dare claim 
 ‗I have the right to govern‘ or 
 Behold in me the Moral Law,‖ 
 And all real unity commences 
 In consciousness of differences, 
 That all have wants to satisfy 
 And each a power to supply 
 We need to love all since we are 
 Each a unique particular 
 That is no giant, god, or dwarf, 
 But one odd human isomorph; 
 We can love each because we know 
 All, all of us that this is so: 
 Can live since we are lived, the powers 
 That we create with are not ours.   
 
The first six lines of the passage closely resemble the argument in defense of democracy 
sketched out in ―Criticism in a Mass Society.‖ In that essay he wrote that people are equal 
―not in their capacities and virtues but in their natural bias towards evil‖; in the poem, it is in 
sinfulness alone that ―all are the same.‖ In New Year Letter, none in a ―true democracy‖ dare 
claim moral superiority, out of awareness of their own weaknesses. In ―Criticism…‖ this was 
spelled out as ―No individual or class…however superior in intellect or character to the rest, 
can claim an absolute right to impose its view of the good upon them.‖168 The two texts where 
written and published in the same time period, and we see how closely the ideas in Auden‘s 
prose and poetry bleed into each other.
169
 In this context, however, it is the explicit presence 
of the idea of love as a political credo I would like to call attention to. ―All are unique‖ 
implies, on the one hand, that each individual is irreplaceable, and, at the same time, that no 
one can be, ultimately, anything other than her- or himself; there is no escape from the self 
and one‘s weaknesses, either in diagnosis or ideology, Auden seems to be saying. Therefore 
―we need to love all,‖ there is no way around it; a ―true democracy‖ will only arise out of 
                                                 
168
 Auden, Prose II, 98. 
169
 We also see how Auden has by no means abandoned all his earlier socialist convictions: ―all have wants to 
satisfy / And each a power to supply‖ clearly refers to the Marxist slogan  ―from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need.‖ 
37 
 
what Auden elsewhere refers to as Agape. This is possible – ―we can love all‖ – because 
everyone is, in this view, fundamentally aware that it is necessary.
170
 The last lines in the 
passage invoke something outside and other than ourselves. This can, on the one hand, be 
read asa call to humbleness: While we are superior in some things – men are not ―equal in 
their capacities and virtues‖ – no one is responsible for their own talents or may be said to 
have ―deserved‖ them; it does not entitle anyone to more power or privilege.  
 
The belief that we can act with love towards our neighbours does not imply, however, any 
optimism as to the question of whether we will.  The passage about the possibility and 
necessity of love follows on the heels of one in which a far grimmer reality is described: 
 
But wishes are not horses, this  
Annus is not mirabilis;
171
  
Day breaks upon the world we know  
Of war and wastefulness and woe; 
Ashamed civilians come to grief 
In brotherhoods without belief, 
Whose good intentions cannot cure 
The actual evils they endure, 
Nor smooth their practical career, 
Nor bring the far horizon near.  
 
The order of these two passages from New Year Letter (opposite of my quotations) should not 
be considered accidental, however. The ―world we know,‖ filled with an abundance of ―actual 
evils,‖ only demonstrates the necessity of the uniting principles of communities.   
  
1.5 Personal choice in the earthly city 
 In New Year Letter, the principles underpinning fascism are alluded to as the ―metaphysics of 
the Crowd.‖ Modern man and woman could not lose the sense of being individuals, they 
could only try to ―merge themselves into an abstraction, the crowd.‖172 In the second quote on 
crowds and communities which introduced the last subchapter, the crowd‘s greatest fear was 
defined as the fear of ―being responsible as a rational being for one‘s individual self-
development.‖ A community, on the other hand, arises out of – in fact is no more than – the 
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sum of individuals‘ ―personal choices.‖ Auden‘s emphasis on the personal is important, and is 
derived from Kierkegaard; a truly personal existence required active choices. In ―The Prolific 
and the Devourer,‖ as well as in several other essays and lectures, Auden uses a cartoon 
printed in the New Yorker as a starting point for a discussion about active personal choice. 
The cartoon depicts the following scene taking place in New York: A little man is standing in 
the middle of the street, fighting an octopus which has come out of an open manhole. A crowd 
has gathered around him, observing. Behind the crowd, two men walk past with suitcases, 
without looking at what is going on, and the one says to the other: ―It doesn‘t take much to 
collect a crowd in New York.‖ Auden called the cartoon ―extremely significant,‖ and declares 
that there is only one individual in the picture: The little man struggling with the octopus. 
―The lookers-on in the picture are a crowd because none of them dare step forward unless 
others do. They can only be a we. None of them is an I.‖173 The two men that walk past the 
scene are not individuals either; their rule of action is to do whatever the crowd is not 
doing.
174
  
To act as a person, however; to accept responsibility for one‘s own self-development, 
meant that the individual would have to accept suffering. Acting out ―personal choices‖ 
exposes the individual to the existential anxieties of uncertainty and indeterminacy: In 
Kierkegaard‘s terms, it would require a ―leap of faith.‖175 The acceptance of suffering is what 
the Chorus requires from Joseph in For the Time Being: ―To do what is difficult all one‘s days 
/ As if it were easy, that is faith.‖(CP: 365)176  What is difficult is, in the context of this 
Christmas Oratorio, for Joseph to continue to love Mary despite his doubts as to the 
circumstances of her pregnancy.
177
 What is asked of Joseph is the same as what is asked of 
any citizen in a true community, according to Auden‘s terms: To love, even in spite of oneself. 
In a 1944 essay Auden states that there can, for the Christian, ―be no distinction between the 
personal and the political, for all his relationships are both; every marriage is a polis, every 
imperium a family…‖178 Thus, Joseph‘s dilemma and his doubts concerning his personal 
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―polis‖ leads us back to the principle of Agape as a ―political credo.‖ In the same 1944 essay, 
Auden makes this credo explicit: 
In so far as its members love themselves, a society is an earthly city in which order is 
maintained by force and fear of chaos, bound sooner or later to break down under the 
tension between freedom and law; in so far as they love God and their neighbor as 
themselves, the same society becomes a heavenly city in which order appears the 
natural consequence of freedom, not a physical or logical imposition.
179
 
In Auden‘s definition, love of one‘s neighbor was in man‘s best interest, based on ―the most 
primitive instinct of all, self-preservation.‖ At the last supper, he points out, Jesus ―took 
eating, the most elementary and solitary act of all, the primary act of self-love, the only thing 
that not only man but all living creatures must do…and made it the symbol of universal 
love.‖180 At first glance this might seem to contradict the statement that to love is to ―do what 
is difficult,‖ but it is in fact consistent with Auden‘s idea of love as the ultimate ―necessity,‖ 
and freedom as the acceptance of necessity. To sin, in New Year Letter, is to ―act consciously 
/ Against what seems necessity.‖181  
1.6 The Incarnation and the “Thou”: Love as model 
In For the Time Being, the most significant meditation upon the meaning of love or Agape 
takes place as the Wise Men and the shepherds arrive at the manger and sing their praise in 
alternating stanzas. The space here does not allow for in-depth analysis, but I will highlight a 
few examples relevant to the ongoing discussion. Towards the end of their song, the Wise 
Men state that ―the singular is not Love‘s enemy; / Love‘s possibilities of realisation / Require 
an Otherness that can say I.‖ (CP: 384) If we connect this to the state described above of 
being ―each a unique particular,‖ that state is not only said to imply aloneness and isolation, 
but to open for the possibility of love: Only an ―Otherness that can say I‖ may be loved. 
Secondly, the Wise Men end their final stanza with the words ―The choice to love is open till 
we die,‖ (CP: 384) echoing and reinforcing the view expressed in New Year Letter that ―we 
can love‖ (my italics).182 In For the Time Being the ―choice to love‖ is, significantly, made 
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possible by the Incarnation – keeping with/consistent with the Christian message and the 
function of the Christmas Oratorio – as is reinforced by the poem‘s next section. In order to 
understand the role of Agape in Auden‘s religious-political vision of the good community, 
therefore, I will devote some paragraphs to that section, the most philosophically dense 
passage in the poem.  
Erik Tonning has argued that the Incarnation is the central Christian dogma in Auden‘s 
thought.
183
  For the Time Being, a Christmas Oratorio whose formal function is to praise the 
birth of Christ, is a natural first place to look for Auden‘s understanding of that dogma. As the 
only long poem in Auden‘s oeuvre dealing explicitly with Christian themes, it is also an 
important source of insight into the significance of the Christian concept of love in Auden‘s 
communal vision. The passage in the poem titled ―The Meditation of Simeon‖ is particularly 
central in this regard. In the Gospels, Simeon is the old man who had been promised that he 
would not die until he had seen Christ. When Mary and Joseph bring Jesus to the Temple to 
be baptized, Simeon utters a short prayer wherein he ―makes explicit the universality of the 
Christian revelation.‖184 In For the Time Being, Auden has given him an extensive prose 
monologue, interspersed by the Choir, in which he explains the historical and metaphysical 
conditions that had to be in place before the Incarnation could occur, and the significance of 
the Incarnation to various sides of human life. For instance, Simeon states that ―[t]he Word 
could not be made Flesh until men had reached a state of absolute contradiction between 
clarity and despair in which they would have no choice but either to accept absolutely or to 
reject absolutely,‖ (CP: 387) a description consistent both with Auden‘s understanding of 
modernity and the uncompromising Christian existentialism he had derived from Kierkegaard. 
Simeon also explains the ―present‖ significance of the Incarnation: 
 
But here and now the Word which is implicit in the Beginning and in the End is 
become immediately explicit, and that which hitherto we could only passively fear as 
the incomprehensible I AM, henceforth we may actively love with comprehension that 
THOU ART. (CP: 387-88)  
 
The ―incomprehensible I AM‖ can be thought to refer both to (the paradox of) self-awareness 
and to the name God gave himself in the Old Testament, YHWH (Yahweh) or ―I am that I 
am.‖ THOU ART has a similar double meaning. In the first editions of the Oratorio, the last 
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words in the quote above were ―…that HE IS.‖185  Mendelson notes that the change to 
―THOU ART‖ might have been made as a result of Auden‘s reading of Martin Buber‘s I and 
Thou. In fact, ―HE IS‖ (as in ―Christ is‖) and ―THOU ART‖ mean the same thing, in this 
context: Through recognition of the Incarnation, Christian faith enables man him to really see 
his neighbor as a unique individual worthy of the pronoun ―you.‖  ―THOU ART,‖ is actually 
more consistent with Auden‘s writing about persons at the time, and with his overall 
argument that the Incarnation embodied the meaning of Agape; through love of God, or 
through faith, man was shown the meaning of loving one‘s neighbor. Keeping in mind that 
―Love‘s possibilities of realisation / Require an Otherness that can say I,‖ the birth of Christ is 
here what makes it fully possible to recognize the Other as someone ―that can say I,‖ in other 
words a ―thou.‖  
As Mendelson and Tonning emphasize, Auden had arrived at this understanding of 
Christanity and the Incarnation through his reading of Charles Williams‘ The Descent of the 
Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit of the Church. Auden had read the book in February 
1940, and it made a huge impact on him, particularly Williams‘ interpretation of the 
Incarnation through the idea of co-inherence. Co-inherence refers to the act of ―divine 
substitution‖ inherent in the birth of Christ: ―We were made sin in Adam but Christ was made 
sin for us and we in him were taken out of sin.‖186 By entering into human existence, bodily 
and spiritually, Christ ―took on‖ human sinful nature and redeemed it through his voluntary 
sacrifice. Co-inherence also involves ―bearing one another‘s burdens even in this life, as 
Christ bore ours,‖187 thereby offering a ―model‖ for Agape.   
1.7  Democracy and science: Love as method 
In October 1939 Auden wrote an essay – a book review, in fact – with the title ―Democracy is 
hard.‖ Here he makes explicit his belief that ―[d]emocracy will only work if as individuals we 
lead good lives, and we shall only do that if we have faith that it is possible and at the same 
time an acute awareness of how weak and corrupt we are. […] …we must find a 
technique.‖188 He goes on to offer a suggestion of this technique, modeled on the scientific 
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method. Not only does he connect science (or the ―way to true knowledge‖) with absolute 
faith, but equates the scientific method with love:   
 
There is one way to true knowledge, and only one, a praxis which, if defined in terms 
of human relations, we should call love. For what is the scientific attitude but that of 
the love which does not reject the humblest fact, resists not evil (recalcitrant evidence) 
nor judges, but is patient, believing all things, hoping all things, enduring all things? 
And what is its opposite but the way of dogmatic belief backed by force? Skepticism, 
then, in belief. Absolute faith in the way and in the existence of truth.
189
 
   
We see again how ―absolute faith‖, combined with the recognition of original sin (―how weak 
and corrupt we are‖), is instrumental in Auden‘s vision of a good society – however 
idiosyncratic his definition of ―faith‖ might be. 
Mendelson claims that Auden treated the Christmas story as a ―parable of the advent 
and departure of a vision.‖190 He finds For the Time Being ―more plausible at the end than at 
the beginning,‖ that is, after the vision has passed.191 The reality of failure is perhaps more 
realistically portrayed – or more recognizable – than the vision of success. After the Massacre 
of the Innocent and Joseph and Mary‘s flight into Egypt, the Oratorio ends with a last 
monologue by the Narrator, followed by a short prayer by the Chorus.  The Narrator‘s 
concluding remarks open like this: ―Well, so that is that. Now we must dismantle the tree, / 
Putting the decorations back into their cardboard boxes…‖ (CP: 399) The atmosphere is one 
of physical and spiritual hangover, as the narrator admits that he and the rest of the party has 
drunk a lot, stayed up late and tried, ―quite unsuccessfully,‖ to love all of their relatives. 
―Once again / As in previous years we have seen the actual Vision and failed / To do more 
than entertain it as an agreeable / Possibility.‖ (CP: 399) The one thing that remains is a faint 
―whiff of apprehension‖ at the thought of the Good Friday already approaching.  (CP: 400)  
In other words, the Narrator might be said to  find himself ―back on the same old 
mountain side‖ that Auden had described in New Year Letter; the purgatory ―in which we live 
/ At least three-quarters of our time.‖ The Christmas vision does not offer any lasting relief to 
the participants in the ritual. They are offered a glimpse of what Auden would undoubtedly 
call the ―Truth‖, before reverting to ―the ordinary condition of anxiety and doubt.‖192 This, 
however, is what Auden refers to as our natural residence in New Year Letter: ―Is it not here 
that we belong, / Where everyone is doing wrong‖?193 Similarly, Joseph and Mary sing, in 
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their final verse in For the Time Being: ―Safe in Egypt we shall sigh / For lost insecurity; / 
Only when her terrors come / Does our flesh feel quite at home.‖ (CP: 398) The vision had to 
fade for Auden, the ordinary condition of anxiety of doubt is our natural state of being. What 
he suggests is to walk on in good faith, so to speak, ―once again…set out / Our faith well 
balanced by our doubt‖ with a ―reverent frivolity / That suffers each unpleasant test / With 
scientific interest.‖194 The only suffering to be avoided is that of trying to escape from 
suffering. That is why Joseph is asked to ―do what is difficult all one‘s days / As if it were 
easy.‖ For the same reason, Tonning describes Auden‘s faith (or what Auden himself usually 
referred to as his attempt-at-faith, his would-be-Christianity) as characterized not by the 
abandonment, but the intensification of questioning and doubt.
195
   
This is the context in which one should read the Narrator‘s statement in his final 
monologue that ―The Time Being is, in a sense, the most trying time of all.‖ Here it has come 
to embody human beings‘ anxiety in time, the crookedness of human nature and the 
―purgatorial hill we climb‖ – what John Fuller calls ―the continual demands of the Eternal 
upon an Individual living in Time.‖196 Another ―time being‖ in the poem is, however, the 
moment of the Incarnation, as is reflected in the language of, especially, ―The Vision of the 
Shepherds‖ and ―The Meditation of Simeon.‖ In ―The Vision…‖ the shepherds and wise men 
sing: 
THE THREE WISE MEN:  O here and now our endless journey stops. 
FIRST SHEPHERD:  We never left the place where we were born 
[…] 
THIRD SHEPHERD:  To-night for the first time the prison gates 
    Have opened. 
[…] 
And swept the filth of habit from our hearts. 
THE THREE SHEPHERDS: O here and now our endless journey starts. 
        (CP: 381-82) 
 
The emphasis on the here and now of the vision is repeated in ―The Meditation of Simeon,‖ 
where the words ―here and now‖ are used to mark the event of the Incarnation, the entry of 
Christ into history, and begin the meditation on its significance in the present. Simeon states 
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that ―by Him is illuminated the time in which we execute those choices through which our 
freedom is realized or prevented…‖ (CP: 388) That time must be understood as the ―time 
being,‖ the only time available in which to ―execute those choices.‖ The meaning of that time 
is revealed in the moment and event of the Incarnation. This has one further implication. In 
Simeon‘s words, ―here and now the Word which is implicit in the Beginning and in the End is 
become immediately explicit.‖ (CP: 387) The vision fades, but points forwards, according to 
Christian scripture, to the ―End‖ of time, to Judgment Day, the Revelation, or the Apocalypse. 
Similarly, the very expression ―for the time being‖ – another formulation of which would be 
―in the meantime‖ – implies waiting, in expectation of some future, if perhaps uncertain, 
event that would, if it occurred, bring the ―time being‖ to an end.  
1.8 The end and the time being  
The notion of an ―End‖ consistent with Christian Scripture merits two comments. First, to 
adopt a belief in a prophesied Christian End of Days during the early 1940s may be 
understood as a postponement of apocalyptic visions. As discussed in the beginning of the 
chapter, with reference to Roger Griffin‘s theory of fascism, the revolutionary fascist 
movements of the 20
th
 century were driven by myths of palingenesis; the belief in national, 
social or political rebirth. In other words, palingenesis can be described as belief in a form of 
secular apocalypse and regeneration through war; specifically, for the fascist movements 
gaining power in the 1930s, what would become the Second World War. Auden‘s adoption of 
faith in Original Sin and the Incarnation is inextricable from a belief in the Last Judgment. 
The latter entails a rejection of secular eschatological ideologies such as National Socialism.  
If we recall that Auden was convinced that man, if he did not ―consciously walk in fear of the 
Lord‖ would find ―something else, airplanes or secret police, to walk in fear of,‖ the idea of 
competing and mutually exclusive eschatological ideologies becomes explicit: In short, 
Auden believed that ―man,‖ in lieu of a fear of divine judgement, would be tempted towards 
the apocalyptic  myths of contemporary totalitarian movements – either that or revert to that 
liberalism he saw offered as fascism‘s only alternative and which he, as shown, despised. 
Secondly, we should remember that the Word which ―in the End is become immediately 
explicit,‖ i.e. the vision revealed in the Incarnation, was, for Auden, one of Agape or love. 
Even the prospect of Judgment, in other words, is part of an overall interpretation that rejects 
despair. Rather, the recognition of Original Sin allows for a common recognition of one 
another as fellow sinners, in need of mutual forgiveness. The Shepherds and Wise Men in For 
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the Time Being, when at the Manger, declare in alternating lines that they ―bless each other‘s 
sin, exchanging here / Exceptional conceit / With average fear.‖(CP: 382) The Narrator 
suggests the following prayer as a response to the insight that ―we are not unlucky but evil‖: 
 Let us therefore be contrite without anxiety, 
For Powers and Times are not gods but mortal gifts from God; 
Let us acknowledge our defeats but without despair, 
For all societies and epochs are transient details, 
Transmitting an everlasting opportunity 
That the Kingdom of Heaven may come, not in our present 
And not in our future, but in the Fullness of Time. 
Let us pray.       (CP: 374)  
 
The note on the possibility of a Kingdom of Heaven to come in the ―Fullness of Time‖ allows 
us, again, to identify the anti-totalitarian character of Auden‘s time being, and define its role 
in his shaping of the Christian concept of Agape into a political credo in response to the 
contemporary threat of totalitarianism. Auden‘s idea of the time being entails an abandonment 
of the hope for a human-made Parousia, a secular revitalization of society brought about 
through an apocalyptic war, and indeed the very idea that human beings are capable of 
achieving their own transcendence. Auden‘s conviction was rather – to take one of his simpler 
formulations – that ―man is born in sin but may be saved by the Grace of God.‖197 The 
eschatological horizon, instead of looming over the present, is shifted into the beyond, to be 
realized only with the coming of a redeemer.  
In the same year that Auden returned to Christianity, in 1940, before either New Year 
Letter or For the Time Being were written, he had published a poetry collection with the title 
Another Time. Several of the poems in this collection deal with, as one would expect, 
variations on the topic of time. Auden‘s use of the expression ―another time‖ marks it as the 
opposite of his idea of the ―time being.‖  In the poem that gives the 1940 collection its title, 
Auden writes: 
 So many try to say Not Now 
 So many have forgotten how 
 To say I Am, and would be 
 Lost, if they could, in history.
198
 
 
In For the Time Being, the emphasis has shifted from ―I Am‖ to ―Thou Art,‖ but ―I Am‖ still 
means to take on responsibility for one‘s own existence and choices; to be a person. Only a 
person can say ―you are‖ and love his neighbor. Only a person can, as Auden was to write in a 
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later poem, assume ―responsibility for time.‖199 The next stanza from ―Another Time,‖ 
following the one quoted above, also indicates what the ―time being,‖ or the unwillingness to 
say ―Now,‖ has to do with Auden‘s understanding of fascism and totalitarianism. There, 
Auden describes those who would be ―Lost, if they could, in History‖ as 
 
 Bowing, for instance, with such old-world grace 
 To a proper flag in a proper place, 
 Muttering like ancients as they stump upstairs 
 Of Mine and His or Ours and Theirs.
200
  
 
But, the poem concludes, ―No one has yet believed or liked a lie: / Another time has other 
lives to live.‖ The duty of a Christian was ―to act now, with an eye fixed, neither nostalgically 
on the past nor dreamily on some ideal future, but on eternity – ―redeeming the time‖ – in the 
words of Sidney Smith, he is to ―trust in God and take short views.‖‖201 The Incarnation had 
shown humankind the imperative of living in the time being, and set the task for the future, as, 
with the ―new-born Word…A city based / On love and consent / [was] suggested to men.‖202 
Faith, which Auden saw as the power by which anxious human beings were ―nevertheless still 
able to choose,‖ allowed them to endure the time being and invest their existential energies in 
helping to build this just city in the here and now.  
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2 Beginnings and ends: Hannah Arendt’s action. 
―The moments we call crises are ends and beginnings.‖203   
―History is predictable in the degree to which all men love themselves, and spontaneous in 
the degree to which each man loves God and through Him his neighbour.‖204 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce a new philosophical perspective into the thesis, namely 
Hannah Arendt‘s theory of action from The Human Condition. The aim is twofold: 1) to shed 
light on the time being as discussed in the previous chapter and 2) to supply a conceptual tool 
for my discussion of Auden‘s Horae Canonicae in the next chapter. The discussion of 
Arendt‘s theory, therefore, may be seen to supply a theoretical bridge between the two 
analytical chapters. This ordering of the chapters is intended to be clarifying: the discussion 
here relies on a prior understanding of Auden‘s time being, and it is fully applied only in the 
last chapter. The chapter is structured as follows: a short summary of what the time being 
entailed for Auden; an introduction of Arendt and her relevance for my analysis of Auden; a 
brief presentation of Arendt‘s theory of totalitarianism and its similarities with Auden, and 
finally; a discussion of Arendt‘s theory from The Human Condition with focus on its parallels 
with and relevance for Auden. 
2.1 The time being 
The time being refers, in Auden‘s For the Time Being, to the present moment as a site of 
uncertainty, anxiety and doubt, the distinctly un-epiphanic experience of temporality 
characterizing everyday life. Frank Kermode used the term Chronos, traditionally the 
personification of Time in a general sense, for this particular, relentless experience of time: 
the endless unfolding of moments perceived as having no special significance, and therefore 
experienced as unfulfilling or even agonizing for the individual humans scrambling for 
foothold in it. In Auden‘s New Year Letter, the time being was described as purgatorial, the 
―same old mountain side‖ that human beings symbolically struggle on throughout their lives.  
The struggle and suffering implied in the time being was in part caused by the individual‘s 
more-or-less-conscious awareness of sin: ―We know,‖ as the Narrator in For the Time Being 
stated, ―that we are not unlucky but evil.‖ At one point in the Christmas Oratorio, however, 
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the time being is filled with significance and wonder, in which the meaning of History is 
momentarily revealed to its participants: in the Incarnation. This moment corresponds to what 
in Kermode‘s model is termed kairos; a point in time which is brimming over with 
significance. In Auden‘s Christian Vision, the Incarnation did and continues to provide the 
true meaning of history, human existence in time, a meaning he approaches in terms of Agape 
or love of one‘s neighbor. The totalitarian promise, as Auden saw it, was related to the 
tribulations of the time being in that it offered the individual a refuge from anxiety and self-
reflection in a collective identity construed as superior; in the projection of anxiety onto 
internal and external enemies; and in the prospect of a future utopian state, realized in secular, 
historical time, in which the uncertainties and sufferings of the time being would be 
transcended once and for all. In New Year Letter Auden gave himself the following reminder. 
A particle, I must not yield 
To particles who claim the field, 
Nor trust the demagogue who raves, 
A quantum speaking for the waves, 
Nor worship blindly the ornate 
Grandezza of the Sovereign State. 
Whatever wickedness we do 
Need not be, orators, for you…205 
 
At the same time, he is aware that ―We are conscripts to our age‖ and wonders how one can 
be a ―patriot of the Now.‖206 This leads me to the parallel I am about to construct between 
Auden‘s time being – the Now – and Arendt‘s action. To Arendt, the public realm – what she 
sometimes describes as the ―web of human relationships‖ – was constituted by two 
fundamental human activities: speech and action. These activities, as Arendt defines them, 
only exist in the moment of execution, in other words, in the ―Now.‖ They leave nothing 
behind, or if they do those ―things‖ can no longer be defined as action or speech, but have 
been transformed into something else. To Arendt, action is essential to a fully human life. 
Individuals gain or reveal their unique identity as they ―insert themselves into the world‖ in 
word and deed. Action is the basis of political life: Political power, she asserts, only exist 
where people ―act together.‖ All of this will be discussed at length throughout the chapter. 
For Auden, to be a person meant to ―take responsibility for time‖; to make one‘s 
choices in the time being without attempting to seek refuge in the past or future, and without 
deluding oneself with visions of grandeur or despair. There is a clear affinity between his 
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understanding of the time being and Arendt‘s action. To be a ―patriot of the Now,‖ as Auden 
formulates it, would be, in Arendt‘s terms, to act. The comparison between Auden and Arendt 
is all the more relevant because Arendt‘s philosophy is rooted in her analysis of 
totalitarianism from her first and perhaps most famous work, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951). Clearly, Arendt developed the philosophical tools with which to make sense out of 
politics from an anti-totalitarian perspective, with the experience of totalitarianism, that is, 
close in mind. Therefore she provides nuance to some of the questions Auden struggles with 
as he attempts to construct a religious-political framework of ideas with which to both explain 
and reject the ―totalitarian temptation.‖  
2.2 Short background 
Hannah Arendt was one of the earliest and most influential philosophers of totalitarianism. 
She became famous for her work The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951),
207
 and is usually 
credited for coining the term ―totalitarianism‖ itself. Arendt‘s biography is of some relevance 
for her philosophy: She grew up in Germany and studied under Heidegger, Husserl and 
Jaspers, but fled the country in 1933 after Hitler‘s Machtergreifung as her Jewish identity and 
political activism put her at risk of persecution. She moved to Paris, where she worked to 
support Jewish refugees. In 1937 she lost her German citizenship, and in 1940, following the 
German conquest of northern France, she was placed in an internment camp for ―enemy 
aliens‖ from which Jewish prisoners were to be deported to concentration camps. She 
managed to escape the camp, and in 1941 fled to the U.S., where she lived for the rest of her 
life.
 208
  
 Arendt and Auden were close contemporaries, born in 1906 and 1907 respectively. 
The rise of fascism in Europe became the crucial formative experience for the both of them 
and they both, for different reasons, moved to the U.S. around the outbreak of the Second 
World War and became permanent residents in New York as well as American citizens. In 
fact, they later came to know each other personally and became friends, intellectual 
conversation partners and mutual influences upon each others thought, as documented in a 
number of mutual quotations, dedications and explicit acknowledgments of influence.
209
  
                                                 
207
 Initially published in Great Britain, with the title The Burden of Our Times (1951).  
208
 Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow, 2. 
209
 For a short account of their relationship, see Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow, 5-11. For more details, see 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl‘s biography of Hannah Arendt: Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press,), 2004.  
50 
 
 Arendt‘s philosophy is relevant for Auden, and my thesis, for several reasons. First of 
all, her influence on and pioneering role within the philosophical understanding of 
totalitarianism makes her interpretation inherently interesting as a point of reference in my 
discussion of Auden and anti-totalitarianism. Secondly Auden, on coming across Arendt‘s 
philosophy in The Human Condition (1958), proclaimed in an effusive review that he felt that 
the book had been ―written especially for [him].‖210 There were so many parallels between his 
own and Arendt‘s understanding of ―the human condition‖ and the modern age that he felt as 
if he had found an intellectual soul mate, and even telephoned her to thank her for having 
written the book.
211
 We know, in other words, that Auden himself recognized and appreciated 
the similarities in their thinking. Thirdly Arendt‘s idea of human action in The Human 
Condition sheds light on Auden‘s understanding of the time being and on human being in 
time. In particular, the role of forgiveness in Arendt‘s analysis of the ―realm of human affairs‖ 
lends clarity both to Auden‘s idea of Judgment, i.e. the eschaton in his interpretation of 
Christian eschatology, and to the links between his time being and anti-totalitarianism. This 
will prove a useful perspective in my analysis of Horae Canonicae in chapter 3. 
2.3 The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Arendt‘s The Origins of Totalitarianism consists of three parts titled ―Anti-Semitism,‖ 
―Imperialism‖ and ―Totalitarianism.‖ The aspects of her theory most relevant to my 
investigation, i.e. those that are closest to Auden‘s ideas and therefore allows for the most 
constructive comparison, derive from the third volume, particularly its discussion of 
―Ideology and Terror.‖212  
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Totalitarianism, as Arendt saw it, constituted an entirely novel form of political 
organization, not to be confused with ‖traditional‖ forms of authoritarian government such as 
tyranny, despotism and dictatorships. She considered the essence of totalitarianism to be 
found in terror and ideology. Totalitarian movements claim to have access to a law, truth or 
authority above and beyond the realm of human law, such as History, Nature or the Divine. 
They pretend to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth – something which 
the legality of positive law…could never attain.‖213 The law in question, whether History or 
Nature, is interpreted deterministically, in other words as inevitable. The totalitarian 
movement or party, in this scheme, considers itself something like Nature or History‘s helping 
hand: Its role is to execute the higher law on earth, to accelerate its realization, in Arendt‘s 
words by making ―mankind itself the embodiment of the law.‖214 Totalitarianism‘s chief 
characteristics, related to this mission of reshaping mankind into an embodiment of the Law, 
were therefore terror and ideology. Under conditions of tyranny terror is used to quench 
opposition and instill fear of the ruler in the population. Under totalitarianism, Arendt argues, 
terror became something more: Not only arbitrary, but total. This had to do with the internal 
logic of totalitarian governments‘ interpretation of that Law they tried to execute. Whereas the 
sources of ultimate truth (say, Nature or Divinity) have traditionally been conceived of as 
permanent and eternal, in totalitarian ideologies they have become ―laws of movement,‖ 
according to Arendt, revealing themselves in a process of constant development.
215
 The danger 
was that the principle of ―movement‖ would come to justify perpetual terror, because the 
―end‖ of development would mean the end of the Law itself:  
If it is the law of nature to eliminate everything that is harmful and unfit to live, it 
would mean the end of nature itself if new categories of the harmful and unfit-to-live 
could not be found; if it is the law of history that in a class struggle certain classes 
―wither away,‖ it would mean the end of human history itself if rudimentary new 
classes did not form, so that they in turn could ―wither away‖ under the hands of 
totalitarian rulers. In other words, the law of killing by which totalitarian movements 
seize and exercise power would remain a law of the movement even if they ever 
succeeded in making all of humanity subject to their rule.
216
  
Terror, therefore, would not come to an end even if all internal and external enemies could be 
eliminated. In fact, she writes, terror in totalitarian regimes is indifferent to the guilt or 
innocence of its targets; it chooses its victims ―without reference to individual actions or 
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thoughts, exclusively in accordance with the objective necessity of the natural or historical 
process.‖217 Terror was more than an instrument of totalitarianism, it was its very essence. Its 
consequence and function was to eliminate the ―space‖ required for freedom of action, in an 
attempt to eliminate the very capacity for freedom in men. Because totalitarian regimes aim to 
realize the higher Law in mankind, the outcome of which has been preconceived by its 
theorists, it must oppose, and ultimately try to abolish, the human ability to act out of 
accordance with the ―script‖: The capacity for free or spontaneous action. The chief aim of 
totalitarian terror, Arendt therefore concludes, is to ―make it possible for the force of nature or 
history to race freely through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous human action.‖218 
The other essential instrument and characteristic of totalitarian movements and 
regimes was ideology. The term, as Arendt points out, literally means ―the logic of an 
idea.‖219 All ideologies have totalitarian aspects, she argues. They claim to explain 
everything, past and future, and insist on a ―truer‖ reality behind observable reality. 
Ideologies order facts ―into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an 
axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a 
consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality.‖220 As such ideology implies 
emancipation from reality. The device, she writes, by which Hitler and Stalin transformed 
their respective ideologies into weapons, was simple: They ―took them dead seriously‖: By 
elevating ideologies to the status of absolute truths, they proceeded to ―drive ideological 
implications into extremes of logical consistency…a ―dying class‖ consisted of people 
condemned to death; races that are ―unfit to live‖ were to be exterminated.‖221 This absurd 
and circular consistency demonstrated, for Arendt, the ability of ideology to eliminate the 
capacity for thinking. Once in power, totalitarian governments would attempt, instead, to 
change reality in accordance with their ideological claims. 
If totalitarianism is essentially different from other historical forms of authoritarian 
government, and therefore novel, Arendt claims that it must also be based upon a new ―basic 
experience‖ in the ―living-together of men.‖ To the question of what kind of basic experience 
―permeates a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the 
logicality of ideological thinking,‖ her answer is: Loneliness.222 This loneliness is ―closely 
connected with what she calls the ―uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the 
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curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution.‖223 Like Auden, that 
is, Arendt locates this new basic experience of loneliness, which she sees as a precondition for 
totalitarianism, in modernity: 
What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact 
that loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social 
conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the evergrowing 
masses of our century. The merciless process into which totalitarianism drives and 
organizes the masses looks like a suicidal escape from this reality.
224
  
Compare this quote to those lines from New Year Letter which state that ―The machine has 
cried aloud / And publicized among the crowd…Aloneness is man‘s real condition‖ and the 
similarity is especially clear.  
Arendt connects the experience of loneliness to what she understands as the three 
essential activities of human life: Fabrication, labor and action. Fabrication (from the Greek 
poiesis) refers to the ―making of things,‖ the efforts that go into creating a product or an 
artifice. Whether the result is a piece of craftsmanship, a book, or a work of art, the act of 
fabrication as a rule leaves something behind, which might be shared with others. The second 
activity, ―sheer labor,‖ refers simply to the ―effort to keep alive,‖ for instance activities 
undertaken with the aim of securing nourishment. Finally action (praxis) in Arendt‘s 
philosophical sense refers to activities which take place between people, in other words in a 
social or political world; activities that produce nothing tangible, but are carried out for their 
own sake, for the sake of acting together.
225
 Now, when an individual is involved in 
productive activities, i.e. fabrication, she ―tends to isolate [herself] with [her] work, that is to 
leave temporarily the realm of politics.‖226 We see how isolation may be compatible with 
tyranny but not with totalitarianism: It requires a private sphere to which one may withdraw, 
which under totalitarian regimes is invaded by the threat of terror and subject to the demand 
of ideological orthodoxy. The realm of human action, as already stated, is similarly targeted 
by both totalitarian terror and ideology, attempting to control and orchestrate both deed and 
thought. Only labor, characterized by automatism and predictability, is compatible with 
totalitarian government, which consequently tries to transform all human activities into 
laboring. The same is true the other way around; totalitarianism is more likely to triumph in a 
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world ―whose chief values are dictated by labor,‖ and where isolation has been replaced by 
loneliness.
227
   
Arendt would elaborate on labor, fabrication and action in The Human Condition, to 
which I shall turn shortly. It is important to note already here, however, that Arendt‘s 
understanding of loneliness and its connection (or rather, lack of connection) to the public 
realm is based on her approach to the most basic questions of human identity and being-in-
the-world. For Arendt, the individual is dependent on the social world not only for the 
affirmation of his or her identity, but for the affirmation of the reality of his or her very 
perception of the world:  
Even the experience of the materially and sensually given world depends upon my 
being in contact with other men, upon our common sense which regulates and controls 
all other senses and without which each of us would be enclosed in his own 
particularity of sense data which in themselves are unreliable and treacherous. Only 
because we have common sense, that is only because not one man, but men in the 
plural inhabit the earth can we trust our immediate sense experience.
228
 (173-74) 
This is why, in other words, the totalitarian bid to eliminate plurality – to make out of many, 
different, unpredictable individuals one homogenous mass that acts in accordance with the 
Law –  and with it the shared space of spontaneous interaction, destroys not only the ability to 
act but to think: Our understanding of the world is developed in interaction and dialogue with 
other people. It also helps explain why Arendt sees loneliness, i.e. detachment from the 
common world, as a factor that makes people more susceptible to totalitarian ideology: ―The 
only capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor the world in 
order to function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking is the 
ability of logical reasoning whose premise is self-evident.‖229 
The activity of fabrication is not entirely eliminated from totalitarian societies, 
however. It remains in the ambition, on behalf of totalitarian rulers, to reshape or fabricate 
mankind into an embodiment of their ideology. This ambition of total control would require 
the elimination of all spontaneity; it would be possible ―only if each and every person can be 
reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions, so that each of these bundles of reactions 
can be exchanged at random for any other.‖230 In practice, Arendt concludes, total control was 
achieved only in the concentration camps. The camps were not only aimed at the 
extermination and degradation of people; from this perspective, they constituted a giant 
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experiment in reshaping human nature, aimed at the ―utter elimination of spontaneity and 
freedom from human existence.‖231 It was there, under ―scientifically controlled conditions,‖ 
that the erasure of human individuality came furthest, as human beings were reduced by terror 
into ―mere specimens of the human animal.‖232 The camps, Arendt concludes, are therefore 
―the true central institutions of totalitarian organizational power,‖233 the paradigm for the 
perfect totalitarian society. They demonstrated how totalitarianism‘s aim of ―eliminating the 
incalculable from human existence‖ requires not only the impotence of the ruled, but ―their 
sheer superfluousness.‖234  In the camps, the inmates were indeed both ―exchangeable‖ and 
superfluous.   
 Conversely, one of the biggest threats to totalitarianism was precisely the human 
capacity for spontaneity and new beginnings: Unpredictability remained an inherent potential 
in all human action. Arendt concludes The Origins of Totalitarianism with the following 
quote 
[T]here remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new 
beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only ―message‖ which the end can ever 
produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of 
man; politically, it is identified with man‘s freedom. Initium ut esset homo creates est 
– ―that a beginning be made man was created‖ said Augustine. This beginning is 
guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man.
235
 
 
These lines in Origins point forwards to Arendt‘s major work of philosophy, The Human 
Condition, published in 1958. There, she would place the faculty of action at the very centre 
of her investigation.  ―Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to 
begin,‖236 she had written in Origins, and to act, for Arendt, was to begin.  
2.4 Work, labor and action in The Human Condition 
In The Human Condition, Arendt returns to the distinction between fabrication (now called 
work), labor and action. The bulk of the work is devoted to these three categories, which are 
presented as the three essential types (ideal types) of human activity, together constituting the 
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active life (vita activa).
237
 Each of the activities corresponds to a ―temporal structure‖ or 
experience of time, which again is related to a distinct form of ―unease.‖ Labor, in its 
continual (re)production of objects that are (practically) immediately consumed, is marked by 
a simultaneous immediacy and eternality. The repetitive and seemingly endless process of 
laboring, Arendt argues, mirrors the cycle of nature. It does not allow for any individuality – 
one specimen, or laborer, cannot be distinguished from the next. Work (fabrication), in the 
same schema, redeems laboring man (animal laborans) from that immediacy and eternality: 
By constructing an ―objective and durable‖ world in which ―an individual life can first appear 
out of the life of the species,‖ work interrupts the cycle of labor and therefore allows for the 
recognition of change and thus the comprehension of time itself.
238
 The activity of work is, 
however, entirely absorbed by its end: The meaning of work lies in its products. Arendt 
describes the general purpose of work as determined by the axiom ―in-order-to,‖ as a contrast 
to the expression ―for-the-sake-of,‖ in terms of which humans usually define meaningfulness. 
Here lies the particular ―unease‖ of work: Man as a worker or producer (homo faber) ―cannot 
overcome the meaninglessness of a world determined by the means-end schema.‖239 The 
activity of work can, in Arendt‘s schema, only be redeemed by the possibility of action.  
The meaning of action, for Arendt, is not to be found in material products or 
processes: Action, and the related faculty of speech, takes place between people, i.e. in the 
realm of social or political affairs. Together action and speech ―constitute the fabric of human 
relationships and affairs.‖240 They are the ―outward manifestations of human life,‖ how we 
―insert ourselves into the human world…like a second birth,‖ and how we reveal our 
identities, our ―unique distinctness,‖ to others.241 The premise of action is the ―human 
condition of plurality, [namely] the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world.‖242  The world of human activity is a social world, inhabited by a plurality of 
unprecedented and unpredictable beings ―who never can guarantee today who they will be 
tomorrow.‖243 To act, moreover, to Arendt, means ―to take an initiative, to begin… to set 
something into motion‖244 Action is inherently unpredictable, because each human being is a 
unique specimen who is always potentially able to do something new; i.e. to begin something. 
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Action is also inherently irreversible, because it takes place between people, within a web of 
relations in which the ability of others to respond and act themselves is equal to our own. To 
act is to set into motion a chain of unforeseeable reactions – new actions in themselves, over 
which we have no control.  It is the ability to act, the potential to do something entirely new, 
which Arendt sees as the most essential feature of human life or the human condition:  
Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take 
initiative, are prompted into action. [Initium] ergo ut esset, creates est homo, ante 
quem nullus fuit (―that there be a beginning, man was created before whom there was 
nobody‖), said Augustine in his political philosophy. The beginning is not the same as 
the beginning of the world; it is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who 
is a beginner himself. With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into 
the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of 
freedom was created when man was created but not before.
245
 
 
In an interesting parallel, Mendelson calls attention to Auden‘s use of verbs in one of his 
poems, the elegy for Ernst Toller: the poem concludes with the lines ―existence is believing / 
We know for whom we mourn and who is grieving.‖ (CP: 250) Existence is active, 
Mendelson writes: ―To define the word ―person‖ using nouns like ―self‖ or ―personality‖ is to 
deceive oneself. To define it through verbs like ―believing,‖ ―mourning,‖ and ―grieving,‖ so 
that a person is that which thinks, speaks and acts…is to come near the truth.‖246 In yet 
another elegy, ―At the Grave of Henry James,‖ Auden ends one of his stanzas by noting that, 
at each tombstone, ―one more series of errors lost its uniqueness / And novelty came to an 
end.‖ (CP: 311) One way to read this – and note that the ―series of errors‖ also conveys a 
sense of sinfulness – is in light of Arendt‘s definition of beginnings (actions) as the essential 
capacity of human life: only in death does one individual‘s capacity for novelty truly come an 
end.  
2.5 Action: Beginning and being-in-time  
By beginning something, introducing something unprecedented and unexpected into historical 
time, action interrupts the means-end logic of work. In Arendt‘s terms, while work was able 
to ―save‖ the individual from the recurrence and anonymity of the life-process, action ―saves‖ 
working man from the meaninglessness of strictly productive activity.
247
 In the ―redemptive 
schema‖ of The Human Condition, indicated by the frequent use and crucial function of the 
                                                 
245
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 177. 
246
 Mendelson, Later Auden, 29. 
247
 Arendt, The Human Condition: 7. The terminology might cause some confusion here: By ―working man‖ 
Arendt still refers to someone involved in the creation of works or artifices (homo faber), as distinguished from 
laboring man (animal laborans), involved in the repetitive and ‗automatic‘ processes of labor.  
58 
 
terms ―save‖ and ―redeem,‖ each of the three main categories of human activities needs to be 
redeemed from its inherent (structural) frustrations. Arendt‘s description of the inherent 
frustrations of action – unpredictability and irreversibility – resembles Auden‘s portrayal of 
human ―being in time‖ in his discussion of Kierkegaard. Auden there describes man as a 
―being who becomes,‖ who at every moment ―must choose of his own free will out of an 
infinite number of possibilities which he foresees,‖ the combination of which with the 
irrevocability of choices – ―he can neither guarantee nor undo the consequences of any choice 
he makes‖ – is the main reason for his ―anxiety in time.‖248 Auden concludes that what finally 
enables individuals to choose, ―without blinding [themselves] to [their] anxiety,‖ is ―religious 
faith.‖249 Arendt sees it differently, despite the ―redemptive schema‖ mentioned above. 
Arendt scholars have pointed out that it is not ―man himself,‖  in this scheme, who is in need 
of redemption, but rather the world itself, from the ―inherent ruination‖ that characterizes the 
normal, natural‖ course of affairs.‖250 The redemption in question in The Human Condition, in 
other words, has nothing to do with any ―effort to transcend the conditions in which human 
beings find themselves‖ and is as such opposed to what Arendt perceives as the 
―worldlessness‖ of Christianity.251 Even so, the ―redemptive schema‖ is crucial to Arendt‘s 
theory and worth our attention. 
2.5.1 The redemption faculties of action: promising and forgiveness  
Action stands out from the other two activities in Arendt‘s scheme in that it possesses the 
means of its own redemption. Whereas labor must be redeemed by work and work redeemed 
by action the ―remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by 
acting does not arise out of another and possibly higher faculty, but is one of the potentialities 
of action itself.‖252 The remedy for the irreversibility of action lies in the ―faculty of 
forgiveness,‖ and the remedy for unpredictability is to be found in the ―faculty to make and 
keep promises.‖253 A promise contains the possibility – though not the guarantee – of 
predicting future actions, simply because an individual can choose to fulfill his or her 
promise. But the stabilizing power of promising, as Gottlieb puts it, is ―predicated on the 
interruptive faculty of forgiveness,‖ precisely because no one can guarantee their future 
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keeping of a promise (―…never guarantee today who they will be tomorrow‖). The anxiety 
caused by the inability to ensure that one will keep one‘s promises, or indeed to predict 
whether any action will turn out to have been ―right,‖ can only be alleviated by the prospect 
of forgiveness: ―Only if one trusts others to relieve one of one‘s trespasses can anyone – 
oneself or others – be entrusted again with the power to act.‖254  Without being bound to the 
fulfillment of promises, in Arendt‘s words, 
we would never be able to keep our identities; we would be condemned to wander 
helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each man‘s lonely heart, caught in 
its contradictions and equivocalities – a darkness which only the light shed over the 
public realm through the presence of others, who confirm the identity between the one 
who promises and the one who fulfils, can dispel.
255
  
Arendt refers to the covenant between Abraham and God in the Old Testament to illustrate 
how the promise ―of fidelity to another…is predicated on a prior promise of this other to 
release one from one‘s failure to keep this very promise.‖256 The prospect of forgiveness, in 
other words, has to come first. Only in the act of forgiveness, in 
…this constant mutual relief from what they do can men remain free agents, only by
  constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so 
 great a power as that to begin something new.
257
 
Forgiveness has the potential to bring an otherwise endless chain of consequences, actions 
and re-actions, to an end; it is interruptive in the same sense that work interrupts the repetitive 
and automatic world of labor. At the same time, forgiveness is itself an act and as such a new 
beginning, initiating a new chain of actions in the web of human relationships. This implies 
that the act of forgiving itself needs to be forgiven; there is no ―end‖ to action; it issues into an 
―abyss.‖ The significance of forgiveness, in Arendt‘s scheme, as a (structural) response to 
action is perhaps not fully clear unless contrasted with another re-action to an act, namely 
revenge. Revenge is, in Arendt‘s terms the ―natural, automatic reaction to 
transgression…which because of the irreversibility of the action process can be expected and 
even calculated.‖258 It can be calculated, measured or assessed in proportion to the foregoing 
act or grievance and therefore depends, to a certain extent, on that same act; it retains an 
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element of the ―automatism‖ of nature. Far from putting an end to the consequences of the 
first misdeed, Arendt writes, revenge ensures that ―everybody remains bound to the process, 
permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take its unhindered course.‖259 
Forgiveness, on the other hand, cannot be expected or calculated. To forgive is, in Arendt‘s 
sense, truly an act in that it must be spontaneous to be real. By initiating a new series of acts 
forgiveness also preserves or contributes to the web of human relations.  
2.5.2 Action as suffering, action as miracle: Arendt on Jesus  
Forgiveness also serves to highlight what is described, in The Human Condition, as another 
characteristic of action: Suffering. ―Because the actor always moves among and in relation to 
other acting beings, he is never merely a ―doer‖ but always and at the same time a sufferer. To 
do and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin, and the story that an act starts is 
composed of its consequent deeds and sufferings.‖260 One reason that forgiveness can never 
be predicted or expected is because, one must assume, it is difficult, even unreasonable or 
irrational. I would like to suggest another parallel here between Arendt‘s idea of action and 
Auden‘s idea of ―personal choice‖: Auden, too, wrote of choosing and suffering as two sides 
of the same coin, and his character Joseph, in the Christmas Oratorio written just after his 
conversion to Christianity, was told that ―to do what is difficult all one‘s days / as if it were 
easy, that is faith.‖ (CP: 365) Auden, again similarly to Arendt, also saw the frustrations of 
doing or choosing as a consequence of the ―indeterminacy‖ and ―irrevocability‖ of action, or 
being in time. In a turn that makes the parallels between Auden and Arendt even more 
striking, Arendt refers, in her discussion of forgiveness, to the ―discoverer of the role of 
forgiveness in the realm of human affairs…Jesus of Nazareth.‖261 It is perhaps worth noticing  
that the Jewish, secular Arendt should give such credit to the Christian Messiah at this crucial 
point in her investigation of ―the human condition.‖ It certainly lends credit to the idea that 
Auden and Arendt had more than a few things in common on their ideas about the ―realm of 
human affairs,‖ despite their diverging views on the role of religious faith (as distinct from 
religious figures…). Arendt in fact claims that the fact that Jesus ―made this discovery in a 
religious context and articulated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less 
seriously in a strictly secular sense,‖262 while Auden, of course, considered the faith itself 
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indispensible. In her discussion of Jesus as the ―discoverer‖ of the role of forgiveness, Arendt 
points out that he turns around the ―ordering‖ of promise in the relationship between God and 
men: The point is not that men must forgive because God has promised to do so, but that if 
men forgive each other God shall do ―likewise.‖263 The power of promising ―does not derive 
from God…but on the contrary must be mobilized by men toward each other before they can 
hope to be forgiven by God also.‖264 Forgiveness, then, becomes a primarily human faculty, 
and only secondarily a divine faculty. Still, as Susannah Gottlieb points out, Arendt‘s 
discussion of action in The Human Condition, and especially her writing on forgiveness, 
abounds with references to ―miracles‖ and the ―miraculous.‖ 
Whereas work is principally determined with respect to its ends, action is defined in 
terms of beginnings. Every beginning worthy of the name is as unprecedented as it is 
unexpected, and Arendt therefore strongly associates action with one of the categories 
that Enlightenment discourse progressively disqualified: the miraculous.
265
  
Towards the end of the chapter on action in The Human Condition Arendt writes that action, 
―seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of 
the world, looks like a miracle. In the language of natural science, it is the ―infinite 
improbability which occurs regularly.‖‖266 In the concluding paragraphs, she employs the 
image of birth – or rather ―natality‖267 – as an analogue to action, in language that emphasizes 
its ―miraculous‖ dimension: 
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 
―natural‖ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of new men and the new beginning, 
the action they are capable of by virtue of being born.
268
  
Action is ―ontologically rooted‖ in the miracle of birth because of its ability to initiate 
something new. Whenever an individual reveals herself through action as a unique individual, 
the miracle of birth is in a sense re-enacted. In a formulation that Auden later borrowed as an 
epigraph to one of his essays, she describes the faculty of beginning which is inherent in 
action an ―ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die 
but in order to begin.‖269 Gottlieb points out that Arendt by this phrase not only replaces the 
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―dismal thought of inevitable death‖ with the idea of beginning, but ―inverts the teleological 
order in which the concept of ―in order to‖ operates.‖270 In order to normally indicates an end 
which absorbs the means, either in the sense of achieving a purpose or coming to conclusion; 
here, on the other hand, the end is to begin. I will return to the eschatological implications of 
this idea towards the end of the chapter.  First, however, I will discuss certain political 
implications of Arendt‘s emphasis on action-as-beginning. In The Origins of Totalitarianism 
she had written that ―freedom…is identical with the capacity to begin,‖ in other words to act. 
In the following I will explain how this understanding of freedom, combined with her view of 
the functions of promising and forgiveness as redeeming potentialities of action, informs her 
politics. 
2.5.3 Action as basis for politics: frailty versus sovereignty  
―Democracy is not a political system or party but an attitude of mind.‖271 
According to Greek thought, Arendt writes, action (praxis) and speech (lexis) were the two 
activities deemed to be political in nature and to constitute the ―realm of human affairs.‖272 
The polis (city-state or state in a general sense; body politic) is not ―properly speaking…the 
city state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting 
and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, 
no matter where they happen to be.‖273 This space is a ―space of appearance‖ and comes into 
being ―wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action.‖274 Once these 
activities cease, so does the space of appearance, and with it the potential for political power, 
in Arendt‘s terminology: Strength – the ―natural quality of an individual seen in isolation‖ – 
and violence both remain possible even where people cannot speak or act, but power exists as 
a potential only where people act together.
275
 Being reliant on speech and action, however, 
means that the ―realm of human affairs‖ or political realm is restricted by the same inherent 
limitations as action itself: The ―fleetingness‖ characterizing the time span of interaction and 
the ―boundlessness‖ that results from the unpredictability of action. This ―frailty‖ of human 
affairs, Arendt writes, arises out of ―the human condition of natality.‖276 It has nothing to do, 
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as she sees it, with the ―frailty of human nature,‖ but is a result of new individuals 
continuously entering the world, each embodying a potential new beginning. The frailty of 
human affairs is, like action, inherent in the condition of plurality.   
This does not, however, make the unpredictability and boundlessness of human affairs 
any less frustrating. How, according to Arendt, have humans traditionally attempted to 
respond to this frustration in politics, and to protect themselves from it? In order to 
distinguish between authoritarian and non-authoritarian responses to the frustrations of action, 
Arendt turns to the linguistic origins of the verb ―to act.‖ Both Greek and Latin, she points 
out, has two words with which to describe action: In Greek, archein means ―to begin,‖ ―to 
lead,‖ or finally ―to rule‖ while prattein means ―to pass through,‖ ―to achieve‖ or ―to 
finish.‖277 Correspondingly, Latin distinguishes between the verbs agere (―to set into motion,‖ 
―to lead‖) and gerere (originally ―to bear‖).278 Historically, she explains, the former of the two 
terms in both languages gradually changed from indicating ―beginning‖ or ―setting into 
motion‖ and came to mean chiefly ―to rule‖ and ―to lead.‖279 The role of the beginner, in other 
words, changed into that of a ruler. In Plato, for instance, only the beginning (archē) is 
entitled to rule (archein).
280
 Arendt uses these linguistic origins to relate the role of action to 
both ancient and modern notions of rule, hierarchy and, in the last instance, tyranny. The 
separation of archein from prattein, beginnings from carrying out, has its parallel in the 
relationship between a ruler and her followers: Political action is split into two functions, ―the 
function of giving commands, which [becomes] the prerogative of the ruler, and the function 
of executing them, which [becomes] the duty of his subjects.‖281 Because our understanding 
of action fails to acknowledge its two constitutive – and interdependent – parts, she argues, 
we are often misled into believing that political problems may be solved by the strong 
individual who is capable of inventing and making solutions. But the tyrant or dictator de 
facto ends up ―monopoliz[ing], so to speak, the strength of those without whose help he 
would never be able to achieve anything.‖282 The false notion of strong leadership justifying a 
monopoly on authority, Arendt sees as based on a misconceived ideal of sovereignty. Plato‘s 
justification for the legitimacy of ―philosopher-kings,‖ for instance, is based on the analogy he 
draws ―between the city and the individual soul: only those who have sovereign control over 
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themselves have a right to control others.‖283 This analogy fails to acknowledge the difference 
between the personal and the public sphere. ―There are two atlases,‖ Auden writes in New 
Year Letter, in language closely resembling Arendt‘s: ―the one / The public space where acts 
are done‖ and the other ―the inner space / Of private ownership…That each of us is forced to 
own‖ and where each individual is ―sovereign indeed.‖284 The problem with extending the 
notion of sovereignty to the public sphere, according to Arendt, is that it ignores plurality, and 
thereby the conditions for action.  
If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be 
free, because sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and 
mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be 
sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth…285 
Theories attempting to justify dictatorships, benevolent of not, conceive of politics ―according 
to the model of fabrication.‖ One example is Plato‘s utopia, where Plato is argued to   
substitute[e] making for acting…[He seeks] to overcome in one stroke both poles of 
the temporality of action: its fleetingness on the one hand, which links it with 
everything ephemeral, and its boundlessness and unpredictability on the other, which 
correspond to the condition of nonsovereign freedom – namely, plurality.286  
At this we have arrived at a crucial similarity, according to Arendt, between traditional 
notions of tyranny and the modern political phenomenon of totalitarianism: Both try to 
substitute freedom with sovereignty and consequently to replace action with fabrication. 
Auden had persistently rejected, as Alan Jacob notes, what he saw as the ―Romantic quest for 
autonomous selfhood‖ and the ―delusion that it is possible to exercise full control‖ over one‘s 
destiny.
287
 Arendt can call the ideal of sovereignty a ―replacement‖ of freedom because she 
has defined freedom as the ability to begin. From the opposite point of view, however, where 
freedom is defined in terms of independence, to be free is to be sovereign.  Arendt‘s critique 
of this equation of freedom and sovereignty contains an interesting defense of egalitarianism, 
based on an acknowledgment of the frailty of action.  
The question…is whether our notion that freedom and non-sovereignty are mutually 
exclusive is not defeated by reality, or to put it another way, whether the capacity for 
action does not harbor within itself certain potentialities which enable it to survive the 
disabilities of non-sovereignty.
288
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The ―potentialities‖ to which Arendt appeals are, of course, the ―redemptive faculties‖ of 
promising and forgiveness.  
2.5.4   Promising and the “darkness of human affairs” 
While they remedy the uncertainties of action they are hardly ―saving solutions,‖289 being 
actions of their own and thus characterized by the same frailty. Nevertheless, the stabilizing 
power of promising is recognized by ―all bodies politic that rely on contracts and treaties,‖ the 
―danger and advantage‖ of which is that they ―leave the unpredictability of human affairs and 
the unreliability of men as they are.‖290  
The unpredictability which the act of making promises at least partially dispels is of a 
twofold nature: it arises simultaneously out of the ―darkness of the human heart,‖ that 
is, the basic unreliability of men who can never guarantee today who they will be 
tomorrow, and out of the impossibility of foretelling the consequences of an act within 
a community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to act.
291
 
The function of the faculty of promising is to ―master this twofold darkness of human affairs‖ 
and is, Arendt states, ―the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one‘s 
self and rule over others.‖292 The ―force of mutual promise or contract‖ is what can keep the 
public space in existence beyond the fleeting moment of concerted action.
293
 According to 
Arendt, the stabilizing power of promising was predicated on the possibility of forgiveness. In 
the public realm, however, forgiveness is a thornier issue, and lacks the more clear-cut 
connection between the promise and the contract. On the one hand, ―without being forgiven, 
released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would…be 
confined to one single deed from which we could never recover.‖294 On the other hand, she 
distinguishes between ―trespasses‖ and ―willed evil,‖ and states – again quoting Jesus – that 
the right response to the latter is not forgiveness, but retribution.
295
 Punishment is an 
alternative to forgiveness in that it also ―put[s] an end to something that without interference 
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could go on endlessly.‖296 Here she arrives at a famous paradox. Arendt insists that ―men are 
unable to forgive what they cannot punish.‖297 Some offences, she concludes, those that she 
(following Kant) calls ―radical evil,‖ can neither be forgiven nor punished: They ―transcend 
the realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power,‖ and causes her to ―repeat 
with Jesus: ―It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast 
into the sea.‖‖298 What she, as a consequence of this paradox, ended up concluding about the 
nature of forgiveness, was to become the object of an enlightening disagreement between her 
and Auden.  
2.5.5 Forgiveness, punishment and charity  
To forgive, Arendt writes, is always a personal affair and ultimately done ―for the sake of who 
did it.‖299 In an essay about Shakespeare‘s Falstaff, published five months after Auden‘s 
review of The Human Condition in Encounter, he makes a distinction between forgiveness 
and ―judicial pardon‖ which implicitly responds to Arendt‘s claim about forgiveness quoted 
above.
300
 The law, Auden writes, ―cannot forgive, for the law has not been wronged, only 
broken; only persons can be wronged. The law can pardon, but it can only pardon what it has 
the power to punish.‖301 This limitation does not apply to forgiveness, however: ―The 
command to forgive is unconditional…to the spirit of charity, it is irrelevant whether I am at 
my enemy‘s mercy or he at mine.‖302 As implied by the term charity, Auden here makes ―the 
command to forgive‖ indistinguishable from Agape, love of neighbor as discussed in chapter 
1 (The term ―Agape‖ is sometimes used interchangeably with ―charity‖). Apparently, Auden 
made Arendt aware of the essay, after which she wrote him a letter conceding that she had 
been wrong about forgiveness being done ―for the sake of who did it,‖ and also conceding that 
punishment could only be, as Auden had argued, an alternative to judicial pardon, not to 
forgiveness.
303
  At the same time, Arendt accuses Auden of talking about charity ―as if it were 
love‖ and asks if even love does not ―violate the integrity of the wrongdoer if it forgives 
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without being asked to.‖304 She then defends her own ―prejudice against charity‖ in a passage 
which would seem to confirm the importance of Original Sin in Auden’s idea about 
forgiveness or Agape: ―I would admit that there is a great temptation to forgive in the spirit of 
Who am I to judge?, but I’d rather resist it.‖305 Arendt as such takes a chance against 
―absolute‖ forgiveness, and instead defends the importance of judgment, in both senses of the 
word.  
2.5.6 Redemption as natality: forgiveness as beginning anew  
Arendt‘s ―redemptive schema‖ in The Human Condition, what Gottlieb describes as her 
messianism, is precisely not Christian, as indicated by her stance on Christian charity. As 
Gottlieb puts it, Arendt finds ―the otherworldly character of Christian messianism a stumbling 
block.‖306 In Arendt‘s redemptive schema, accordingly, it is the world (of human affairs) that 
itself needs to be ―saved‖ from its ―inherent ruination‖– ―not souls from the world.‖307 The 
central image she which embodies her ―faith in and hope for the world‖ – natality – is 
therefore, even while described as ―the miracle that saves the world,‖ placed within the 
boundaries of the world. The passage on natality which concludes her chapter on action is, 
admittedly, undeniably ambiguous, ending as it does on a quotation from the Gospels: ―A 
child has been born unto us.‖308 This is, Arendt writes, the ―most glorious and most succinct 
expression‖ found for natality, the embodiment of new beginnings. Even so, Arendt‘s 
analysis, her messianic schema, ultimately remains non-religious. In Gottlieb‘s words: 
Salvation does not come by way of a child, for the appearance of a child is [in]capable 
of resolving once and for all the abyssal structure of action…. This structure is 
constitutively incapable of resolution – so much that not even divine forgiveness can 
resolve it, since forgiveness is primarily a human faculty. Redemption, then, remains 
only a schema internal to the activities of the vita activa in relation to one another: this 
schema cannot be embodied in a salvational figure, nor even can it proceed into the 
world as an independent force. Nowhere is this impossibility more apparent than in the 
appearance of a child, for a child is sheer dependence. And with its appearance the 
anxiety generated by the abyssal structure of action itself changes from a concern with 
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forgiveness for one‘s own actions to an alertness to one‘s responsibility for a child – 
and therefore alertness to one’s responsibility for the world to come.309  
 
This difference with respect to the ―otherworldly‖ character of forgiveness clarifies, as I see 
it, the specifically Christian elements of Auden‘s theory. In his view, redemption did need to 
transcend the human world, because of Original Sin. Arendt‘s insight that even forgiveness is 
an act which therefore requires forgiveness approaches this stance, but to Arendt, the 
interruption of human chains of action by the birth of new human beings – and the re-
enactment of the beginning of birth in each action – was ultimately the means by which man 
was ―released‖ from the consequences of previous actions, and the cause for hope in the 
world. Both in its differences and similarities, Arendt‘s ―redemptive schema‖ and her 
understanding of acting as beginning – a re-enactment of the beginning embodied in birth – 
illuminates Auden‘s time being and how it relates to his anti-totalitarianism. I will now 
summarize what I see as the main implications of Arendt‘s theory for Auden. 
2.5.7 Implications: plurality, helplessness and eschatology 
One implication of promising and forgiveness being considered the ―redemptive faculties‖ of 
action is the relational quality of these acts. As Arendt puts it, both faculties ―depend on 
plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no one can forgive himself and no one can 
feel bound by a promise made only to himself.‖310 This is one way in which promising and 
forgiveness is opposed to the notion of sovereignty, which can well be conceived of in 
isolation.  By placing action at the centre of her analysis of the human condition, Arendt 
deeply commits herself to human plurality or fellowship. Although Auden and Arendt 
disagreed with regards to the relationship between forgiveness and Agape (or charity), 
similarities between their interpretations remain. The dependence on others for forgiveness 
has a parallel in Charles Williams‘ theory of co-inherence, of taking up the burden of another, 
by which Auden was influenced. Auden‘s view of forgiveness, rooted in the conviction of 
Original Sin and developed through the idea of co-inherence, finds expression in For the Time 
Being when the shepherds sing ―We bless / each other‘s sin.‖ (CP: 382.) This dependence on 
the web of human relations is, for Arendt, not viewed in negative terms. Gottlieb points out 
that Auden, too, tended to emphasize ―the essential indeterminacy‖ in contemporary writings 
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and speeches.
311
 To Arendt, human ―distinctness‖ is revealed in speech and action: ―With 
word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second 
birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical 
appearance.‖312 In other words, human individuality is only revealed through an individual‘s 
appearance among a plurality of other beings, both equal and distinct to herself.  
 Arendt‘s use of birth, or the ―fact of natality,‖ as a central image or metaphor has 
similar implications in terms of dependency or helplessness. ―A child is sheer dependence,‖ 
Gottlieb points out, who for this reason deems what she sees as Arendt‘s messianism as 
―weak‖ and ―inconspicuous.‖ Helplessness is, in Arendt‘s schema, an inevitable consequence 
of the unpredictability and irreversibility of even the ―smallest act in the most limited 
circumstances,‖ and this, to her, testifies to the falsity of authoritarian and totalitarian 
ideologies.
313
 The totalitarian attempt to ―fabricate‖ mankind as to be in complete accordance 
with an ideological Law, which abolishes all uncertainty, is, in Arendt‘s words, a ―delusion‖ – 
as is the idea that something can be ―made‖ in the realm of human affairs at all, that one can 
―make institutions or laws, for instance, or ―make‖ people better or worse. 314 Whereas all 
totalitarian movements, in Gottlieb‘s words, seek to ―overcome helplessness with the 
principle of infallible leadership,‖ action, as Arendt understands it, ―continually reignites 
helplessness without end.‖315 Nowhere is this clearer than in her use of the image of the child, 
which, within the general structure of The Human Condition, ―functions as the central image 
of miraculous novelty.‖316 The image also demonstrates why helplessness, in Arendt‘s theory, 
is something to be ―reignited‖ and embraced: Without it, novelty would be impossible. If the 
outcome of an action could be controlled or directed, ―omnipotence would be a concrete 
human possibility,‖ but nothing unexpected would ever happen.317 Neither would human life 
any longer be human, because plurality would be abolished. ―Plurality and contingency save a 
world otherwise consigned to reactive repetition.‖318  
 The definition of action as a new beginning has an eschatological dimension. By 
beginning something new, an action at the same time brings an old chain of events to an end. 
This is especially revealed in the act of forgiveness, that potentiality of action which itself 
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embodied the potential to redeem action. Jesus, as the figure who ―discovered the role of 
forgiveness‖ for Arendt, also discovered the ―immanent eschatological possibility contained 
within the miraculous act of forgiveness itself: the possibility, that is, of ―put[ing] an end to 
something that…could go on endlessly.‖‖319 Without relying on means of any kind, 
―forgiveness can accomplish an end‖ and ―only under the condition that action be able to 
come to an end can it begin.‖320 To Auden, for whom human being in time was characterized 
by the agonizing paradox of indeterminacy and irrevocability, what finally allowed man to 
make choices was ―religious faith.‖ Man had to ―walk in fear of the Lord,‖ in other words to 
make each choice in the shadow of the thought of Judgment Day. But Judgment, for Auden, 
contained the possibility of redemption. By looking at Auden‘s time being through Arendt‘s 
―redemptive schema‖ of forgiveness and promise, we get a sense of how Auden‘s 
existentialist understanding of being in time is compatible with a notion of absolute Judgment. 
Action itself, which is parallel to Auden‘s idea of being a ―patriot of the Now,‖ living in the 
time being, itself provides a beginning and an end which, as Arendt sees it, provides hope for 
the world. To Auden, that hope would have to be anchored in faith in divine redemption, the 
promise embodied in the birth, the Incarnation: That was, for him, the ―prior promise, issued 
by another, of forgiveness for failing to fulfill one‘s promises‖ the responsibility for which 
Arendt assigns to other people.
321
 For Arendt, the very fact of birth was enough to earn the 
description ―the miracle that saves the world,‖ a miracle that was re-enacted every time an 
individual ―stepped forward‖ in word and deed into the human world. 
In this chapter I have introduced Hannah Arendt‘s theory of action to shed light on Auden‘s 
time being and to provide a theoretical bridge to chapter 3. The main points can be summed 
up as follows. Arendt‘s definition of action provides a useful parallel to Auden‘s 
understanding of human being in time, not least since both concepts have been shaped in 
response and opposition to totalitarian metaphysics. Arendt‘s understanding of what she calls 
the ―redeeming faculties of action‖ – promising and forgiveness – illuminates the possibility 
of non-totalitarian responses to the frustrations of the time being, and lends clarity to Auden’s 
proposed responses, which were anchored in his interpretation of Christianity. A politics 
based on the faculties of promising and forgiveness, acts which are relational in nature, 
underpins political ideals of fellowship and plurality above those of sovereignty and strength. 
Dependency and ―helplessness‖ are ultimately positive qualities in Arendt‘s theory, because 
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they allow for fellowship and new beginnings. Arendt‘s emphasis on the function of 
beginnings in the ―realm of human affairs,‖ and her rooting of this function in ―the fact of 
natality,‖ provides an interesting parallel to Auden‘s rooting of human choice in the 
Incarnation. The eschatological dimension of action lends credit to the idea that Auden‘s time 
being may, similarly, be understood as eschatological in nature, as I suggested in chapter 1. 
This chapter has now made available some useful terms and theoretical connections through 
which to assess Auden‘s Horae Canonicae.  
 
 
 
72 
 
3 The Unforgiveable Act: Auden’s Horae 
Canonicae 
 
―I have heard it suggested that the first punctual people in history were the monks – at their 
Office hours. […] [The notion of punctuality, of action at an exact moment, depends on 
drawing a distinction between natural and historical time which Christianity encouraged if it 
did not invent.‖322 
―Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity 
to act would…be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover.‖323 
 
In this chapter, I will investigate the act in Auden‘s Horae Canonicae. Horae Canonicae is a 
sequence made up of seven poems written in the late 1940s and early 50s. Auden originally 
wanted to write them to explore the topic of natural vs. historical time, but the poems 
encompass a range of themes: the act, the community, punishment and forgiveness. At the 
center of the poem sequence is an act. It is not described directly, but referred to as ―this 
dying,‖ ―this death,‖ ―our deed,‖ ―our act‖ and ―this event.‖ The structure of the sequence – 
seven poems corresponding to various points of time throughout the day – is derived from the 
catholic Liturgy of the Hours, also known as the Divine Office or the Canonical Hours: 
recitation of prayers at fixed hours throughout the day. The original purpose of these prayers 
is to encourage participants to meditate upon the significance of the Crucifixion. In other 
words, the unnamed deed in Horae Canonicae alludes to the Crucifixion, if quite subtly. The 
poems are not ―about‖ the crime they imply so much as they are ―about‖ the people who 
partake in the crime, watch it or repress it. The victim of the deed is entirely absent from the 
poem: only perpetrators and observers are present.  
 The city is a central symbol in Horae Canonicae and stands for the collective in its 
various forms. I will argue that Horae Canonicae explores the community in action: what it 
means to act, what it means to act collectively, and what an ―unforgivable act‖ can be said to 
mean in this context. Towards the end, I will link Hannah Arendt‘s theory about the faculty of 
forgiveness to Auden‘s idea of the Last Judgment or Redemption in a discussion of the last 
poem in Horae Canonicae, ―Lauds.‖ 
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Auden, we will recall from the discussion in chapter 1, often resorted to the distinction 
between a crowd, a society and a community. A crowd was simply a ―collection of people,‖ a 
society was organized for ―some functional purpose‖ and a community was ―united by a tie of 
a common love.‖324 He used these terms not only to distinguish between different forms of 
human social relations and organization, but applied them to all kinds of pluralities (defined 
as three or more events), whether in the realm of nature, history, emotions or language. The 
poet, for instance, when sitting down to write a poem, had two crowds at his disposal, 
according to Auden:  
[T]he crowd composed of the total number of occasions of past feeling he can recall, 
and the crowd composed of the total number of words in his vocabulary. His task is to 
organize the relevant members of the latter into a society which will embody as many 
members of the former as it can transform into one community.
325
 
The task of the poet, that is, was to organize crowds of past feeling into verbal societies that 
could– if the poem was good – embody a verbal community. Only human beings, Auden 
writes, have ―real individuality and [are] therefore capable of forming communities.‖326  In 
nature, on the other hand, there were only societies, since ―in nature there is no choice and 
hence no distinction between doing and loving.‖327 Natural events, recurrent and occurring 
according to laws, had to be distinguished from historical events, which were unique. Nature 
and history were related to different forms of time: ―Natural time in which natural events 
occur is reversible and cyclical. Historical time which historical events create by their 
occurrence is irreversible and moves in a unilinear direction.‖328 Man, in Auden‘s phrase, ―is 
both a natural and historical being.‖329  
In the period 1949 – 1954, Auden composed a sequence of seven poems that were 
eventually published as a whole in the collection The Shield of Achilles (1955).
330
 His idea 
was originally, as he explained to an audience of students in 1950, to write a series of poems 
―about the relation of history and nature, which is a problem which has fascinated me for at 
least ten years.‖331 The poems were to be modeled on the church offices, which ―celebrate 
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historical events, particularly events of the Passion of Christ, and…are repeated daily.‖332 By 
1955 the planned sequence was finished, and published as Horae Canonicae. The title –
―canonical hours‖ – refers to the prayer services of the Catholic Church, also known as the 
Divine Office or the Liturgy of the Hours. These are a series of prayers that are carried out at 
set times throughout the course of a day. The seven poems in Auden‘s sequence borrowed 
their titles from seven of these prayers: Prime, Terce, Sext, Nones, Vespers, Compline and 
Lauds.
333
 Auden begins with ―Prime,‖ named after the morning prayer (to be said at the first 
hour of daylight), and ends with ―Lauds,‖ the prayer at dawn in the early morning hours. The 
sequence, in other words, covers the span of a single day. The day cycle is overlaid by several 
levels of imagery, where associations shift between the course of a day, the course of an 
individual‘s life, the life of a society and the life of the world. In Edward Mendelson‘s words, 
the poem‘s structure encompasses ―the decades of a human life from birth to death, the 
history of a city from its founding to its dissolution, and all time from the creation of the 
world to the Last Judgment.‖334 Thematically, the poems circle around what is alternately 
referred to as a deed, a crime, a sacrifice and a murder. While the exact nature of the event is 
never explicitly revealed, the very structure of the sequence alludes to Good Friday: As 
Auden was quoted as saying above, the church offices celebrate the Passion of Christ in 
particular. The day in question could, in other words, be read as Good Friday, and the poems 
as revolving around the event of the Crucifixion. 
 
Horae Canonicae is very interesting to this investigation, for a number of reasons. As shown 
in the first chapter, Auden‘s religious framework in the early 1940s was, to a large extent, 
developed as a response to the political and metaphysical questions raised by the rise of 
fascism and the eruption of the Second World War. Analyzing Horae Canonicae allows me to 
see to what extent Auden‘s ideas from the early 40s, particularly the concept of Original Sin, 
had survived in a post-war context: Which parts remained, and what had changed? Horae 
Canonicae revolves around the Crucifixion, and this makes it a good place to look for the 
expression of religious ideas. For the Time Being was the only poem in Auden‘s authorship 
dealing explicitly with a Christian theme, the Incarnation. Horae Canonicae, to the extent that 
it alludes to the Crucifixion, provides a natural counter-point: The death of Christ as opposed 
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to the birth of Christ. Moreover, of course, Christianity teaches that Jesus died for the sins of 
humankind. The Crucifixion could be understood as the ultimate consequence of human 
sinfulness, making it an ideal motif for investigation of the concept of Original Sin and its 
connection to forgiveness and redemption.  
 Secondly, Horae Canonicae explores the topic of the human City: In Auden‘s usage, 
the City signifies civilization, human collective life, or what Monroe Spears termed ―man‘s 
social achievement.‖335 The City can take any form and as such encompasses all the varieties 
of crowds, societies and communities that Auden saw it as possible for people to enter into. In 
the beginning, Auden explained to his students, he wanted Horae Canonicae to portray the 
―idea of two cities, the civitas dei and the civitas terrena.‖336 The distinction refers to 
Augustine‘s concepts of the City of God and the Worldly City. Auden claimed to have given 
up the particular distinction during the course of writing, ―but kept the idea of the city.‖337 Yet 
that distinction, which appears repeatedly in Auden‘s prose during the 50s, should be 
considered relevant as a backdrop to the poems. In the 1951 prose publication The Enchaféd 
Flood
338
, for instance, Auden describes the two cities as, respectively, ―The state of being 
human as decreed by God,‖ and as the wordly city ―created by self-love, inherited and 
repeated, into which all men since Adam were born, yet where they have never lost their 
knowledge of and longing for the Civitas Dei and the Law of Love.‖339 The ideal community, 
as we saw in chapter 1, was the one that approached as closely as possible the principles of 
Agape, i.e. the ―Law of Love.‖ The City of God, in other words, remains a relevant concept as 
the absolute standard against which all human ―social achievements‖ and civilizations should 
be measured. Horae Canonicae engages, I will argue, closely with the questions raised in 
chapter 1 and 2, regarding the nature and possibility of the good society. The relation of the 
individual to the collective is central to Horae Canonicae, as it was in New Year Letter and 
For the Time Being. More than in the two other long poems, however, Horae Canonicae 
explores the question of collective guilt and responsibility; the role of the ―We‖ in the 
unnamed event at the centre of the poems.  
 Thirdly, the poems‘ central event or act allows me to return to the discussion of 
Arendt‘s concept of action, introduced in chapter 2, and develop its connection to various 
                                                 
335
 Monroe Spears, ―The Dominant Symbols of Auden‘s Poetry,‖ The Sewanee Review 59:3 (1951): 413.   
336
 Auden, ―Nature, History and Poetry [C],‖ Prose III, 650. 
337
 Auden, ―Nature, History and Poetry [C],‖ Prose III: 650. 
338
 Auden‘s investigation of the ―nature of romanticism,‖ originally delivered as a set of lectures to the Page-
Barbour Foundation at the University of Virginia. Incidentally these were the same traditional lectures that T. S. 
Eliot had held in 1935 and which were published as After Strange Gods. (Mendelson, Later Auden, 120.) 
339
 Auden, The Enchaféd Flood, 64.  
76 
 
notions of time in Auden‘s poetic universe. The cyclical structure of the poems, and the prayer 
services they are based on, imitate the cyclical processes of nature. Its central act, on the other 
hand, belongs to historical time and is as such unique and irreversible. But history is also, as 
one critic points out, the realm of ―transcendence and the freedom to create something 
new.‖340 The tension between the cyclical time of nature and the historical time of the act is 
important to the sequence, and central to my argument: That the nature of action demonstrates 
the possibility and necessity of forgiveness and, ultimately, redemption.  
3.1 The Fall  
I draw breath; that is of course to wish  
No matter what, to be wise,  
To be different, to die and the cost,  
No matter how, is Paradise  
Lost of course and myself owing a death…  (―Prime,‖ CP: 627) 
 
The first poem in Horae Canonicae, ―Prime,‖ depicts an individual in the process of waking 
up: ―Simultaneously, as soundlessly, / Spontaneously, suddenly / As, at the vaunt of the dawn, 
the kind / Gates of the body fly open / To its world beyond…‖ (CP: 627.)  The cascade of 
multi-syllabled, similar-sounding adjectives creates a sense of motion and rhythm, of being 
rushed along. The line breaks, punctuation, and the irregularly placed internal rhymes, on the 
other hand, bring the motion to asymmetrical stops, a rhythmical syncopation almost tripping 
up the reader. Auden, famously attentive to the musicality of poetry, and obsessive about 
formal and metrical requirements, here achieves several effects at once. The combined 
elegance and complexity of the meter in ―Prime‖ requires a certain attentiveness in the reader, 
in order not to stumble: one could argue that it wakes us up. More importantly, the tension 
between motion and interruption introduces, by imitation, one of the central concerns of 
Horae Canonicae: the difference (and tension) between historical and natural time. Each of 
the three stanzas contains one long, unbroken sentence. Along with the syllabic meter and 
internal rhymes, this gives the lines an unforced, natural flow, while the interruptive 
measures, on the other hand, draws attention to individual words and rhymes.  
In one of his lectures on ―Nature, History and Poetry,‖ Auden used ―Prime‖ to 
illustrate the process by which a poem develops, how the crowd of recollections is made into 
a verbal society. Here Auden explains that he used syllabic meter in ―Prime‖ to achieve a 
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balance between ―freedom and order.‖341 This balance – or tension – could be interpreted as 
an analogy to the tension between natural and historical time in human experience. Through 
conscious metrical choices, the poet could create a voluntary ―sense of pattern‖ out of the 
crowds of memories and words he had at his disposal.  
 ―The experience of waking up is something that has always interested me,‖ Auden 
explained in lectures; ―the problem of return to consciousness and the return of memory and 
identity, the whole relation of the ego and self.‖342 In sleep the individual belongs to the realm 
of the ―Unconscious, the Instinctive and extra-personal,‖343 in other words, outside the realm 
of personal responsibility, willed choices and individuality. Upon returning to consciousness, 
he or she is back in the historical world of irreversible actions and a unilinear time; the world 
of work and action that, according to Arendt, interrupts the endless cyclicality of natural 
processes. The first stanza ends with the words ―Recalled from the shades to be a seeing 
being, / From absence to be on display, / Without a name or history I wake / Between my 
body and the day.‖ (CP: 627). In this interval, ―between my body and the day,‖ the speaker is 
awake, but not yet self-conscious, ―the will has still to claim / This adjacent arm as my own, / 
The memory to name me.‖  The senses (―the kind / Gates of the body‖) have become aware of 
the external world, but the personality is still unsplit into instinct and morality, between 
individual desires and the ―shouldn‘ts and shoulds‖344 of the social world, so that the day is 
still ―intact.‖ (CP: 627) In this state of ―intact‖ time and an intact sense of self, the speaker 
calls himself the ―Adam sinless in our beginning, / Adam still previous to any act.‖ (627)  It is 
common to read the wakening into consciousness portrayed in ―Prime‖ as an analogue to the 
Fall. When identity, volition, and memory are assumed, as Monroe Spears puts it, ―Paradise is 
lost.‖345 This interpretation is supported by the third and last stanza of ―Prime,‖ the quote that 
opened this subchapter: 
 I draw breath; that is of course to wish 
 No matter what, to be wise, 
 To be different, to die and the cost, 
 No matter how, is Paradise 
 Lost of course and myself owing a death.  (CP: 628.) 
 
In 1939, Auden had written that the Fall is ―repeated in the life history of each individual, so 
that we have a double memory of Eden, one from personal experience, and one social-
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historical.‖346  In ―Prime‖ the Fall repeats itself in the daily entry into consciousness. The 
rapidly disappearing memory of that ―smiling‖ instant ―in which the day is intact‖ doubles as 
a memory of Eden, in an echo of a stanza from one of Auden‘s ―Sonnets from China,‖ 
wherein, ―Chilled by the present, its gloom and its noise, / On waking we sigh for an ancient 
South, / A warm nude age of instinctive poise, / A taste of joy in an innocent mouth.‖347 In 
Auden‘s 1941 review of Reinhold Niebuhr, whose passages dealing with sin Auden found 
especially ―brilliant,‖ he drew attention to an excerpt where Niebuhr describes the Fall as ―a 
symbol of an aspect of every historical moment in the life of Man. …Perfection before the Fall 
is, in other words, perfection before the act.‖348 The event of waking up in ―Prime‖ makes up 
one such historical moment, and in the moment of drawing breath – resuming consciousness – 
the intactness of the day ―before the act‖ is broken. According to Alan Jacobs, the key 
experiences that led Auden to Christian belief involved, among other things, ―a conviction of 
his own sinfulness,‖ which consequently informed large parts of his theology early in his life 
as a Christian.
349
 However, Jacobs argues, Auden later moved beyond his emphasis on 
existential despair and contrition: One major theme in his later moral theology became ―the 
insistence that we live in the realm of natural necessity as well as that of existential choice.‖350 
Another such theme was his emphasis on communal life. Tony Sharpe has described how this 
emphasis on community informed Auden‘s Anglicanism: ―Private devotion was important to 
Auden…but so were the public prescriptions in The Book of Common Prayer, defining ‗a 
community in action‘ renewed by repetition through the centuries.‖351 The ―community in 
action‖ is, I would argue, precisely the issue and central problem in Horae Canonicae. In the 
last lines of ―Prime,‖ the speaker states that: 
 
   …my name 
 Stands for my historical share of care 
 For a lying self-made city, 
 Afraid of our living task, the dying 
 Which the coming day will ask.  (CP: 628.)  
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The individual‘s existence in ―historical time‖ unavoidably entailed her participation in 
communal life, in the ―self-made city‖ or civitas terrena, ―created by self-love.‖ To attempt to 
withdraw from the City into a private world of prayer and contrition would make one no less 
complicit in the unspecified ―dying / Which the coming day will ask.‖ If we remember that a 
poem, for Auden, constituted a ―verbal community‖ that could be analogous to interpersonal 
communities, it becomes clear that the structure of Horae Canonicae itself contains a parallel 
to the participation or ―historical share of care‖ that the speaker in ―Prime‖ acknowledges. 
According to Sharpe, Auden associated Anglicanism with ―liturgical practice that 
enabled…reaffirmation of individual faith within a verbal structure that was communal.‖352 In 
choosing the canonical hours as a model for his sequence of poems, Auden consciously 
entered into/participated in a communal liturgical practice which might enable the 
―reaffirmation of individual faith.‖  
3.2 The Act  
The critic Richard Johnson has suggested that an exploration of ―action‖ or ―to act‖ lies at the 
heart of Horae Canonicae.
353
 Based on the understanding of action developed in chapter 2, 
the questions I aim to answer in this section are: How does the act appear in Horae 
Canonicae, what is its significance, and how does it relate to Auden‘s communal vision, 
Original Sin, and his warning against totalitarianism? I will look at these questions with 
reference to the poems ―Terce,‖ ―Sext,‖ ―Nones‖ and ―Compline.‖  
The act at the heart of Horae Canonicae is a murder, although it is never described 
explicitly. During the course of the sequence, the central act is referred to as ―the dying,‖ ―this 
death,‖ ―our deed,‖ ―our act,‖ ―our feat‖ and ―this event.‖ The terms themselves are neutral, 
descriptive, saying nothing about the moral status of the act. But we know that it is related to 
―us‖ somehow, that the act-feat-deed is ―ours,‖ in other words that it concerns the community. 
The poems avoid direct descriptions of the deed, describing instead the thoughts and actions 
of participants, observers, witnesses and other ―agents.‖ The poem is about ―us‖ as much as it 
is about the victim of ―our deed,‖ concerned with the significance of the murder for the 
collective, its complicity, participation and response.  
In an essay about detective fiction from 1948, titled ―The Guilty Vicarage,‖ Auden 
discusses the unique nature of murder. All crimes, he writes, are ―offenses against God,‖ 
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some are offenses against one‘s neighbors, but only murder was also an offense against 
society. ―Murder is unique, in that it abolishes the part it injures, so that society has to take the 
place of the victim and on his behalf demand restitution or grant forgiveness; it is the one 
crime in which society has a direct interest.‖354 In Arendt‘s sense, murder is the ultimate 
demonstration of the irreversible nature of action. If action could be redeemed by the 
possibility of future forgiveness, the forgiveness becomes distorted in the case of murder, 
because it must be performed vicariously. But what about a murder in which the society as a 
whole had been complicit? Questions of guilt, responsibility and forgiveness permeate Horae 
Canonicae. The poems ―Terce,‖ ―Sext,‖ ―Nones‖ and ―Compline‖ all explore the question of 
complicity: Who can be said to have responsibility for, or have contributed to the act? Could 
anyone at all be exempted? And how could the collective – the society, community or City – 
respond to its own role in facilitating the murder? The day cycle of the poems makes all 
events that take place in it the more symbolic. If the murder is at the heart of the poem, how 
are the other actions depicted in the cycle related to it?  
 After shaking paws with his dog 
 (Whose bark would tell the world that he is always kind), 
 The hangman sets off briskly over the heath.   (―Terce,‖ CP: 628) 
 
The second poem in Auden‘s cycle, ―Terce,‖ corresponds to the third canonical hour, the 
prayer traditionally said at 9 A. M. In the Liturgy, ―Terce‖ refers to the hour at which Jesus 
was condemned to death. In the opening stanza of the poem, three representative figures are 
getting ready for work: the hangman, the judge and the poet. All three appear as ―civilians,‖ 
i.e. outside their official or professional role, mentioned with reference to spouses and pets 
and recognizably domestic surroundings: the judge, for instance, ―descends his marble stair‖ 
with a sigh, after ―Gently closing the door of his wife‘s bedroom / (Today she has one of her 
headaches).‖ (CP: 628) These details have the effect of humanizing the nameless figures, 
establishing a sense of identity in the reader through the recognition of the average. According 
to Arendt, action is something that invariably takes place in an inter-personal, social realm. In 
―Prime,‖ the speaker was still confined to what Auden thought of as ―the inner space / Of 
private ownership,‖355 and has yet to enter the world of action. In ―Terce,‖ the ―I‖ from 
―Prime‖ has yielded to a ―we,‖ and the figures are preparing to enter the city. The poem deals 
with a moment with which ―the Big Ones / Who can annihilate a city / Cannot be bothered,‖ 
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and each individual is left to ―his secret cult,‖ praying for personal and arguably banal 
accomplishments: ―Let me get through this coming day / Without a dressing down from a 
superior… Or behaving like an ass in front of the girls; / Let something exciting happen… Let 
me hear a new funny story.‖ (CP: 628-629.) The rather trivial desires, ambitions and fears 
governing everyday life are here depicted in all their underwhelmingness. ―At this hour we all 
might be anyone,‖ the speaker states, a phrasing that foreshadows the ―crowd‖ which is to 
appear in the next poem; in a crowd, we may recall, there are no persons, only faceless and 
replaceable constitutive elements.  For the time being, however, the figures in ―Terce‖ seem 
―naively unaware‖ of the ―measureless resonances and implications‖356 of their role in the 
event soon to take place. The hangman ―does not know yet who will be provided / To do the 
high works of Justice with‖ and the poet does not know ―whose Truth he will tell.‖ (CP: 628.) 
 The figures in ―Terce‖ are presented not as persons but in their respective functions as 
professionals. In the third poem of the sequence, ―Sext,‖ Auden continues to explore the topic 
of vocation, or what Arendt defined as the faculty of work. In the first stanza the speaker 
praises ―that eye-on-the-object look‖ of people ―forgetting themselves in a function,‖ and asks 
―Where should we be but for them?‖ (CP: 630) It is due to the ―nameless heroes‖ who forgot 
their dinners while engrossed in their work, he claims, that civilization has progressed at all. 
In the second stanza the focus shifts from expertise, superiority within a given field, to the 
authority that comes with it. ―You may not like them much,‖ the speaker admits, referring to 
figures of command, the ones who take pleasure in always ―being right,‖ ―but we owe them / 
basilicas, divas, / dictionaries, pastoral verse, / the courtesies of the city.‖ (CP: 631) The 
characteristics and abilities that have driven human development forward, however, and made 
possible successes on an ever larger scale, have also enabled proportional misdeeds and 
atrocities, in Auden‘s schema. Without the human ability to subordinate or sacrifice certain 
concerns in order to achieve a self-defined goal, they would not be able to justify the sacrifice 
of individuals for the larger good. In the words of the poet Anthony Hecht, commenting on 
the poem, the ―competence of the actors also enables them to carry out death sentences.‖357 In 
―Terce,‖ without the judge and the hangman serving in the name of Law and Justice, there 
would ―at this noon, for this death…be no agents.‖ (CP: 630) In this image we recognize the 
understanding of human capacity for good as inseparable from the ability to do evil; in other 
words, what Auden interpreted in terms of Original Sin.   
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 All the three parts of ―Sext‖ play on the contrast between a generous exposition on a 
concept – vocation, authority and the crowd, respectively – and a concise final statement 
about that concept‘s connection to ―this death,‖ altering the reader‘s view of its significance. 
―This death‖ takes place in public; it is commanded, carried out and watched. It is observed 
not by individuals but by a crowd which ―stands perfectly still, / its eyes (which seem one) 
and its mouths / (which seem infinitely many) / expressionless, perfectly blank.‖ (CP: 632). It 
happens, as is repeated thrice, at noon, alluding to the first hour of the Crucifixion. Richard 
Johnson claimed that the Crucifixion, in this poem, is ―emblematic of all actions.‖358 If that is 
true, it is also the ultimate symbol of the sinfulness which, if one believes in Original Sin, is 
inherent in all human action. 
In ―Nones,‖ set at the ninth hour from dawn (the hour of Christ‘s death), a community 
wakes up – or comes out of the trance of the crowd – in the aftermath of the execution. ―It is 
barely three, / Mid-afternoon, yet the blood / Of our sacrifice is already / Dry on the grass; we 
are not prepared / For silence so sudden and so soon…‖ (CP: 634) The collective is ―left alone 
with [its] feat.‖ (CP: 634) At its core the poem explores the response of the collective to the 
―deed‖ that has been done. Two moments have particular significance with regards to the 
argument under development. The first is the speaker‘s realization in the third stanza, on 
behalf of his collective, that ―wherever / The sun shines, brooks run, books are written, / 
There will also be this death.‖ (CP: 635) This insight follows on the heels of a claim that any 
activity, even the most innocent game, ultimately lead to this ―deed,‖ the result of which is 
―the mutilated flesh‖ of the victim. This is a fact of which ―we‖ will from now on always be 
aware, an awareness which is going to haunt their subconscious and pursue their waking 
minds until, one day, it catches up with them: ―under a hotel bed, in prison / Down wrong 
turnings, its meaning / Waits for our lives.‖  (CP: 635) At some unspecified point in the 
future, in other words, the ―we‖ of the poem, representing the community, are going to realize 
the full extent of their deed. The shadow of Judgment Day in this sentiment in fact 
materializes a few lines on in seemingly apocalyptic imagery: ―Sooner than we would choose 
/ Bread will melt, water will burn, / And the great quell begin.‖359 (CP: 635) Secondly, the 
poem hones in on the unique nature of the murder: All ―our projects under constructions, / 
Look only in one direction, / Fix their gaze on our completed work…Crane and pick-axe wait 
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to be used again, / But how can we repeat this?‖ (CP: 635, my italics) Murder is, as discussed 
earlier, the ultimate embodiment of the irreversibility of the act.  It ―abolishes the party it 
injures,‖ leaving the question of punishment, forgiveness and atonement in the hands of 
society. But how can the collective respond to this? 
The day is too hot, too bright, too still, 
Too ever, the dead remains too nothing. 
What shall we do till nightfall?   (CP: 634)   
 
These lines from the first stanza of ―Nones‖ hone in on the uncomfortable experience of time 
after the deed; the excruciating indifference of a time in which the terrible sacrifice seems to 
have left no mark. It is ―too ever,‖ too unrepeatable, it cannot be undone. It is also ―too still‖: 
There is no apocalypse (yet), no repercussions, no response from the universe. No change. If 
the deed was hoped to achieve something, it fails to materialize, and the members of the 
collective are no nearer to an answer to the eternal question: ―What shall we do?‖ The most 
distressing factor is perhaps the lack of distress, the seamless way the catastrophe has merged 
itself with the other events in time. Stanza five returns to the baffling normality of society, 
continuing as if nothing has happened: ―The shops will re-open at four, / The empty blue bus 
in the pink square / Fill up and depart: we have time / To misrepresent, excuse, deny / 
Mythify…‖ (CP: 635) The individuals who had witnessed the murder as a part of the crowd, 
the ―faceless many who always / Collect when any world is to be wrecked,‖ are now once 
again persons, none of whom wishes to take responsibility for the crime: 
 
All if challenged would reply 
 ―It was a monster with one red eye, 
 A crowd that saw him die, not I.‖  (CP: 634)  
 
For Hannah Arendt, it was an important point that ―men are unable to forgive what they 
cannot punish.‖360 This becomes significant in a context wherein a collective as such is 
complicit in a crime, and where no identifiable individuals admit responsibility for the act. In 
the 1948 essay on detective fiction, Auden explained that a murderer should, ―preferably,‖ be 
executed: ―Execution…is the act of atonement, by which the murderer is forgiven by 
society.‖361 But what if the society is the culprit? In ―Nones,‖ the vague guilt and impotence 
felt by the collective in the wake of the act materializes in subconscious anxiety. ―Our 
dreaming wills,‖ the speaker states, wander ―on knife edges, on black and white squares,‖ 
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fleeing through vaguely disturbing subconscious realms in order to ―escape / This dead calm.‖ 
(CP: 636) Meanwhile, the apocalyptic hints discussed above indicate the fear that there will 
indeed be a day of reckoning. This foreshadowing of a Judgment Day re-appears in the night 
poem ―Compline.‖  
In ―Compline,‖ sixth in Auden‘s sequence and traditionally the last prayer in the 
Liturgy, the speaker has withdrawn from the social realm, left to contemplate the events of the 
day. Alone, he waits for the ―instant of recollection / When the whole thing makes sense‖ but 
all he recalls is ―doors banging, / Two housewives scolding… A child‘s wild look of envy, / 
Actions, words, that could fit any tale, / And I fail to see either plot / Or meaning.‖ (CP: 640) 
Above all, he cannot remember a thing ―between noon and three.‖ (CP: 640) The murder or 
sacrifice, ―our deed‖ which took place in that interval of time, withholds its significance from 
the participants. ―Compline‖ is the hour of confession, but the speaker is uncertain of what to 
confess: Maybe, he muses, ―My heart is confessing her part / In what happened to us from 
noon till three,‖ but the heart talks ―a language of motion / I can measure but not read.‖ (CP: 
640) The heart‘s rhythm, like the rest of the human body, belongs to the realm of nature 
where processes are cyclical. As the speaker approaches unconsciousness, ―the body escapes, 
/ Section by section, to join / Plants in their chaster sleep.‖ (CP: 640) In ―Nones,‖ the 
automatic bodily functions restore ―the order we try to destroy, the rhythm / We spoil out of 
spite: valves close / And open exactly, glands secrete, / Vessels contract and expand / At the 
right moment, essential fluids / Flow to renew exhausted cells…‖ (CP: 636) The language 
evokes images of eternal reoccurrence, echoing Auden‘s reminder that human beings belong 
to the natural as well as the historical world. In historical time, however, participants must 
face the reality of beginnings and ends. The speaker in ―Compline‖ admits that ―the end, for 
me as for cities, / Is total absence,‖ (CP: 641) recalling the pre-conscious absence from 
―Prime‖ as well as the more solemn absence in death: What comes to be ―Must go back into 
non-being / For the sake of equity, the rhythm / Past measure or comprehending.‖ (CP: 641) 
In the following and last stanza of ―Compline‖ the speaker turns to contemplate the prospect 
of final Judgment: ―Can poets (can men in television) / Be saved?‖ (CP: 641) He prays for 
himself, his friends and ―all poor s-o-b‘s who never / Do anything properly‖ to be spared ―in 
the youngest day when all are / Shaken awake, facts are facts, / (And I shall know exactly 
what happened / Today between noon and three).‖ (CP: 641) The ―youngest day‖ alludes, of 
course, to Judgment Day. It is significant that the speaker expects to be shown ―exactly what 
happened‖ between noon and three, that is, to be shown the full significance of the 
Crucifixion. In 1939, Auden had written that 
85 
 
Forgiveness of sins does not mean that the effects of our acts are annulled, but that we 
are shown what that effect is. This knowledge, which is our only punishment, the 
punishment consisting in knowing that we have failed in our intention, removes our 
sense of guilt, for guilt is in part ignorance of the exact effect of our act upon others, 
and in part a dread that upon ourselves it has had no effect at all, that we are so 
unimportant to be beneath the notice of the Divine justice.
362
 
To ―know exactly what happened,‖ in other words, can mean forgiveness as well as judgment.  
Here we approach the religious significance of the ―unforgiveable act‖ at the center of Horae 
Canonicae. Jan Curtis has presented a persuasive reading of Auden‘s ―philosophy of salvation 
history‖363 in Horae Canonicae. He argues that the sequence, as a poetic construct, not only 
―provides an analogue of the Christian philosophy of history‖ but that the choice to model the 
poems on the Divine Office, as a liturgical pattern of devotion, suggests not only analogy ―but 
a sacramental re-enactment of the events of salvation history.‖364 In Christianity, it is the 
―redeeming work of Christ who gives meaning to a history which men and women create.‖365 
Connecting this account to Arendt‘s interpretation of action sheds further light on the 
collective dilemma in Horae Canonicae. In Arendt‘s philosophy, individual action could be 
redeemed through the act of forgiveness:  
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our 
capacity to act would…be confined to one single deed from which we could never 
recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the 
sorcerer‘s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell.366 
The faculty of forgiveness depends, in Arendt, on plurality, ―on the presence and acting of 
others, for no one can forgive himself.‖367 In the human plurality of the ―city‖ in Horae 
Canonicae, no one is at liberty to forgive the central act because, it is implied, no one is 
entirely free from complicity. But the Christian significance of the Crucifixion is, of course, 
that humans are forgiven through Christ‘s voluntary sacrifice. It is the act through which 
history, conceived of as the chain of human action, is ultimately redeemed. The forgiveness of 
sins, Curtis explains, constitutes the ―eschatological fulfillment toward which the historical 
world, as a redeemable world, moves.‖368  
However, as the speaker in Auden‘s ―Compline‖ admits even as he prays to be 
forgiven: ―It is not easy / To believe in unknowable justice / Or pray in the name of a love / 
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Whose name one‘s forgotten.‖ (CP: 641) The question from ―Nones‖ remains: what shall we 
do until nightfall?  In the next parts of this chapter I will look at Auden‘s formulation of 
possible responses to that question in the political, social and poetic realm.  
3.3 The Victim  
The liturgical prayers are, as Curtis emphasizes, a form of ―corporate worship.‖369 Their 
significance cannot be divorced from their collective function. From the individual I 
becoming aware of the world in ―Prime‖ to the individuals getting ready for work in ―Terce‖ 
to ―everyone‖ watching the sacrifice taking place in ―Sext,‖ Horae Canonicae weaves the 
individual voice and experience into a social context, without which, of course there would be 
no individual existence. This exploration of the dynamic between individual and collective 
serves, in the poem‘s context, a specific purpose. Modeled on a ritual meditation revolving 
around the significance of the Crucifixion, the poems in Horae Canonicae explore the 
dynamic of individual and collective, private and public, with regards to a central crime, an 
unforgiveable act: A murder. The question of guilt and responsibility concerns the collective 
as a whole. Individual and collective become citizen and city: Born into history as well as into 
nature, each person takes part in a common effort to create or sustain a civilization with its 
particular norms, rules and aims. A city or civilization, in Auden‘s sense of the word, does not 
(only) evolve mindlessly and deterministically, but is shaped by our conscious wishes, aims 
and actions. ―The course of History,‖ we remember from the discussion of Simeon‘s 
Meditation in For the Time Being, is predictable ―in the degree to which all men love 
themselves,‖ and spontaneous in the degree to which ―each man loves God and through Him 
his neighbor.‖ The ―city‖ is where the central act of Horae Canonicae takes place, and 
constitutes a central theme in its own right. In this section I will explore the city as a socio-
political arena, as it appears in Auden‘s evening poem in Horae Canonicae, ―Vespers.‖ 
  ―Vespers‖ is the poem that addresses the question of the city‘s collective 
responsibility for the murder perhaps the most explicitly. Before the first sentence is over, the 
poet has asked or alluded to ―what a citizen really thinks of his citizenship.‖ (CP: 637) The 
speaker is on his way back home after a day of work, and during the course of his walk he 
runs into his ―Anti-type,‖ with whom he constructs an imaginary argument. In the liturgy, 
―Vespers‖ is prayed in the early evening, the hour of ―peaceful reflection on the passing 
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day.‖370  The stanza form in ―Vespers‖ is among the most relaxed in the sequence: it is written 
in a seemingly prosaic and conversational style which Mendelson simply calls ―cadenced 
prose.‖371 The style allows for lengthier sentences, and prepares the reader for longer trains of 
thought, digressions and what might first come across as detached observations and idle 
musings. One can practically hear the dawdling train of thought in the poet‘s mind as he 
strolls aimlessly through the city. The casual form lowers the reader‘s defenses in a way that 
is typical of Auden, setting us up for a final statement that will impact all the more in its 
unexpected gravity.  
 ―At this hour we all might be anyone‖ was the verdict from ―Terce.‖ In ―Vespers‖ this 
image is inverted: ―in this hour of civil twilight all must wear their own faces.‖ (CP: 637) One 
can imagine, for instance, the commuter from Auden‘s famous ―September 1, 1939‖ who was 
in the morning on his way ―into the ethical life‖, concentrating on his vows, now tired after a 
long days‘ work, with more truthful wishes written into his face. In this hour, the masks and 
demeanors of everyday ―ethical life‖ have become more transparent – or perhaps it is the 
speaker, his own concerns and worries successfully worn down by a long day, who has 
become more perceptive. In either case, the speaker now perceives, for instance, behind a 
―drunkard‘s caterwaul‖ his ―rebel sorrows crying for a parental discipline.‖ (637) The central 
opposition in the poem is set up by the speaker between himself as an Arcadian and his ―Anti-
type‖ the ―Utopian.‖ The Arcadian poet wants, in Mendelson‘s words, ―to be left alone to 
daydream about an aesthetic Eden,‖ while his utopian counterpart ―dreams of organizing 
everyone into the permanent ethical order of some New Jerusalem.
372
 This opposition has 
long roots in Auden‘s poetry. One example would be Sonnet XVIII from ―Sonnets from 
China,‖ where ―at night in our huts we dream of a part / In the balls of the future‖ and ―On 
waking we sigh for an ancient South.‖ (CP: 193) Both tendencies were present in Auden‘s 
archetypical individual, but whether one leaned more towards the one or the other longing he 
perceived as a matter of personality.  ―Arcadia‖ is associated with ancient Greece and the 
―idyllically pastoral‖373 – but also, as the speaker states, with ―Eden‖, with a state of harmony 
preceding history. Auden also attributed to the Arcadian personality an ―aesthetic‖ attitude, in 
terminology deriving from Kierkegaard. Thus the speaker observes that a lampshade in a store 
window is ―too hideous for anyone in their senses to buy‖ while the Utopian notes that it is 
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―too expensive for a peasant to buy.‖ (CP: 637) If the latter point of view has a ring of 
absurdity, the first, though entertaining, is frivolous. The Arcadian in the poem is bohemian, 
ivory tower, removed from reality, loves comfort, cultivates certain taboos and rituals, and 
idealizes the past: ―In my Eden we have a few beam-engines, saddle-tank locomotives, 
overshot waterwheels and other beautiful pieces of obsolete machinery to play with…‖ (CP: 
638) He preserves certain illusions about the present, and hopes that ―our senators will behave 
like saints, provided they don‘t reform me.‖ (CP: 638) In other words, he avoids the question 
of participation in the public or political sphere by imagining that professional politicians will, 
somehow, be exempt from the flaws that he is aware of in himself. The Utopian, on the other 
hand, is pragmatic, practical, dedicated, uncompromising and willing to commit violence, but 
also to risk violence against his own person. He idealizes the future, cultivates rationality and 
envisions a world where ―the temples will be empty but all will practice the rational virtues.‖ 
(CP: 638) Whereas, in the speaker‘s Eden, ―a person who dislikes Bellini has the good 
manners not to be born,‖ in the Utopian‘s New Jerusalem ―a person who dislikes work will be 
very sorry he was born.‖ (CP: 638) The contrasts between the two also bear certain 
similarities to Auden‘s frequently used distinction between the artist and the politician, or 
between the point of view privileging the uniqueness of particular individuals and events (the 
artist, the historian) and the attitude compared with generalities, averages and comparable 
truths.
374
 
 As in ―Terce‖ and ―Sext,‖ however, casual musings and drawn-out comparisons build 
up towards a simpler and harsher concluding statement. In the very last sentence, which itself 
spans six stanzas, the speaker turns to the possible meaning or purpose of the meeting of the 
two ―incorrigible‖ types. Perhaps, he suggest, they met to ―remind each other…of that half of 
their secret which he would most like to forget‖? At that, the poem has arrived at its real 
point, the reminder ―…for a fraction of a second, to remember our victim.‖ Our nameless and 
faceless victim here makes its third and last appearance in Horae Canonicae. Each time the 
expression used is ―our victim.‖ In the concluding lines of ―Vespers,‖ the speaker connects 
the victim and the city in a statement that drives home the extent to which Auden‘s ideas 
about society were still anchored in the doctrine of original sin: 
…forcing us both, for a fraction of a second, to remember our victim (but for him I 
could forget the blood, but for me, he could forget the innocence), 
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on whose immolation (call him Abel, Remus, whom you will, it is one Sin Offering) 
arcadias, utopias, our dear old bag of a democracy are alike founded: 
 
For without a cement of blood (it must be human, it must be innocent) no secular wall 
will safely stand. 
        (CP: 639)  
Any civilization, in other words, is founded upon the sacrifice of innocents. No ―city‖ comes 
into being without such sacrifice; the point about a society, after all, was ―that the part is 
subordinate to the whole.‖375 The reference to Abel and Remus is significant here. Both of 
their counterparts – their brothers Cain and Romulus, by whom they were murdered – became 
founders of cities. In both cases it is the murderer who founds the state, an idea first developed 
in Augustine.
376
 Power, in this worldly city, is from the first moment associated with guilt. 
Hannah Arendt, who was also intimately familiar with the writings of Augustine, expressed a 
similar thought when she wrote that ―whatever brotherhood human beings may be capable of 
has grown out of fratricide, whatever political organization men may have achieved has its 
origin in crime.‖377 To accept this premise and still not ―forget the innocence‖ – not to treat it 
with indifference or try to justify the fact – is a problem the poem has been quietly working 
towards. Even if the sacrifice is somehow inevitable, it is ―real suffering and reminds us of all 
the suffering in the world which we prefer not to think about because, from the moment we 
accepted this world, we acquired our share of responsibility for everything that happens in 
it.‖378 This responsibility, Mendelson asserts, is what both the Arcadian and Utopian in 
―Vespers‖ try to avoid, in their respective daydreams of an ―aesthetic Eden‖ and the 
―permanent ethical order‖ of a New Jerusalem: it is only when they meet that they are 
reminded of the ―mechanisms of injustice and murder which their evasions serve.‖379 What 
they try to evade could perhaps, in the terminology of earlier chapters, be described as the 
time being. Like ―So many,‖ they try to say ―Not Now.‖   
In 1950, Auden wrote about the ―most besetting temptations for the Christian layman‖ 
in the contemporary age ―in relation to the evils of the historical order with which it is his 
duty to deal.‖380 Apart from ―the self-love which either fear to lose by change or hopes to 
gain,‖ the most important of these temptations were to be found in laziness and impatience: 
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Laziness acknowledges the relation of the present to the past but ignores its relation to 
the future; impatience acknowledges its relation to the future but ignores its relation to 
the past; neither the lazy nor the impatient man, that is, accepts the present instant in 
its full reality and so cannot love his neighbour completely. [my italics] 
 In our age it is impatience, perhaps, which is the more characteristic 
temptation, partly because the historical situation is rather desperate, but mainly 
because for us the problem of faith is not of lapsing into a childish magical conception 
of God but of despair, of believing that God has abandoned us. ―Trust in God and take 
short view [sic],‖ wrote Sidney Smith. …[A]s a motto for the laity in 1950 I cannot 
imagine a better one nor a more terrifying.‖381   
 
The Arcadian and Utopian in ―Vespers,‖ it would seem, display the respective vices of 
laziness and impatience. The second part of the quote above is included in order to connect it 
to Auden‘s linking of despair and totalitarian temptations in the political sphere, of which he 
had warned since the late 1930s. A clear continuity can thereby be established to his political 
analyses of the 1950s. In a 1942 essay, Auden had written that: 
 
Every child, as he wakes into his life, finds a mirror underneath his pillow. Look in it 
he will and must, else he cannot know who he is, a creature fallen from grace, and this 
knowledge is a necessary preliminary to salvation. Yet at the moment that he looks 
into his mirror, he falls into mortal danger, tempted by guilt into a despair which tells 
him that his isolation and abandonment is irrevocable. It is impossible to face such 
abandonment and live, but as long as he gazes into the mirror he need not face it; he 
has at least his image as an illusory companion, so that, if he yields to despair, then he 
can never dare take his eyes off the mirror for an instant. Self-love is the faute-de-
mieux of despair: ―I am so dreadful that neither God nor other men can love me, 
therefore I shall have to love myself.‖382 
 
The totalitarian, he continues, whether ―of the Right or the Left, promises the crowd that if 
only they will all hand in their private mirrors to him, to be melted down into one huge 
mirror, the curse of Narcissus will be taken away.‖383 One of the temptations of 
totalitarianism, in other words, was the prospect it offered of replacing the anxieties of 
individual self-love with the equally false certainty of collective self-love – the certainty of 
the crowd. Fourteen years after the above essay, in a series of aphorisms published in the 
magazine Encounter, Auden returns to the mirror metaphor in almost identical formulations: 
―Every man carries with him through life a mirror, as unique and impossible to get rid of as 
his shadow…The politician, secular or clerical, promises the crowd that, if only they will 
hand in their private mirrors to him, to be melted down into one large public mirror, the curse 
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of Narcissus will be taken away.‖ 384 The sentiment is the same, but the ―tempter‖ has 
changed from a ―totalitarian‖ to, simply, ―politician.‖  A decade after the end of the Second 
World War, Auden still perceived in politics a highly relevant threat of being tempted out of 
personal responsibility. ―The politicians we condemn / Are nothing but our L.C.M.,‖ as he 
had put it in New Year Letter.
385
 (Auden once quoted, with bitter humor, a reply by the 
populist politician Huey Long to the question of whether Fascism would ever come to 
America: ―Sure. Only it will be called Anti-fascism.‖386 Ironically, the magazine in which the 
above warnings about politicians were published, Encounter, later turned out to have been 
secretly funded by the C.I.A., and thus caught up in the U.S. Cold War strategy. As critic Stan 
Smith notes, ―Auden‘s reflections here are not exactly historically innocent.‖387)  
 Smith has argued that Auden‘s concern in the mid-50s was still ―to explain the sorcery 
by which totalitarian political movements mobilize…the self-love‖ of the man in the street in 
projects which would ultimately be ―not only self-destructive but world-destroying.‖388 In 
1950 Auden warns, again, against the kind of despair that makes one vulnerable to the 
―totalitarian temptation‖ – or to an apathy that allows it to grow. Yet even our ―dear old bag 
of a democracy,‖ in ―Vespers,‖ is implicated in the emblematic crime at the heart of history: 
―without a cement of blood (it must be human, it must be innocent) no secular wall will safely 
stand.‖  By ―secular,‖ Auden could here be referring to the Augustinian use of the term, 
meaning temporal, embodied and historical. According to Augustine, ―we live in the 
saeculum, the world of time and space, of history and its sufferings, in which all incarnate 
human existence takes place.‖389 All worldly life, whether or not religious, belonged to the 
civitas terrena, the worldly city; ―No political state, nor even the institutional church, [could] 
be equated with the City of God.‖390 In Auden‘s terms, no Arcadia or Utopia could either, nor 
―our dear old bag of a democracy.‖ This view must be connected with the conviction that all 
―our‖ efforts are, from the outset, imbued with sin; it hinges on the premise of Original Sin. 
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Our cities come into being, like us, in an already Fallen world, in which we must nevertheless 
partake. ―Vespers‖ thus points back to ―Prime‖ and its allusion to the loss of Paradise.  
The phrase ―for a fraction of a second, to remember our victim,‖ placed in the middle 
of one of ―Vesper‘s‖ casual, sprawling lines, is an unassuming admonition, perhaps easily 
overshadowed by the claim in the last two stanzas about the ―cement of blood‖ in our ―secular 
wall.‖ And yet this little reminder is arguably the heart of the poem. ―But still each private 
citizen / Thanks God he‘s not as other men,‖ Auden had written in New Year Letter, and in 
one sense, the preceding lines of ―Vespers‖ can be read as a display of the same vanity; the 
imaginary rivalries and petty distinctions by which we all try to establish our identities. Auden 
tends to be humorous and affectionate rather than acerbic in tone when portraying 
―weaknesses‖ such as these. After all, he does not imagine that we are able to improve 
ourselves much. ―Each has his comic role in life to fill / Though life be neither comic nor a 
game,‖ Auden wrote in a 1938 poem. (CP: 176) Our weaknesses only become serious, in 
Auden‘s vocabulary, in light of the victim: What our ―evasions serve,‖ in Mendelson‘s words, 
were the ―mechanisms of injustice and murder‖ to which real people fall victim, and because 
of which real, innocent people experience real suffering. To ―remember our victim‖ is another 
way for Auden to remind us about those ―absolute values‖ that, in his view, we must assume 
to exist although ―our knowledge of them will remain imperfect,‖ the same values that, to 
him, were inseparable from Judgment. 
 Despite the significance of the references to Abel and Remus in ―Vespers,‖ i.e. victims 
of murderers that went on to become the founders of cities, the reader is nevertheless 
encouraged to view the victim in Horae Canonicae as ―whom you will.‖ By indicating that 
the victim could be anyone, Auden seems to confirm the symbolic role of the victim in the 
sequence. Unlike Abel and Remus, Christ is never named in the poems, and other than the 
title and structure of the sequence, the closest we have come to a direct allusion to the 
Crucifixion so far has been the mention of ―good Friday‖ in ―Terce.‖ Christ was never 
mentioned by name in Auden‘s Christmas Oratorio either (For the Time Being), but there he 
was still alluded to by Simeon as ―He‖ who is ―in no sense a symbol.‖ By sticking to phrases 
such as ―our victim‖ in Horae Canonicae, i.e. in leaning towards a neutral and 
―universalizing‖ language, Auden in practice ensures that here, the immediate associative 
range is open. The nameless space behind ―our victim‖ is left blank for the reader to fill, 
allowing for allegorical and historical as well as religious interpretations. In the aftermath of 
the Second World War, there were plenty of ―unforgiveable crimes‖ to choose from.   
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Auden is, however, as unwilling to name any of these crimes as he is to name the 
victim. In A Certain World, he would write that while ―Christmas and Easter can be subjects 
for poetry, but Good Friday, like Auschwitz, cannot.‖391 A play about Auschwitz, he claimed 
elsewhere, would be ―wicked,‖ for ―author and audience might try to pretend that they are 
morally horrified, but in fact they are passing an entertaining evening together, in the aesthetic 
enjoyment of horrors.‖392 If we take Auden at his word, therefore, Horae Canonicae cannot 
be ―about‖ either Good Friday or the Holocaust. Yet, by borrowing a structure from a ritual 
set of prayers corresponding to the events of Good Friday, and whose major religious purpose 
is to meditate on the significance on the Crucifixion, Auden does allude – to state the obvious 
– to Good Friday. And by having the poems circle around a ―murderous deed‖ involving the 
whole collective, the poems certainly allow for associations to contemporary historical events. 
The speaker in ―Vespers‖ reminds himself to ―remember the victim,‖ but nowhere in the 
sequence does the poet write about the victim. As one critic notes, at ―the heart‖ of this 
central poem is ―a massive absence, an emotional blank.‖393 In this sense, the poems can be 
read as pointing to something outside themselves, outside of the aesthetic sphere: The speaker 
will try to ―remember the victim,‖ but somewhere else than in his poetry. In another sense, the 
poems can be seen as calling attention to their own absence. Where is the victim? Who? 
Readers in search of answers will have to supply their own suggestions.  
Absence of descriptions of horrific deeds was one of the major topics raised at the 
2012 Auden-Arendt Conference Poetics of Anxiety and Security: The Problem of Speech and 
Action in Our Time. In her lecture ―Poetry in Times of Need,‖ Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb 
paraphrases one of the questions that concerned Auden: What is the responsibility of poets, 
and other political thinkers, in times of unprecedented political catastrophe?
394
 Both Auden 
and Arendt, she points out, remained silent about the experiences where they themselves 
personally came closest to the ―catastrophic events of the twentieth century.‖  In their quests 
to develop ―articulate responses to the catastrophic events of the twentieth century,‖ she says, 
both Auden and Arendt confronted the ―limits and incapacities of language.‖ Arendt 
practically never talked about her personal experiences from the internment camp in France in 
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which she ―had the opportunity of spending some time.‖395 Auden, who had written (highly 
allegorical) poems about the Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War, left one 
experience wholly out of his writing: his service with the American military as a Bombing 
Research Analyst in the Morale Division of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. His job had 
been to ―interview German civilians about the effects of Allied bombing on their morale.‖396 
Gottlieb connects Auden‘s and Arendt‘s silence about the catastrophes they ―surveyed and 
survived‖ to one of Arendt‘s insights about the totalitarian horrors: That ―the brutality of 
unimaginable events makes those who survive them into brutes, bereft of language at the very 
moment it may be needed most.‖397 Language, in the face of atrocity, can be rendered 
incapable to communicate. In fact, as Arendt saw it, language was totalitarianism‘s first 
victim. ―Whenever language and action no longer correspond with each other, wherever the 
relationship between speech and action is misunderstood, misrepresented, or obscured, there 
emerge the conditions for brutality.‖398 Arendt had experienced how citizens, once 
reclassified as ―enemy aliens,‖ become vulnerable to evacuation, interment, extermination. 
Totalitarian propaganda and mass indoctrination ―deform and fossify reality to such an extent 
that descriptions of the world cannot be distinguished from proscriptions – for wide scale 
murder.‖399 In response to the totalitarian perversions of language, Gottlieb points out, Auden 
had begun to conceive of his responsibility as a poet, ―in times of unprecedented political 
catastrophe,‖ as someone whose role was to defend language against corruption. This was, he 
told a friend, ―the poet‘s only political duty.‖400 But Auden, like Arendt, did not conceive of 
language as something that could be secured against dishonesty or insincerity. As a poet 
known as a rhetorical virtuoso, Auden knew only too well how easily speech could turn into 
rhetoric. In Arendt‘s terms, speech was ―inherently irresponsible.‖  
 Gottlieb remarks, about Auden‘s For the Time Being, that something is ―missing.‖ 
First of all, the child whom Gabriel announces and about whom Herod worries is ―entirely 
absent,‖ which casts the whole poem, as she sees it, ―into a mood of mourning.‖401 For 
Auden, she argues, whose concept of time in For the Time Being runs counter to all notions of 
history ―on the march‖ or ―in the making,‖ the only access to time not understood in terms of 
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making and marching is in the experience of mourning.
402
 This sheds light on the other 
something missing from that poem, the ―brutal destructions and annihilations that were being 
organized and executed as the [text was] being written,‖ about which the poem ostensibly 
remains silent.
403
 The absent victim in Horae Canonicae can be considered in a similar way; 
as a silence which points to its own absence and cast the poems into a mood of mourning.  
 While, however, the only direct response to the ―historical disaster‖ in the background 
Auden finds in the poems is ―silence,‖ silence is not the answer to the question posed in 
―Nones‖: ―What shall we do until nightfall?‖ If silence was ―all‖ no speech – from the point 
of that first act Arendt alludes to, the first trespass from which ―we would never recover‖ – 
would be possible, and Auden would not be a poet.  In her lecture Susannah Gottlieb draws 
attention to the last line of one of Auden‘s most famous poems, ―In Memory of W. B. Yeats‖ 
(1939). The line in question reads ―Teach the free man how to praise.‖ There is no bridge, 
Gottlieb argues, between the horrors referred to above and the imperative of praise: ―Praise 
was not something a ―free man‖ wanted to do in 1939,‖ or at any time in response to historical 
catastrophes.
404
 Yet praise, she suggests, is a ―response to the irresponsibility of action that 
absorbs into itself this very irresponsibility.‖405 One of the people to perceive this function in 
Auden‘s poetry was Hannah Arendt, who made it into a guiding motif for her memorial essay 
on Auden after his death. What had made Auden a great poet, she begins, was 
 
[T]he unprotesting willingness with which he yielded to the ‗curse‘…of vulnerability 
to ‗human unsuccess‘ on all levels of existence; the crookedness of the desires, the 
infidelities of the heart, the injustices of the world.
406
  
 
The praise which Auden called for, Arendt explains, is a praise ―that pitches itself against all 
that is most unsatisfactory in man‘s condition on this earth and sucks its strength out of the 
wound.‖407 Gottlieb follows this line of thought when she writes that Auden and Arendt saw it 
as possible to ―praise the frustrations of action against the infinitely unsatisfactory historical 
disaster that occupies, and never leaves, the center of both Arendt‘s and Auden‘s articulate 
reflections.‖408 Praise offers no resolution to the ―historical disaster‖ – there is no bridge – nor 
is it directed at them. What praise can do, in Gottlieb‘s words, is not to praise individuals for 
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their actions but to embrace ―the condition of action such that there can be individuals.‖409 
The object of praise, even against the backdrop of totalitarian horrors, are not those horrors 
but the capacity for action (in Arendt‘s definition: freedom), even though that same capacity 
made totalitarian horror possible. The totalitarian attempt to eradicate the ―irresponsibility‖ 
inherent in action represents, in Gottlieb‘s words, ―the intensification of irresponsibility.‖410 
The fact that the Holocaust, for instance, was not planned as a genocide from the start, but 
rather turned into a genocide through a radical escalation of the genocidal impulse inherent in 
totalitarian ideology,
411
 could be read as a grotesque confirmation of this argument: The 
unimaginable extent of the genocide is itself a demonstration of the same ―boundlessness‖ of 
action that all totalitarian movements try to control. To praise the frustrations – the 
unpredictability, irreversibility and boundlessness – of action against historical disaster means 
to reject the totalitarian attempt to achieve control over those frustrations. The act of praise 
directs itself at ―the calamities of action‖ while at the same time embodying those calamities: 
It is a ―frail‖ act, as ―irredeemably faulted as action itself,‖ which directs itself at ―frailty,‖ 
and therefore points towards what Arendt called the primary ―redemptive faculty of action,‖ 
namely forgiveness. It is with these considerations in mind that we must turn to the last poem 
in Auden‘s Horae Canonicae, the in some senses most difficult poem, ―Lauds.‖ The last poem 
in Auden‘s series of reflections about the ―unforgiveable act‖ or historical disaster, is a poem 
of praise.   
 
3.4 Praise what there is for being 
The last poem in Horae Canonicae, ―Lauds,‖ corresponds to the prayer said at daybreak. In 
New Year Letter, ―Day breaks upon the world we know / Of war and wastefulness and 
woe.‖412 Daybreak formed, in that setting, a disillusioning contrast to the vaguely idealistic 
formulations in the preceding lines. In the Divine Office, on the other hand, daybreak is first 
of all an occasion for praise. Within the pattern of the liturgy, the prayer ―Lauds‖ gives 
occasion for the monks to ―chant songs of praise for the wonder and splendor of a new day, 
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the glory of all creation and the glorious gift of light.‖413 Auden‘s poem follows this model, as 
everything related to the deed which resonates through the rest of the sequence is set aside 
and attention turned to the task of ritual prayer. This has caused some critics to dismiss it 
prematurely, as when John Fuller calls it ―merely a decorative postscript.‖414 As we shall see, 
rather, the poem absorbs several of the central themes touched upon in the sequence, and is 
functionally crucial to the poems‘ religious significance. The poem is included in its entirety 
below.  
 
Lauds 
 
Among the leaves the small birds sing; 
The crow of the cock commands awaking: 
In solitude, for company.  
 
Bright shines the sun on creatures mortal; 
Men of their neighbours become sensible: 
In solitude, for company. 
 
Men of their neighbours become sensible; 
God bless the Realm, God bless the People: 
In solitude, for company. 
 
Already the mass-bell goes ding-ding; 
The dripping mill-wheel is again turning: 
In solitude, for company. 
 
God bless the Realm, God bless the People; 
God bless this green world temporal: 
In solitude, for company. 
 
The dripping mill-wheel is again turning; 
Among the leaves the small birds sing: 
In solitude, for company.      (CP: 641-642) 
 
 
The poem derives its form from a thirteenth-century Galican cossante.
415
 The circular pattern 
of the seven stanzas, where every line is repeated except for number 4 and 14, reflects the 
cyclical character of the day covered in the sequence as a whole. ―Lauds‖ is the prayer set at 
dawn, and by placing it last Auden evokes associations of beginnings and awakening, rather 
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than the ―total absence‖ and nothingness referred to in the night poem ―Compline.‖ The 
implications of these associative beginnings significantly inform my reading of ―Lauds.‖ In 
the following, I will discuss the significance of ―Lauds‖ as a poem of praise in the context of 
Horae Canonicae.  
 
To begin with, this is the only poem in the series that is completely impersonal: there is 
neither an ―I‖ nor a ―we‖ present. This impersonality reinforces the timeless, ritual aspects of 
the prayers from which the sequence borrows its structure. The repetition of ―In solitude, for 
company‖ at the end of each stanza could be seen as resembling the response of a choir to a 
soloist (chorus to a verse) or that of a congregation to a preacher. It has the ring of something 
said together, a confirmation of ―company‖ from the solitude of the individual, and would tie 
in with Auden‘s appreciation of a ―verbal structure that is communal.‖ Still, there is no 
particular ―we‖ or ―ours.‖ If, for Hannah Arendt, praise could be understood as a ―response to 
the irresponsibility of action that absorbs into itself this very irresponsibility,‖ the poem, 
considered as an impersonal, collective act of praise, can be read as a self-reflective 
acknowledgment of the calamities of action. According to Gottlieb, Auden can be seen as 
praising the calamities of action – uncertainty, dependency, indeterminacy, unpredictability, 
irreversibility, irresponsibility, boundlessness and ―helplessness‖ are all words that have been 
used – because ―this condition alone makes possible fellowship.‖416  The repetition in 
―Lauds‖ of the words ―for company‖ lends strength to this interpretation. A ritual also 
belongs to several generations, and as such may also be said to connect the participants to the 
historical past and future; creating the sense of participating in a chain of continuous events 
whose reach in time is known to no one.  New individuals and communities may be imagined 
as coming into being after one‘s own subjective passing into ―total absence,‖ participating in 
the same or similar rituals. For Hannah Arendt, the essential characteristic of human 
existence, the capacity for action or the ability to begin, was rooted in the fact of natality. The 
birth of a new person embodied the very principle of beginning, for it meant not only the 
beginning of something but ―of somebody, who is a beginner himself.‖417 If the novelty of 
action or the capacity for new beginnings is the most unique characteristic of human 
existence, the idea of future beginnings contained in the generational dimension of a 
collective ritual could be seen as an affirmation of the individual participant‘s temporal –and 
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temporary – existence. Without the frailty and eventual end of one‘s own existence, life 
would be resigned to the endless repetitions and cyclicality of nature. 
 Secondly, the ritual act of praise – embracing the calamities of action because they 
enable fellowship and new beginnings – can be linked to Auden‘s understanding of Agape. As 
we know, Auden‘s ideal society was one in which ―love for one‘s neighbor can express itself 
the most freely,‖ that is to say, a worldly ―city‖ approaching the conditions of a true 
community: ―A group of people associated on the basis of common love.‖  In ―Lauds,‖ ―Men 
of their neighbours become sensible,‖ in a parallel to the process of awakening portrayed in 
―Prime,‖ but also in the Christian sense of acknowledging others as real and unique subjects 
in their own right, what Martin Buber would call ―Thous.‖ From that point of recognition, it is 
possible for Auden‘s ―man‖ to choose out of his own free will to do what he must, namely to 
love his neighbor. To recall Simeon‘s Meditation in For the Time Being, human history was 
―predictable in the degree to which all men love themselves, and spontaneous in the degree to 
which each man loves God and through Him his neighbor.‖ For Auden the possibility of new 
beginnings, the spontaneity inherent in all acts of ―love,‖ would have to be rooted in the 
prospect of divine redemption. In ―Lauds,‖ however, the line ―God bless the Realm, God 
bless the People‖ is placed after ―Men of their neighbours become sensible,‖ perhaps 
indicating the order of things: First when people recognize, or try, the realness of their 
neighbors, does the possibility of redemption arise. ―Sensible‖ here also celebrates the 
―body‘s senses as a medium of faith and charity.‖418 The physical existence of the body was 
as important in Auden‘s faith, and as deserving of blessing, as man‘s ―spiritual‖ existence, his 
imagination and consciousness. 
Horae Canonicae, thirdly, deals with the tension between natural and historical time. 
History was the ―realm of unique, voluntary, irreversible events that occur in linear time,‖ 
while nature was the ―realm of recurring, involuntary, reversible events that occur in cyclical 
time.‖419 Human experience occurs in both these realms. When God is called upon in ―Lauds‖ 
to bless the Realm and the People, the prayer addresses both the natural and the historical 
dimension of human experience. The sun that shines ―on creatures mortal,‖ the crow of the 
cock and the small birds all belong to the realm of natural processes, and are all praised. The 
dripping mill-wheel and the mass-bell indicate the human world of work and worship, the 
realm of willed, historical acts. In the end, Mendelson notes, the prayer in ―Lauds‖ asks 
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―benediction on two kinds of time, the cyclical time of the green world and the historical time 
of the temporal world.‖420   
 In Auden‘s inaugural lecture as Professor of Poetry at Oxford in 1956, he ends on a 
statement about the fundamental duty of all poetry: ―there is one thing that all poetry must do; 
it must praise all it can for being and for happening.‖421 This echoes a line from the poem 
―Precious Five,‖ written in 1950, in which Auden praises the five senses with reference to 
―That singular command / I do not understand, / Bless what there is for being.‖ (CP: 591) In 
fact, blessing appears everywhere in Auden‘s poetry, before and after his conversion.422 
Arthur Kirsch has pointed out that Auden found ―belief in the goodness of existence‖ an 
―assumption necessary to the writing of poetry.‖423 As Gottlieb perceived, however, this 
should not be taken to mean that Auden saw it as necessary – or possible – to praise 
―everything.‖ In her words, ―nothing that destroys the plural world of appearances‖ could be 
praised.
424
 This excludes, in other words, the possibility of ―blessing‖ anything which 
threatened to destroy the ―common world,‖ the world of speech and action. Combine this with 
Auden‘s definition of praying as ―paying attention to‖ or ―listening‖ to someone or something 
other than oneself
425
 and we get even closer to his understanding of the task of poetry: 
―Whenever a man so concentrates his attention—be it on a landscape, or a poem or a 
geometrical problem or an idol or the True God—that he completely forgets his own ego and 
desires in listening to what the other has to say to him, he is praying."
426
 ―Lauds‖ is an 
example of both praying and praising. The refrain ―celebrates the liturgy, a thing done 
together,‖427 In New Year Letter, ―aloneness‖ was stated to be ―man‘s real condition.‖ While 
that might not have changed, the emphasis has, as the (imagined) participants of the collective 
ritual pray ―In solitude, for company.‖ When writing about social and interpersonal 
relationships, Auden often referred to the Biblical phrase that ―it is not good for man to be 
alone.‖ In the context of Horae Canonicae and its exploration of the ―city,‖ this can be kept in 
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mind as a premise: each individual is born into a social world, for better and for worse, and 
that should be seen as a cause for praise, even in the wake of atrocity. ―Men of their 
neighbours become sensible / God bless the Realm, God bless the People.‖ Mendelson takes 
Auden‘s choice of the word ―People‖ here to mean simply ―a plurality made up of persons, 
not an abstract impersonal public.‖428 Persons, in Auden‘s vocabulary, enter communities, but 
I read the word ―People‖ here as referring equally much to the ―city‖ itself, the neutral 
plurality that individuals can make into a community if – and only if – they choose to act as 
persons. As I see it, the prayer for blessing here can be read, in other words, as a blessing of 
the potential for community, the ―uncertainty and indeterminacy‖ that makes possible new 
beginnings: Not any particular existing community, but the potential to create one.  ―In 
solitude, for company‖ quietly unites the private and public worlds of Auden‘s poems in a 
communal verbal structure.  
The emphasis on communal praise in ―Lauds‖ achieves a particular significance in the 
context of Horae Canonicae. The poem marks the end of a series of meditations upon the role 
of the victim, the meaning of the sacrifice of an innocent as embodied in the Crucifixion. How 
does the poem – how does praise – relate to ―our victim,‖ to ―this death,‖ ―the blood dry on 
the grass‖ and the ―cement of blood‖ as the foundations of civilization?  For an answer to this, 
we have to return to the question of Original Sin and see how it is connected, in Auden‘s 
framework of ideas, to the possibility of redemption. 
The Crucifixion can be understood, within the framework of Christianity, as the 
ultimate consequence of human sin. With Auden‘s definitions in mind, it also functions as an 
embodiment of that ―unique class of crime,‖ murder, which constitutes an ―offense against 
society‖ as well as against the victim and against God. According to Christian scripture, 
Christ‘s voluntary sacrifice turns the Crucifixion into an ―eschatological triumph,‖ 
demonstrating the possibility of ―ultimate reconciliation.‖429 As I showed in chapter one, 
Auden became convinced, in the forties, that the only answer to the existential anxiety and 
despair arising out of the condition of sinfulness was Christian faith. ―The power by which, 
without blinding himself to his anxiety, he is nevertheless still able to choose, is religious 
faith.‖430 In 1950 this conviction is echoed in the essay ―The Things Which are Caesar‘s,‖ in 
which Auden once again connects the demands on the individual living in time – the 
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challenge in being a person   –with sin and the necessity to have faith in (ultimate) 
forgiveness:  
A Christian is at once commanded to accept his creatureliness, both natural and 
historical, not to attempt to escape into a fantastic world untrammelled [sic] by the 
realities of space and time, and forbidden to make an idol of nature or history. It might 
be said that for him only two temporal categories are significant, the present instance 
and eternity. The present instance is, of course, the result of the past; the command to 
accept this world exactly as it is without bowdlerization would be impossible but for 
the promise that our sins can be forgiven, for the burden of guilt for one‘s own sins 
and of resentment for the sins of others which have made the present instant what it is 
would [otherwise] be intolerable.
431
   
The murderous deed in Horae Canonicae embodies this ―burden of guilt.‖  Curtis has argued 
that the central problem in the sequence is in fact that of sin, ―which is occasioned by the 
paradox of human freedom and finiteness and the various ways in which we either deny 
contingency or seek to escape the responsibility of freedom.‖432 Auden, convinced of the 
reality of Original Sin, characteristically tried to imagine what his own role would have been 
if he had been present on Good Friday: 
Just as we are all, potentially, in Adam when he fell, so we were all, potentially, in 
Jerusalem on that first Good Friday before there was an Easter, a Pentecost, a 
Christian, or a Church. It seems to me worthwhile asking ourselves who we should 
have been and what we should have been doing. None of us, I‘m certain, will imagine 
himself as one of the Disciples, cowering in agony of spiritual despair and physical 
terror. Very few of us are big wheels enough to see ourselves as Pilate, or good 
churchmen enough to see ourselves as a member of the Sanhedrin. In my most 
optimistic mood I see myself as a Hellenized Jew from Alexandria visiting an 
intellectual friend. We are walking along, engaged in philosophical argument. Our 
path takes us past the base of Golgotha. Looking up, we see an all too familiar sight – 
three crosses surrounded by a jeering crowd. Frowning with prim distaste, I say, ‗It‘s 
disgusting the way the mob enjoy such things. Why can‘t the authorities execute 
people humanely and in private by giving them hemlock to drink, as they did with 
Socrates?‘ Then, averting my eyes from the disagreeable spectacle, I resume our 
fascinating discussion about the True, the Good and the Beautiful. 
 
If we recall Auden‘s interest in the New Yorker cartoon depicting the little man fighting the 
octopus (chapter 1, page 17), we see some clear parallels. In his analysis of the caricature, 
Auden identified the failure of anyone to step in and help – the failure of Agape, in practice – 
as an unwillingness to be persons (individuals).   
The poems in Horae Canonicae were written in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and the Holocaust. Auden, who had been deployed to survey the damage in Germany 
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after the war, had seen some of the damage first hand.
433
 Susannah Gottlieb, as discussed 
above, argued that the function of praise, in Auden‘s poetry, should be understood as a 
conscious response to the ―catastrophes of totalitarian domination,‖ the ―historical disaster‖ of 
the 20
th
 century. In ―Memorial for the City,‖ another poem ―consciously written in the years 
after Auschwitz,‖434 Auden writes: ―As we bury our dead / We know without knowing there 
is reason for what we bear, / That our hurt is not a desertion, that we are to pity / Neither 
ourselves nor our city; / Whoever the searchlights catch, whatever the loudspeakers blare, / 
We are not to despair.‖ (CP: 592) In that poem, Auden tried to articulate the historical disaster 
in metonymical images: ―On the right a village is burning, in a market-town to the left / The 
soldiers fire, the mayor bursts into tears…‖ (CP: 592) In Horae Canonicae descriptions of the 
central event, the crime itself, are entirely absent. Instead, the focus is turned towards the 
other inhabitants of the city in which the deed takes place: The professional participants in the 
murder, the expressionless crowd and those observers who, like Auden thought he himself 
would have, avert their eyes from the ―disagreeable spectacle.‖  
The idea that we were ―all, potentially, in Jerusalem on that first Good Friday‖ is 
another expression of the conviction that men are equal ―not in their capacities and virtues but 
in their natural bias towards evil.‖435 Each individual has their ―historical share of care‖ for 
the civitas terrena, the ―lying self-made city.‖ (CP: 628) To take on that responsibility, or to 
take ―responsibility for time,‖ as Auden put it in a later poem,436 would be impossible ―but for 
the promise that our sins can be forgiven.‖ For Hannah Arendt, the predicaments of action – 
uncertainty and irreversibility – could, similarly, only be redeemed through the faculties of 
promising and forgiveness. Forgiving, she writes: 
is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, 
unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its 
consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven. The freedom 
contained in Jesus‘ teachings of forgiveness is the freedom from vengeance, which 
incloses [sic] both doer and sufferer in the relentless automatism of the action 
process…437 
Where vengeance would be predictable, forgiveness is always spontaneous. Whereas 
vengeance is predictable, characterized by some of that automatism that belongs to the natural 
realm, forgiveness is and has to be an act of free will. It is ―the only reaction that acts in an 
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unexpected way,‖ the only reaction that ―retains…something of the original character of 
action,‖ perpetuating the principle of beginning.438  Again, 
Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take 
initiative, are prompted into action. [Initium] ergo ut esset, creates est homo, ante 
quem nullus fuit (―that there be a beginning, man was created before whom there was 
nobody‖), said Augustine in his political philosophy. The beginning is not the same as 
the beginning of the world; it is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who 
is a beginner himself. With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into 
the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of 
freedom was created when man was created but not before.
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Forgiveness, as Arendt saw it, is the faculty which makes beginnings possible, by interrupting 
the otherwise endless chain of reactions. Where vengeance perpetuates a past chain of 
reactions, forgiveness puts an end to them, thereby initiating a new series of events. As I 
understand it, Auden‘s view of the time being, of personal acts and choices in the difficult 
―Now,‖ can be tied to his view of redemption – or Judgment – in the same way. In his 
investigation of the ―theology of history‖ in Horae Canonicae, Jan Curtis quotes another of 
Auden‘s theological influences, Paul Tillich: ―History has a turning point or a center in which 
the meaning of history appears, overcoming the self-destructive trend of the historical process 
and creating something new which cannot be frustrated by the circular motion of nature.‖440 In 
Christianity that center is Christ, in whose sacrifice ―the eschaton, the fulfillment of history 
has already occurred.‖441 In other words, it is the forgiveness of sins embodied in Christ‘s 
voluntary sacrifice – the Crucifixion – which allows for the creation of something new in the 
realm of history. The canonical hours or Divine Office, Curtis argues, constitute a ―re-
enactment of the history of salvation.‖442 Modeled on the framework of the Divine Office, 
Horae Canonicae presents an analogy to that same history of salvation. 
The idea of salvation or redemption in fact impacted directly on Auden‘s view of his 
own poetic practice. ―Every beautiful poem,‖ he wrote in 1950, presents ―an analogy of 
forgiveness of sins.‖443 The ―formal order‖ of a poem echoed the state of harmony that would 
govern in a true community. As he devotes a generous portion of New Year Letter to argue, 
―Art is not life and cannot be / A midwife to society.‖444 In 1942 he had written that art 
―cannot make a man want to become good, but it can prevent him from imagining that he 
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already is; it cannot give him faith in God, but it can show him his despair.‖445 In 1956, the 
poem‘s foremost duty has become to ―praise what there is for being and happening.‖ The span 
between these two quotes indicates the direction in which Auden‘s faith had developed in the 
decade following the Second World War: While still rooted in a conviction of sinfulness and 
the despair such a condition inevitably entailed, the imperative to – nevertheless – praise had 
come to share the central spot among the doctrines of Auden‘s faith. The severe and 
absolutely passionate Kierkegaardian position from the 40s has given way to an arguably 
humbler rephrasing emphasizing communal ritual and allowing for not only the endurance but 
the embrace of the calamities of action.  
The exploration of historical and natural time in Horae Canonicae ultimately frames 
the Now in which all human beings must act. As individuals who ―know‖ that they have 
―fallen from grace,‖ the inhabitants of the City in Horae Canonicae carry a burden of guilt 
and a fear of complicity in the ―dying / Which the coming day will ask.‖ But trying to escape 
the ―predicament,‖ as we remember from the discussion of Niebuhr in chapter 1, can only 
worsen it; the citizens wish to deny the realities of the present, but, as Mendelson puts it, their 
―evasions serve…the mechanisms of injustice and murder.‖446 For the Christian, Auden 
wrote, ―only two temporal categories are significant, the present instance and eternity.‖ His 
task was to  
act now, with an eye fixed, neither nostalgically on the past nor dreamily on some 
ideal future, but on eternity – ―redeeming the time‖ – in the words of Sidney Smith, he 
is to ―trust in God and take short views.‖447 
 
In Gottlieb‘s interpretation, Auden calls on his ―fellow-creature‖ to praise the uncertainty and 
irreversibility of action – the condition of the Now – because ―this condition alone makes 
possible fellowship.‖  The calamities of action also made possible new beginnings. For Auden 
and Arendt both, the ―faculty‖ or prospect which continually made beginnings possible within 
the chain of historical, unilinear time, was forgiveness.  
The subtitle of Horae Canonicae is ―Immolatus Vicerit,‖ which means ―the victim 
triumphs,‖ or ―the sacrificed one triumphs.‖448 Biblically, the crucified Jesus is ―victorious‖ in 
two senses: His sacrifice redeems the sins of mankind, and he ―conquers‖ death in the 
Resurrection. In Regions of Sorrow, Susannah Gottlieb draws attention to the way forgiveness 
and resurrection tends to appear as parallels in Auden‘s poetry, which leads her to suggest the 
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following ―conclusion‖ in terms of how Auden perceived forgiveness: ―[T]here is nothing 
simple about the act of forgiving faults; it is no less miraculous and no less transformative 
than the paramount and paradigmatic messianic moment: the resurrection of the dead.‖449 
Forgiveness, in Arendt‘s sense, put an end to the past chain of reactions and made it possible 
to begin again; it perpetuated the principle of beginning embodied in action. Arendt saw 
Auden‘ praise as a response to the irresponsibility of action which ―pitches itself against all 
that is most unsatisfactory in man‘s condition.‖ To Auden, the duty of poetry had become, 
precisely, to praise, and beautiful poetry presented an ―analogy of forgiveness of sins.‖ To 
conclude my discussion of ―Lauds‖ and Horae Canonicae, I want to bring in a quote from one 
of the last books Auden published, a book of quotations accompanied by his own commentary 
titled A Certain World (1970). As he explained in the foreword, he considered the compilation 
―a sort of autobiography,‖ a map of his world. Here, he has included a quote from the 
anthropologist and natural science writer Loren Eiseley, describing the attack on a nestling by 
a raven. Below is the quote in full. 
 
When I awoke, dimly aware of some commotion and outcry in the clearing, the light 
was slanting down through the pines in such a way that the glade was lit like some vast 
cathedral. I could see the dust motes of wood pollen in the long shaft of light, and 
there on the extended branch sat an enormous raven with a red and squirming nestling 
in its beak. 
 The sound that awoke me was the outraged cries of the nestling‘s parents, who 
flew helplessly in circles about the clearing. The sleek black monster was indifferent 
to them. He gulped, whetted his beak on the dead branch a moment and sat still. Up to 
that point the little tragedy had followed the usual pattern. But suddenly, out of all that 
area of woodland, a soft sound of complaint began to rise.  
Into the glade fluttered small birds of half a dozen varieties drawn by the 
anguished cries of the tiny parents. No one dared to attack the raven. But they cried 
there in some instinctive common misery, the bereaved and unbereaved. The glade 
filled with their soft rustling and their cries. They fluttered as though to point their 
wings at the murderer. There was a dim intangible ethic he had violated, that they 
know. He was a bird of death. 
 And he, the murderer, the black bird at the heart of life, sat on there, glistening 
in the common light, formidable, unperturbed, untouchable. 
 The sighing died. It was then I saw the judgment. It was the judgment of life 
against death. I will never see it again so forcefully presented. I will never hear it again 
in notes so tragically prolonged. For in the midst of protest, they forgot the violence. 
There, in the clearing the crystal note of a song sparrow lifted hesitantly in the hush. 
And, finally, after painful fluttering, another took the song, and then another, the song 
passing from one bird to another, doubtfully at first, as though some evil thing was 
being slowly forgotten. Till suddenly they took heart and sang from many throats 
joyously together as birds are known to sing. They sang because life is sweet and 
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sunlight beautiful. They sang under the brooding shadow of the raven. In simple truth 
they had forgotten the raven, for they were singers of life, and not of death.
450
 
 
Read as an analogy, this quote can be seen to reveal quite a lot about Auden‘s view of the role 
of poetry. The ―black bird at the heart of life‖ allows, within the framework presented in this 
thesis, for a range of interpretations: Original Sin, the catastrophe at the centre of Auden‘s 
(and Arendt‘s) historical reflections, the Crucifixion, the calamities of action or death itself. 
The quote abosrbs the fullness of the mourning that Gottlieb read in For the Time Being, and 
which the absence in Horae Canonicae points to. Above all, it portrays – not identically, but 
analogously – the kind of praise Auden thought that poetry could be, performed ―under the 
brooding shadow of the raven‖: A praise of ―what there is for being,‖ of everything that 
constitutes the common world, and of the capacity for new beginnings. Eisely calls it ―the 
judgment of life against death,‖ Auden calls it forgiveness or redemption. As a Christian he 
saw the prospect of forgiveness as embodied in the sacrifice of the Crucifixion. For Arendt, 
the capacity for beginnings was ―ontologically rooted in natality,‖ the fact that new 
individuals keep being born into the world, themselves embodying the capacity for 
beginnings. In her formulation, the ―judgment of life against death‖ sounded like this: ―Man, 
although he must die, is not born in order to die but in order to begin.‖ For Arendt, too, 
forgiveness was what enabled new beginnings within the stream of history. By allowing 
individuals to start again, forgiveness could, in Arendt‘s sense, perhaps be understood as 
―resurrecting‖ the capacity for action.  
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Conclusion 
In the first chapter of my thesis, I investigated the function of Original Sin in Auden‘s 
political philosophy in the early 1940s, particularly his analysis of the dynamics of liberalism 
and fascism. Auden sees the ―failure of liberalism‖ to withstand fascism as rooted in a 
misguided optimistic assumption about the fundamental goodness of human nature.  He 
perceives in fascism a ―romantic pessimistic reaction‖ against the failure of liberalism to 
produce the good society, one which is characteristically modern in nature. I describe the 
mechanics of this argument with reference to Auden‘s analysis of Hitler, his critique of 
romanticism and his understanding of modernity. With reference to the historian of fascism 
Roger Griffin, I show how some more recent perspectives upon the core dynamics of fascism 
helps shed light on Auden‘s analysis of fascism, particularly with regards to its conception of 
time.  I further showed how Auden‘s understanding of sin is crucially influenced by his 
reading of the contemporary theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as the Christian 
existentialism of Sören Kierkegaard. With reference to For the Time Being and New Year 
Letter, I illustrated how Niebuhr‘s and Kierkegaard‘s influence manifest in Auden‘s poetry 
during the early 40s. I place particular emphasis on the link, as Auden saw it, between 
Original Sin and the twentieth-century totalitarian temptation, and how it relates to his view 
of the uniquely modern experience of time.  
I have demonstrated how Auden‘s adoption of the doctrine of Original Sin underpins a 
complex defense of democracy as opposed to fascism   Based on readings of  New Year 
Letter, For the Time Being and Audens central prose texts from the early 40s, I show how 
Auden‘s rejection of fascism is rooted in his recognition of an ―equality of wretchedness‖: 
―Humans are equal not in capacities and virtues but in their natural bias towards evil,‖ he 
writes, and concludes that no individual or group can claim the kind of moral superiority that 
would justify.    
While rejecting fascism and expressing a clear preference for democratic governance, 
Auden remains critical of liberalism, something which becomes especially clear in For the 
Time Being.  In the last parts of the chapter I take one step further and explore Auden‘s 
―counter-vision‖ or anti-totalitarian vision; his understanding of a good community based on 
the Christian notion of Agape. With emphasis on Auden‘s existentialist notion of personal 
choice, I show how he links the concept of Agape to Original Sin, to the forming of 
communities, and to the idea of the ―time being.‖  
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In my second chapter I continue to explore Auden‘s notion of the time being and its 
anti-totalitarian implications from a slightly different angle. The chapter is devoted to the 
political philosopher Hannah Arendt‘s theory of action. 
 Arendt sees action as the most characteristic faculty of human existence. Her analysis 
of action becomes the cornerstone in a philosophical framework wherein the human capacity 
for promising and forgiveness become central constitutive principles.  Inspired by the scholar 
of philosophy Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb, I show how Arendt‘s emphasis on forgiveness 
and promising led to a view of politics fundamentally different from that which underlies 
fascist and totalitarian ideologies, because it is based on a recognition and embrace of 
interdependence, uncertainty and helplessness. Her interpretation of promising and 
forgiveness also helps shed crucial light on the link, in Auden’s framework of ideas, between 
Original Sin and the role of forgiveness  in Christianity. Her understanding of action as 
beginning is shown, in chapter 3, to be directly relevant to Auden‘s time being and his view of 
the ideal community. This becomes especially clear when Arendt‘s Augustinian-inspired 
writing on beginnings is compared to Auden‘s understanding of the role of praise.  
 This chapter should be considered as a kind of interlude in the thesis, a theoretical 
bridge. First of all, I argue that Arendt‘s action illuminates the role of forgiveness in Auden‘s 
schema of Original Sin, democracy and faith in a Christian Judgment. Secondly, by framing 
Auden‘s time being in terms of Arendt‘s action, I am preparing the way for my third chapter, 
in which the act plays a central and religiously significant role.  
In chapter 3, I looked at Horae Canonicae, a sequence of poems Auden wrote between 
1949 and 1953. Horae Canonicae is modeled on the Liturgical Offices of the Catholic 
Church, whose central function is to induce reflection upon the significance of the 
Crucifixion. The poems in the sequence revolve around an unnamed act which is revealed to 
be a murder or sacrifice, and which alludes to the Crucifixion. The sequence was therefore 
ideal for an investigation of the continuities and changes in Auden‘s religious views. My aim 
in this chapter was to revisit the questions of sin, democracy and the time being in this 
sequence, written after the Second World War. I have argued that Horae Canonicae explores 
the community in action: what it means to act, what it means to act collectively, and what an 
―unforgivable act‖ can be said to mean in this context. Using Arendt‘s theory of action as 
beginnings I have demonstrated how the act in Horae Canonicae can be linked to Auden‘s 
idea of the Last Judgment and Redemption.  
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